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**Race beyond the Plantation:
Slavery and Freedom in Colonial Santo Domingo**

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In recent decades, scholars have fully discredited the notion common in the early and mid-twentieth century that the history of race and slavery in Latin America was both fundamentally different from and relatively benign compared with that of the United States.¹ Yet the idea that race and slavery were the same phenomena across time, space, and mode of production (namely, plantation, cattle, gold mining, or urban artisan economies) is also untenable.² One key feature of slavery that did vary significantly across the Americas from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century was the potential for slaves to gain their freedom through legal manumission or by running away. In the Greater Spanish Caribbean, the relative feasibility of slaves' self-purchase, escape, and gratuitous manumission led to far larger free populations of African descent than those that formed in the British colonies and eventually the United States. Indeed, in Santo Domingo, Puerto Rico, Venezuela, and Caribbean Colombia, free people of color constituted the plurality or even majority of society at certain points (a feature that also characterized large regions, and ultimately all, of Brazil). By contrast, free people of color generally composed approximately 3 percent of the population in anglophone American slave systems.³ Cuba represents an intermediate case, where the free population of color represented around 15 percent of the colony (and a minority of all people of color) in the nineteenth century, though the eastern region was more similar to the rest of the Spanish Caribbean.⁴ This essay explores the hypothesis that the racial norms and meanings consolidated in the Americas after 1492--ones that equated African descent with slavery and

European descent with liberty and mastery--were confused, altered, or subverted when free people of color constituted a large portion of society long before the abolition of slavery.⁵

Historian Ira Berlin has stressed the contrasting economic, social, legal, and cultural forms characterizing "slave societies" versus "societies with slaves" in the Americas.⁶ The latter--where slavery was not central to the economy--were characterized, he shows, by greater ambiguity and indeterminacy in the meanings of "blackness" and "whiteness" and even of "slave" and "free."⁷ The history of the Spanish Caribbean suggests that we might add a third ideal-type to this schema, and that is societies in which a large portion of the population were free persons of African descent. Attention to the history and consequences of this demographic pattern in largely Afro-American societies may help explain a seemingly even greater indeterminacy of race across much of the history of the Spanish Caribbean (and also Brazil) since 1492. Such analysis may also help explain the relative weakness of collective racial identity--that is, of a sense of shared experience, common history, and "imagined community" on the basis of color or African genealogy--that has characterized nations like the Dominican Republic up to the present day.⁸

The greater frequency of manumission in Latin America was one of the factors leading historian Frank Tannenbaum and others in the early and mid-twentieth century to imagine that Latin America had experienced less brutal slave regimes than anglophone America and continued to be characterized by a lesser degree of racism. A subsequent generation of scholars effectively refuted these conclusions. The greater prospects for manumission in Latin America, and, more generally, for inclusion of people of African descent in colonial and national institutions did not, as has been repeatedly shown, signify less racial hierarchy or less brutality against slaves.⁹ Nonetheless, manumission and forms of racial integration did have important effects--including the fostering of particular modes of racism--that, along with their causes, should be analyzed by historians.

Thus this essay explores the history of colonial Santo Domingo to throw light on two sets of questions. First, what conditions account for the disparate histories of slave manumission and escape across the Americas? To what extent were these histories a product of divergent laws and ideologies

or, rather, the product of varying economic conditions and contrasting political realities and struggles? And second, how might different patterns of slave manumission and escape and varying sizes of the free population of African descent have conditioned the contours of historically specific racial identities, meanings, and modes of racism? In this essay, I offer some of my initial hypotheses and emerging perspectives on these questions, which form part of a broader project on race in the greater Spanish Caribbean.

The Dominican case is central to this project because it is here that the features of racial formation common to the early Spanish Caribbean, with its large free populations of African descent, developed most dramatically. Despite having been composed mostly of enslaved Africans (roughly 75 percent of the population) in the mid-sixteenth century--and not receiving any subsequent great waves of European immigration--Santo Domingo never consolidated a "slave society" nor an enduring black identity linking people of African descent. Indeed, by the late 1600s, the Americas' first plantation society had become one in which free people of color composed the majority of the population--mostly independent peasants--some 150 years before the abolition of slavery.¹⁰

The Dominican Republic is also a particularly rich site for research in the Spanish Caribbean because, unlike Cuba, and to a large extent Puerto Rico, Santo Domingo was not transformed in the 1800s into a slave plantation economy--a historic divergence that was largely the consequence of the differential impact of the Haitian Revolution on these neighboring territories. While 19th-century Cuba (at least until the 1870s) dramatizes the increased racialization of politics, law, and culture transpiring in the transition from a "society with slaves" to a "slave society,"¹¹ the Dominican Republic's concomitant history, in which after the 1500s a "slave society" never developed, provides a window onto a type of ostensible racelessness, not in all senses of course, but in terms of a nation essentially without either imagined communities or laws structured by color or genealogy.¹²

The history of Santo Domingo suggests that in certain respects Tannenbaum was right that the overall history of race and slavery in colonial Latin America differed from what emerged in the

rest of the Americas by the 1700s,¹³ but that he was wrong about the reasons for this distinctiveness. In his explanation for the comparative frequency of manumission and relative integration of people of African descent in Latin America, Tannenbaum appears to have overestimated the role of imperial discourses and legacies and underestimated local economic trajectories as well as political struggles and realities, namely, pressures from people of African descent themselves. In contrast to what Tannenbaum argued, Spanish American laws were, as a whole, highly and openly racist. It was more in practice that there was relative racial fluidity and mobility in Latin America,¹⁴ and this, one could argue, only in particular contexts beyond the plantation or in post-plantation periods. Furthermore, as we will see, when Spain envisaged a (new) slave plantation economy for its Caribbean possessions in the late 1700s (some 250 years after colonial rule began), colonial officials evinced a clear desire to limit, subordinate, and control the free population of color. But in Santo Domingo, those efforts were largely in vain.¹⁵ As a result, colonial Santo Domingo would produce a powerful legacy of contradiction for the Dominican Republic, mixing racial hierarchy with racial integration, racist laws with comparatively fluid practices, and racial slavery (slavery effectively limited to one putative race)--a history that really begins in Santo Domingo--with the deracialization of freedom.

Slavery and freedom in Santo Domingo

At the dawn of European colonialism, the island of Santo Domingo, or Española, became the cradle of modernity in what Spanish colonists referred to as the "New World." Although this period has largely been forgotten in the historiography of slavery, Santo Domingo was both the initial venue for modern transoceanic colonialism and the site for the earliest sugar mill complexes in the Americas.¹⁶ The colony's sugar industry boomed between 1520 and 1600 via the systematic exploitation of enslaved Africans, as well as, particularly in the industry's early stages in the 1520s and 1530s, enslaved Indians (most of whom had been captured from the Bahamas, the lesser Antilles, and the northern coast of South America).¹⁷ Spanish records indicate that by the 1530s,

there were between 30 and 40 sugar mills in operation in any given year.¹⁸ And annual sugar production reportedly reached several thousand tons at the industry's height in the mid-sixteenth century.¹⁹ Roughly 2.5 million pounds were exported to Seville every year, while much was also marketed locally in the Caribbean or sold as contraband to European rivals.²⁰ In 1568, *Oidor* (Justice) Juan de Echagoian reported to the King of Spain that among the more than 30 mills then in service in Española, two belonging to one wealthy Spaniard were together exploiting 900 slaves--an impressive number for plantations at any point in world history. The rest of the estates, he recounted, were worked by between one and three hundred slaves (with the mean probably closer to the former figure). Altogether, Echagoian stated, there were some 20,000 slaves in the colony, working not only on the sugar plantations, but also on ranches and other rural estates, and as servants and urban laborers (some 2,000 in the capital).²¹ At this time, others estimated a far smaller number of Spaniards living on the island, approximately 6,000, and identified a mere 500 "Indians" under colonial rule--a shocking number given a contact population still estimated today to have been in the hundreds of thousands.²² (Some Indian slaves and runaways and doubtless many persons of partial Indian descent were not included, it seems, in these mid-sixteenth century estimates of "Indians."²³) Officials also reported thousands of runaway black slaves and a great number of "free blacks" (*negros horros*).²⁴ Such demographic accounts help explain why in the 1500s Spanish chronicler Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo dubbed Santo Domingo "a new Guinea."²⁵

Yet at the end of the sixteenth century, Santo Domingo's sugar industry and wealthy and powerful planter elite collapsed as quickly and dramatically as they had emerged for reasons that remain far from obvious.²⁶ The colony fell into commercial decline and what many historians have labeled a "century of misery," a period of "historical regression" from Santo Domingo's putative splendor in the 1500s when it was at the vanguard of expanding global capital.²⁷ The end of the plantation economy was, however, a boon for the vast majority of the population, who were slaves. The decline of the plantation economy left open-range cattle ranches, or *hatos*, as the only real commercial endeavor on the island. Some slaves did work on these large cattle estates, but they had

minimal labor needs.²⁸ Over time, many slave holders rented out slaves for whom they no longer had any use.²⁹ These conditions and overall underdevelopment of land and commerce opened up dramatic new opportunities for slaves to escape or to purchase or be granted their freedom. And thus the slave population would decline from over three-fourths of the total in the sixteenth century to an estimated 15 percent of the colony at the twilight of Spanish rule in the late 1700s. Already by 1681, nearly three-fourths of all persons of African descent were free and composed the majority of the colony.³⁰

In addition to the collapse of the plantation economy, relatively liberal manumission laws and practices--or to be more precise the relatively liberal *absence* of manumission restrictions--contributed to declining slave numbers in Santo Domingo. As in most of Spanish and Portuguese America and as had been the norm throughout world history--but in stark contrast to the historically exceptional slave systems that developed in the rest of the Americas--no spate of legislation ever emerged to impede manumission through prohibition, taxes, or other official hurdles and economic disincentives.³¹ To the contrary, customs developed that permitted slaves (or their parents, godparents, or others) to purchase their freedom if they paid their owners what was considered their just price. Over time, these practices appear to have become customary rights, eventually gaining the force of law.³²

There is evidence in notarial records of numerous manumissions through self-purchase that took place in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.³³ Owners appear to have been ready to sell freedom to their slaves--indeed even at times for relatively low prices--to obtain scarce income given the colony's poverty and the limited market and need for slaves.³⁴ Self purchase prices during the 1700s appear to have ranged from 25 pesos (usually for children) to 310 pesos.³⁵ Some slaves accumulated the funds they needed to purchase freedom by saving the portion of the wages they received when contracted out as laborers by their owners; hiring out was a common practice, particularly in the cities, in the 1700s.³⁶ Others were able to pay the price of their liberty by selling what they produced on otherwise uncultivated lands during hours remaining after they completed

their assigned tasks.³⁷

Some slaves did not pay anything for manumission, as a substantial number of slave holders granted freedom to their slaves at no cost. Many of these manumissions were, though, conditioned on slaves' continuing to serve their elderly masters until their owners' death.³⁸ Owners generally depicted such manumission as a reward for "loyalty" and good service, often for not "abandoning" their owners during difficult times of illness, poverty, or old age.³⁹ The promise of freedom, then, may have formed part of an implicit or explicit exchange, a stimulus for the cooperation and services of (presumably mostly domestic) slaves that might not have been rendered as extensively simply from the threat of force. In other cases, though, owners used manumission as a means to relieve themselves of responsibilities for unproductive elderly and child slaves. Although more research needs to be done on this question, owners appear to have ceded liberty to slaves without payment for disparate reasons. In some instances, manumission emerged from relationships of concubinage with slaves.⁴⁰ In other cases, masters freed children they had fathered with slaves--especially, no doubt, if they were the owners' sole offspring and heirs, a tendency seen elsewhere in the Americas.⁴¹ Masters might even bequeath slaves to those they freed.⁴²

The extent of both gratuitous manumission and self-purchase was commented on by contemporaneous observers, particularly in the late eighteenth century. In a work published in 1796, Médéric-Louis Élie Moreau de Saint-Méry, a prominent Martinique-born jurist and former resident of Saint Domingue (the French colony sharing the same island of Hispaniola), indicated that the practice of self-purchase had evolved into an effective right by the late 1700s. "All slaves [in Santo Domingo]," he wrote, "can make themselves free by paying the price [250 *pesos fuertes*] to their owners, who cannot refuse [their slaves]."⁴³ The 1780s, the period of which Moreau de Saint-Méry wrote, was one of brief commercial revival in the Spanish colony, when slavery promised greater profitability amid elite dreams of expanding plantations. Not surprisingly, important local figures now strongly criticized slaves' access to self-purchase.⁴⁴ For instance, in 1784, one of Santo Domingo's leading state officials, Don Antonio Mañón, proposed the elimination of the "power"

[*facultad*] of slaves to "set themselves free without the consent of their masters."⁴⁵ Historian Raymundo González has discovered further evidence of slave "rights" with regard to self-purchase in several court cases from this period. In these cases, owners had refused to grant freedom to slaves even though the slaves had accumulated the necessary funds. The slaves, however, were able to press their claims in court and to obtain their freedom.⁴⁶ Of course, in the absence of any positive law supporting it--an absence found with few exceptions throughout Latin America--slaves could not be guaranteed access to self-purchase.⁴⁷ And these court cases are themselves evidence of owners resisting customary rights to manumission. However, the fact that the practice continued even in a period when it seemed contrary to owners' economic interests speaks to how entrenched it had become.⁴⁸ Why it became so entrenched is suggested in a report at this time by another prominent local figure, Lieutenant Colonel Ignacio Caro. Although critical of the ease of manumission, he argued that eliminating the practice "would bring harm to the landowners since there are some blacks who are quite hardworking, and they are so in order to have time leftover from their assigned tasks that they can use for their own work and thus to attain [the funds for] the price of their liberty. Were that not possible, they would abandon [their work], like the others."⁴⁹

In broad terms, then, legal manumission can be seen as more than the product of economic decline and slaves' unprofitability. It can also be interpreted as a concession to slaves to shore up owners' hegemony in response to the potential for slave resistance, a potential that often manifested itself, as Caro argued, in the form of refusal to work or by flight. Indeed, in addition to self-purchase and other legal means of manumission, the slave population declined throughout the colonial period as large numbers fled into the colony's immense untamed woodlands, or *los montes*. Santo Domingo's vast unpopulated landscape, teeming wildlife, rugged terrain, and minimal infrastructure provided optimal conditions for slaves to escape to freedom and to secure their own subsistence.⁵⁰ And these conditions, along with peasant dispersion and mobility, minimized colonial officials' ability to govern the countryside; runaway slaves could thus remain outside the state's narrow metropolitan view.⁵¹ Although some slave owners paid private maroon hunters to pursue

runaways into los montes, the scale, frequency, and efficacy of these operations were relatively limited, given minimal elite resources and labor needs after the early 1600s.⁵² Former slaves and their descendants were, it seems, able to live dispersed throughout the countryside with relatively little fear and largely independent of officials and elites. They lived by hunting, grazing cattle on the open range, foraging natural fruits, fishing where possible, and cultivating shifting subsistence plots.⁵³ Mixing fluidly with marginal colonists of European descent, they constituted an exceptional and enduring Afro-Caribbean peasantry more than a century before the formal abolition of slavery in 1822, when Santo Domingo came under Haitian rule.

Official racism and racial categories persisted in colonial law and ideology.⁵⁴ And racial slavery--slavery limited to people of African descent--prevailed until 1822.⁵⁵ Yet how race and racism evolved under conditions of freedom in los montes remains far from clear. The vast majority of the colony's rural inhabitants were always nonwhite, as was true also among urban denizens. Various European observers and officials had classified the largest portion of the population as *mulato* or *pardo* (brown) by the eighteenth century.⁵⁶ This demographic make-up along with the peasantry's distance from metropolitan institutions, a small white presence in rural areas, and a low degree of economic segmentation may have minimized the everyday significance of racial categories among the popular rural classes. On the one hand, the peasantry emerged out of the wreckage of plantation slavery and remained inevitably affected by racist practices and discourses in the colony. On the other hand, independent peasants succeeded in living lives at odds with and largely removed from elite visions of a society of free whites and coerced and subordinated black workers. The fact that it is not obvious or easy to imagine how race and racism factored into everyday peasant life in this context is in itself striking compared with most of the eighteenth-century Americas.

Direct evidence of racial meanings in rural Santo Domingo--a world that left few traces in archival sources--is indeed hard to find. One possible window onto this world, though, are parish registers from the few small towns in the interior of the colony for which records remain from the colonial period. Although these registers were compiled by and thus reflect the perspectives of

Church officials in rural towns rather than of peasants living in los montes, they nonetheless document a space in which metropolitan colonial ideologies came in closest proximity to the realities of the countryside. And in this encounter, the former seems notably weak. Even the capacity of marriage to serve as an instrument of racial division and hierarchy appears problematic. This was the case despite the fact that it was certainly those closer or more subordinated to metropolitan norms who tended to marry formally (hence many more slaves appear in available marriage registers than do those identified as free people of color, despite the far greater numbers of the latter within the overall population).⁵⁷

A preliminary analysis of parish marriage registries from one small town in the colony's interior for which we have records, Santa Cruz del Seybo, suggests the relative weakness of race for representing identity, community, and status. Although never completely separable, identity was expressed more in a language of proximity to slavery than a language of color or race. Those entering marriage who were slaves were always identified as such, as were their owners. And many persons were identified as *libres* (free persons) and *libertos* (freed persons, that is, freed in their lifetime)--both terms used only for those considered to be of color and indicating how close to slavery persons of color were. Also, records identified persons born outside the colony of Santo Domingo, for instance in sub-Saharan Africa or in other parts of the Caribbean. Race thus could be indirectly indicated in several ways. Only in exceptional cases, however, were individuals identified as black (*moreno* or *negro*) or mulatto (*pardo* or *mulato*), despite the fact that these terms had been common in Spanish American legal and popular discourses for centuries. These books thus leave the impression that racial identities in Santa Cruz had not come to stand in for status and place in society to the same extent that they had in most of the Americas.⁵⁸

Furthermore, a substantial number of those identified as *libre*, *liberto*, or born in sub-Saharan Africa, married individuals who were not identified directly or indirectly as persons of color.⁵⁹ Nor were these individuals identified as "white," a term that is not found at all in these records. Rather, it appears that officials divided society into those who they classified as others (by reference to their

color and African descent or by their proximity to enslavement) and those they did not, with whiteness suggested through a lack of racial identification but only clearly indicated when individuals had the honorific "Don" or "Doña" before their name, a title of nobility requiring "pure blood" and appearing infrequently in parish records. Although a more thorough investigation remains to be done, this initial pattern would seem to indicate one of two striking phenomena: either that people of (some) African descent were marrying people of (virtually full) European descent or that individuals who had secured a respected place in their community and in the eyes of Church officials were then not marked by race, regardless of African ancestry or physical appearance.⁶⁰ In other words, even implicit race marking may have been reserved largely for slaves, *libertos*, and those closely related to slaves or freed persons. Collective identities based on slave descent were assigned and perhaps assumed but they did not have the immutability over generations that typically inhere in notions of race or "blood."

The image of a society in which constructions of African versus European "blood" did not effectively divide people into meaningful social groups is also suggested by--and embodied in--another feature of Church records in colonial Santo Domingo. In contrast to most of colonial Spanish America, including the rest of the Greater Spanish Caribbean, parish records of marriage, baptism, and death were not kept in separate books for whites and non-whites (those of African and/or indigenous descent depending on the region).⁶¹ Nor were records kept in separate registries for slaves and for free persons as in the French colonies.⁶² In both the capital and the interior towns for which records are available, the registry entries for whites, slaves, *libertos*, and *libres* were all recorded chronologically in the same books. One can find the marriage of a prominent figure in colonial society juxtaposed with that of an African-born slave or a runaway slave from Saint Domingue. In 1815, local officials were obliged to defend to the crown their practice of entering all individuals in the same book without regard, as the lieutenant governor and the notary reported, to "the distinct types [*clases*] of persons...whether whites, *pardos*, or *morenos*, free persons or slaves, children [*párvulos*] or adults." The governor of Santo Domingo contended that the priests could not

"know with scientific certainty the *calidades* [qualities] of the parents, or of those contracting marriage, so as to be able to record...whether they are whites, *pardos* (mulattos), or slaves [sic., blacks]."⁶³ Therefore, church officials did not "meddle" with questions of classification that, he argued, would only generate "prejudicial errors."⁶⁴

The significance of this refusal to implement longstanding Spanish American policy requires further analysis. Yet it suggests that the importance of the metropole's hierarchical line between those entirely of European descent and those of any African descent had been weakened over time in colonial Santo Domingo. More broadly, it suggests that race had become a problematic basis for collective identity and for signifying other social cleavages, including in the capital.⁶⁵ Had social difference and power relations been mapped onto race to a greater extent across the colony, imagined communities of African versus European descent would doubtless have congealed, marking individuals racially and making identification seem less tenuous or problematic to church officials.

The early history of plantation slavery's dramatic rise and fall in Santo Domingo thus appears to have reduced the power of race as a basis of collective social identity and as a symbol of other socially significant differences. And it appears indeed to have disrupted Spanish racial ideologies and policies in various ways. Nonetheless, official racism continued to prevail in this mostly Afro-American territory, particularly in the urban zones. The state sustained, in principle at least, a clear racial hierarchy similar to that found in other parts of the Spanish empire. The Spanish legal tradition from the 1400s of privileging those of "pure blood" (fully of "Christian" descent) continued, and norms, laws, and regulations barred individuals of color from various professions and positions in the church, the military, and the government, as well as from entry into the university.⁶⁶

Even in the capital, however, and despite protest by some white officials, members of the municipal council (*cabildo*), and other residents,⁶⁷ racial boundaries became, in practice, relatively porous during the early eighteenth century.⁶⁸ Some individuals of African descent managed to

secure positions in the state, the church, the university, and the military.⁶⁹ And a few persons of color acquired slaves. Church records from the capital provide examples, for instance, of *moreno* (dark-skinned) owners of *moreno* slaves.⁷⁰ At the same time, a distinct set of racial terms gained official currency for persons of African descent who were better-off and living with privileges putatively reserved for whites. In the 1700s, some local officials identified such persons as *trigueños* (wheat-colored individuals), or as *los blancos de la tierra* (the whites of this land), or, in some instances, *los blancos que da la tierra* (the type of whites that our land has).⁷¹ Some individuals of African descent self-identified this way as well, asserting a status equivalent to whites and rejecting racial identities associated with subordination. One French observer wrote at the beginning of the nineteenth century: "White, yellow, copper, or black, they are Spaniards proud of themselves! Unfortunate is the person who dares to call them by their true name, for then their patience gives way to anger. And although they may be as black as ebony, they will tell you, thumping their chest with a pride greater than that found anywhere in the West Indies, or indeed in Europe: 'I, I am *blanco de la tierra*.'"⁷²

Using such terms ("white of the land," "wheat-colored," and so forth) reinscribed racist discourse and associations. But it also served a practical end that resisted racial hierarchy. It allowed certain individuals of African descent to enter positions and undertake responsibilities (in the military, for example) legally reserved for whites. And it did so not on the basis of individuals "passing" as "white," successfully pretending to be persons of full European descent, but rather on the basis of individuals who were not fully of European descent successfully claiming the same rights as "whites." These racial terms thus mediated between metropolitan discourses and local realities, and between white resentment and efforts to subordinate free persons of color and the demands for equality, measure of upward mobility, and important role of people of African descent in constituting colonial Dominican society.

Working in favor of this system, which allowed some relative mobility for those of African descent, was the shortage of those of "pure blood" (full Christian lineage) in Santo Domingo's

population. Thus in the early 1700s the Archbishopric of Santo Domingo defended the practice of ordaining black and mulatto priests to the crown as necessary given the scarcity of local nobility.⁷³ At the end of the eighteenth century, the Spanish crown appears itself to have sought to find a *modus vivendi* with the social realities of the greater Spanish Caribbean, in particular, by allowing certain better-off individuals of mixed European and African descent to purchase exemptions (*gracias al sacar*) from official racial exclusions.⁷⁴

It is likely that lighter-skinned persons of African descent generally entered the realms reserved for and associated with whites--and were accepted as *trigueño* or *blanco de la tierra*--more easily than darker-skinned individuals.⁷⁵ Nonetheless, in other fundamental ways status was less associated with and thus mapped onto color than, for example, in Saint Domingue. No imagined community of free people of African descent identified as "mulattos" or "mixed" appears to have developed in Santo Domingo as it did in the neighboring French territory.⁷⁶ In Saint Domingue, free people of color controlled a substantial portion of both the colony's slaves (around 30 percent) and its plantations, even while they faced escalating racial discrimination during the 1700s.⁷⁷ And this important and legally distinct group was, at times, referred to loosely as "the mulattos."⁷⁸ This naming reflected the small number of slaves of mixed European and African descent, given that white and free mixed fathers facilitated the manumission of their enslaved offspring with relative frequency.⁷⁹ Mixed European and African heritage thus became equated with freedom, albeit a legally constrained one--even if, in reality, much of the free population of color consisted of individuals considered black (and there were always some "mulatto slaves").⁸⁰ In Santo Domingo, on the other hand, notary records suggest that a large portion--perhaps even the majority--of slaves were considered mulatto.⁸¹ Also free people of African descent overall never gained anything like the wealth, education, or number of slaves that they so quickly did in booming Saint Domingue. Thus the category of mulatto, while often serving as a bureaucratic identification for individuals, did not develop the same power that it did in various other parts of the Caribbean and the Americas, where it appears to have named a distinct social group and to have corresponded to other significant

divisions in society.⁸²

Despite some opening, in practice, of the system of racial exclusion to persons of African descent who claimed the same status as whites and were legally rationalized as being *blancos de la tierra*, most urban free people of color remained confined to jobs such as saddlers, cobblers, and carpenters.⁸³ On the other hand, in the countryside, people of color enjoyed great autonomy, freely exploiting seemingly endless uncleared lands with only vague and inchoate property claims on them.⁸⁴ And notary records indicate that a number of free people of color became relatively well-off ranchers.⁸⁵ Certainly in the countryside, and even to some extent in the city, persons of African descent, while not constituting a wealthy "mulatto" class as in Saint Domingue, were far from the type of small marginal group that they were, for example, in the most of the pre-Civil War United States, where they were variously ejected from certain states, subjected to control by guardians, and prohibited from owning slaves and other forms of property.⁸⁶ Instead two different worlds seem to have coexisted in colonial Santo Domingo. Slavery, legal racial hierarchy, and Spanish colonial ideology weighed heavily on people of color, especially in the cities and, to a lesser extent, the smaller towns, and in the few extant slave plantations. Outside these spaces, free peasants of color lived largely out of the reach of the colonial state and the arenas where its racist distinctions predominated.

This is not to say, though, that people of color in the countryside faced no threats or influences from metropolitan forces. Most peasants were the descendants of slaves; the peasantry was "the offspring of slavery," as nineteenth-century Dominican intellectual Pedro Francisco Bonó put it.⁸⁷ And rural Santo Domingo remained a branch, however distant, of a larger Atlantic world conditioned by European racist discourses, colonization, and the Atlantic slave trade. Inevitably, too, Santo Domingo's metropolitan discourses of racial hierarchy radiated out into the small towns and even los montes, albeit with seemingly fading significance in terms of structuring local constraints and opportunities. Peasants would also have been subjected to these discourses more forcefully if they ventured closer to urban (and whiter) spaces, denizens, and functionaries. Indeed,

one reason that many peasants relied as much as they did on hunting and foraging, along with small shifting plots, rather than on sedentary agriculture may have been the perceived need for geographic mobility in order to elude maroon hunters and colonial officials. As political scientist James C. Scott has argued, people on the move and in hinterlands have more easily impeded the state's gaze and frustrated its dictates.⁸⁸

And yet while rural denizens would never have been entirely isolated from metropolitan racism, neither could metropolitan racism have been immune to transformation by local conditions in the colony and its interior, including race's more limited capacity in these lands to stand in for and symbolize other fundamental social divisions. Indeed, there seems to have been somewhat of a collision between colonial racial discourses and local realities. The patterns of peasant life that emerged in late seventeenth-century Santo Domingo simply did not provide the powerful self-reproducing racist structures and associations that, for instance, a slave plantation economy composed mostly of black slaves and free whites would have.

Over the course of the eighteenth century, however, economic developments mobilized new state and elite interests in subjugating the rural world to metropolitan norms in order to redevelop a plantation economy and capture the colony's independent peasantry for sorely needed inexpensive labor.⁸⁹ In 1788 the acting governor of the colony and chief justice of the Royal Audiencia (High Court) of Santo Domingo, Don Pedro Catani, denounced the ease of manumission and escape that fostered the growth of Santo Domingo's autonomous peasantry, blaming it for the colony's economic backwardness.⁹⁰ In a subsequent report to the crown, Catani condemned Santo Domingo's "free blacks, who live where they want, working for themselves or for others as suits them...These [blacks] are subject to no control. Generally residing in los montes, they live as they please with complete independence and liberty. They go around practically naked. They are the cause and origin of all the wrongs that are committed and may occur on the Island."⁹¹

Beginning in the 1760s, local elites and subsequently the crown made various efforts to draw up a "black code" modeled after France's *Code Noir* (both the 1685 and 1724 versions) in order to

harden legal norms regarding race and slavery and to emulate the lucrative plantation economy of neighboring Saint Domingue. In 1783, the crown ordered the governor of Santo Domingo to draw up "regulations for the economic and moral government of the blacks on that Island." One year later, a commission of local political and ecclesiastical authorities and large landowners headed by the Audiencia's chief justice, the Basque jurist Agustín Ignacio Emparán y Orbe, completed the *Código de Legislación para el Gobierno Moral, Político y Económico de los Negros de la Isla Española* or *Código Negro Español* (also known as the *Carolino Código Negro* in honor of King Carlos III).⁹²

What most stands out in the local deliberations over what to include in this "black code" are not the concerns with slavery per se, but rather with free people of color, the frequency of manumission, and the massive "black" population living in supposed idleness and vice in the countryside. One member of the commission proposed "restricting the freedom that until now has been granted with such ease to slaves of both sexes...because after they acquire their freedom, which costs them no more than putting together two hundred or at most three hundred pesos--most of the time stolen from their own master--they go about in vagrancy [*vagamundo*] across the countryside...and because as the blacks, in general, are of perverse inclinations, they become worse without the control of their masters."⁹³

Echoing these concerns, Colonel Joaquín García, a member of the local elite who would soon become governor, protested that manumission upon an owner's death had become virtually a standard practice, and that each new freed slave meant "one more to count among the population of black vagrants." "An infinite number of *negros* and *pardos*," he asserted, "live in dispersed huts throughout the countryside, without any more patrimony than that which they or their ancestors brought from Guinea. And they are happy and at ease simply because they are free. They never work, except when they are hungry--a hunger which they alleviate at the expense of their nearest neighbor with provisions or animals they can poach."⁹⁴

García voiced concern not only about the lack of surplus production but also the limited

significance of race in rural society. The free *negros* and *pardos*, he complained, travel across the colony with "complete impudence and self-assurance," confusing their identity "with that of the master, the white man [*vecino blanco*], the honorable patrician, and the distinguished figure, as if there were no more classes than free or slave." Thus, García argued, it was necessary that the Code "encompass all the classes of blacks....If it only treats slaves, all the existing difficulties will persist (in my opinion)."⁹⁵

The 1784 Black Code would respond to these local elite concerns and interests in re-establishing the racial hierarchy of Spanish colonial ideology. In addition to seeking "the useful and assiduous occupation of free blacks and slaves in the cultivation of the products needed by the metropolis," the preamble to the Code also demanded their "appropriate division into classes and races." According to García, racial hierarchy was scarcely respected in the countryside. The Code's stipulations suggest that it was also problematic in urban environments. The Code sought to re-establish racial difference through strict regulation of public deference--through people of color's "complete subordination and respect...toward all white people"; racially distinct punishments, including public whipping of free blacks and mulattos; strict restrictions on employment and geographic mobility for blacks, mulattos, and *tercerones*;⁹⁶ sumptuary regulations forbidding blacks and mulattos from wearing formal attire; and bans on education for blacks and first-generation mulattos (*pardos primerizos*), as well as the separation of "whites, *tercerones*, quadroons and others [of color]" into separate classrooms in schools where previously "confusion and mixture" had supposedly created "sinister appearances of equality and familiarity among them." The Code also demanded an end to the prevalence "of blacks, *libres*, and even some slaves...[in] all the mechanical trades, arts, and professions."⁹⁷ These forms of legal discrimination were coupled with measures to eliminate peasant autonomy, namely harsh vagrancy laws and ordinances stipulating that peasants living "wild" [*alzados*] in los montes be resettled close to population centers.⁹⁸

Furthermore, the Code sought to establish state control over manumission and thus the size of the free population of color. The Code prohibited "from now on the unlimited license [*facultad*]

and practice of granting freedom simply in return for payment." Manumission would now require "government participation and permission...[which ensured] the proper equilibrium between the population of slaves and *libres*"; evidence of a slave's "good conduct"; and that the money paid for the purchase of liberty not have derived from prostitution or theft. Finally, the Code prohibited grants of liberty made to owners' female slaves [*siervas*] and their children when those manumissions were motivated by their masters living in concubinage with them. In theory, the state would confiscate and sell slaves freed under these circumstances. It was, however, far from clear how such a policy could be implemented. The prohibition did indicate, though, that officials considered master-slave concubinage and manumission arising from it a significant problem. These restrictions did not entail prohibitive manumission fees, interdiction, or forced out-migration of freed persons, as legislated elsewhere in the Americas. They nonetheless echoed some of the regulations in France's *Code Noir* and diverged significantly from the overall thrust of past Spanish jurisprudence.⁹⁹

For reasons that remain obscure, the Code was sent to the crown for approval but never, in fact, promulgated.¹⁰⁰ Nonetheless, the history of this effort at legal reform makes clear that frequent manumission, a large free population of color, and racial fluidity and mobility ran contrary to the racist goals and attitudes of various local and metropolitan Spanish elites at the time. It thus suggests that high levels of manumission and a large and relatively well integrated free population of color in Santo Domingo should not be cast simply as the product of a relatively liberal discourse of race and slavery in Spain and colonial Latin America. Rather these were primarily the result of struggle, negotiation, and compromise between state officials, slave holders, and people of African descent in the early, plantation-less period, and eventually of substantial numbers of free people of color with (customary) rights and a level of integration too entrenched to be easily overturned. By the time Spain was ready to back local elite efforts to (re)establish a slave plantation economy and colonial racial order, the free population of African descent was too numerous and too integrated to be as excluded and exploited as was envisioned in the never implemented Carolino Black Code. Indeed, such forms of exclusion and exploitation may well have opened up prospects for wide-scale

rebellion, with slaves and free people of color ultimately uniting, as occurred at this time in Saint Domingue after the rights of a relatively well-integrated and wealthy free population of African descent were suddenly curtailed.¹⁰¹ Moreover, in the Dominican case, at least, the Carolino Black Code embodied a Spanish fantasy of baroque racial divisions--with categories bereft of any real social meaning (*tercerones*, quadroons, and so forth)--that could never have been realized without a massive expansion of police forces, genealogical records, government expenditures, and the colonial state apparatus in general.

Postcolonial racial formation

The early formation of a free peasantry of color that constituted the majority of the population in colonial Santo Domingo would be followed by formal abolition and the establishment of laws devoid of references to race and status during the Haitian occupation of the Dominican Republic from 1822 to 1844 (an occupation welcomed at first by much of the population but increasingly resented and eventually overthrown).¹⁰² And this occupation would be succeeded by multiple crossracial independence struggles as well as caudillo rebellions throughout the nineteenth century. These phenomena would all condition paradoxical processes of racial formation and modes of racism in the Dominican Republic. On the one hand, in the decades after independence from Haiti, the Dominican state would be led mostly by persons of African descent, such as President Buenaventura Báez (1849-1853, 1856-1858, 1865-1866, 1868-1874, 1876-1878) the child of a slave mother, and President Ulises Heureaux (1882-1884, 1887-1899), the son of a Haitian father and Saint Thomasian mother.¹⁰³ And from the independence period up to the U.S. occupation in 1916, neither racial categories nor color descriptions were used in most official documents (parish records, local censuses, and so forth).¹⁰⁴ On the other hand, elite Dominicans, at least, would continue to privilege physical features associated with Europe and to stigmatize those associated with Africa. In the early 1870s, one New England traveler to the Dominican Republic was struck by how an intense preoccupation with color among the upper class coexisted with legal racial equality. He

wrote: "Although the Dominicans are a mixed race...there is some species of gradation, according to the 'amount of coffee', as the phrase is here...[B]ut...the *government* here knows no such arithmetic, and counts in its service all 'points of coffee' indiscriminately, many of the most able being quite black."¹⁰⁵

The few official records that did identify *color* prior to the U.S. Occupation (1916-1924) seem to confirm one aspect of this New Englander's observations about the Dominican Republic: the imagining of a continuum of color gradations more than of discontinuous racial groups. Military and prison records from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries employed an elaborate vocabulary to describe soldiers' and convicts' skin color along with other physical features. The military records provided as much detail as possible, no doubt to assist in identifying casualties. And the prison records were most likely shaped by analogous concerns to identify escapees. The preprinted forms on which physical details were recorded may also have been generated in light of racist criminological and scientific discourses then prevailing throughout Europe and the Americas.¹⁰⁶ These documents did not, though, evince a consistent or limited set of racial categories. Instead, the prison and military registers I have found from the turn of the century employed a gamut of overlapping and vaguely defined descriptions for *color*: *negro*, *moreno*, *oscuro* (dark), *mulato*, *pardo*, *indio* (Indian or lightish brown-colored), *indio claro* (light Indian), *trigueño* (wheat-colored), *claro* (light), *blanco* (white), and *amarillo* (yellow, for persons of east Asian descent).¹⁰⁷ Individual officials were evidently selecting their own set of labels for classifying "color," presumably drawing on commonly used terms. In one military command list from 1897, for example, the skin color of ten soldiers was described as *moreno*, nine as *indio*, and three as *indio claro*.¹⁰⁸ In another list from the same year, the *color* of twenty-four marines was labeled as *moreno*, nineteen as *mulato*, and seven as *claro*.¹⁰⁹ And a personnel list from a Dominican military ship in 1897 listed the *color* of the crew members as *blanco*, *trigueño*, *mulato*, *grifo* (presumably dark mulatto), *moreno*, and *aceitunado* (olive-colored, for a man of Chinese descent).¹¹⁰ These somewhat varying sets of terms used by officials do not answer an often-asked question among

outsiders today, "What are (or were) the racial categories in the Dominican Republic?" or "How many racial categories are (were) there in the Dominican Republic?" Rather they suggest, again, a preoccupation with a continuum of skin colors, yet the absence of color as a marker for generally recognized groups in society. If such groups, or communities, had been thus imagined, one would have expected to find greater uniformity in the number of categories and the terms deployed.

During and after the 1916-1924 U.S. Occupation of the Dominican Republic, the government did report on race in new national censuses and identity cards.¹¹¹ According to the 1920 census, 24.9 percent of the country was "white," 49.7 percent was *mestizo*, and 25.4 percent was "black." And in 1935, under the dictatorship of Rafael Trujillo (1930-1961), the national census reported 13 percent of the population as "white," 19 percent "black," and 68 percent *mestizo*--the substantial decline in whites conceivably reflecting a narrower construction of whiteness as opposed to mixture.¹¹² Still, beyond the constraints of bureaucratic identification, a color continuum seems to have continued to prevail over a three- (or two-) tier construction of discontinuous groups comprising people envisaged as fundamentally similar. (In this sense color distinctions in the Dominican Republic have been more analogous to, for instance, income stratification than, say, divisions of nationality.) In 1932 when a mandatory national identity card (*cédula de identidad*) was first issued, one author surveyed how people in the Cibao region identified their own *color*. Echoing nineteenth-century observations and seeming to address an audience outside the Dominican Republic, she concluded: "Here we distinguish ourselves by the following classification of colors: White, Indio, light *Indio*, dark *Indio*, Mulatto, reddish Mulatto (*Mulato colorado*), and *Moreno*....Very few identify themselves as black, if they are not Haitian or from the English colonies [in the Caribbean]; ours call themselves *moreno*."¹¹³ In fact, the preoccupation with notions of color (appearance) rather than of race (communities of descent), including the use of *indio* as a metaphor for color rather than indigenous identity, extended in the early 1900s to immigrants from the non-Hispanic Caribbean as well. For instance, when Haitian-born Nina Adelfa Juster died in Santo

Domingo in 1924, she was identified as *india*, as was a man from Curaçao, though both were doubtless viewed as of African, not indigenous, descent.¹¹⁴

What is extraordinary in the Dominican case, however, is not the mere existence of a color continuum among people of African descent. For instance, during slavery and until the establishment of legal segregation, at least, analogous differentiations could be found even in the United States, ones perceived and articulated at that time among whites as well as among African Americans. For instance, in 1859 in the northern Virginia town of Augusta, the county court clerk (presumably white) recorded the color of free persons of color as "very dark, dark, mulatto, black, yellow, copper, high mulatto, dark brown, fair, freckled, bright, high bright, light, light brown, and not very black."¹¹⁵ The existence of color sensitivity is not explained by the size of the free black population, which remained relatively small in Augusta compared with the Americas at large. Rather the growing absence of such awareness in the United States doubtless corresponded with the spread of Jim Crow rendering color differentiations less and less significant compared with the profound legal and social division instituted across society between those of any African descent and those of full European lineage.¹¹⁶

Probably in all societies across the Americas, one can find modes of racism based both on a color continuum and on a distinction between "whites" and "blacks." But the degree to which each of these modes has predominated does indeed vary. For instance, the United States and the Dominican Republic are at opposite ends of the spectrum in this respect, especially in the early twentieth century. In the former "color politics" continued but society was structured to a greater degree by overarching categories unifying all those of any African descent and dividing them from "whites." In the Dominican Republic, on the other hand, the color continuum, to a great extent, has comprised not only those of African descent but people entirely of European lineage as well, who, in some senses, are one more gradation--a privileged gradation no doubt, but still a gradation more than a separate category for most of the nation, at least. And this reflects, as I have been arguing throughout this paper, the relative absence of histories of community formation dividing "whites"

and "blacks."

In sum, although color consciousness prevailed as part of racist discourses privileging whiteness in the postcolonial Dominican Republic, skin color has nonetheless not been a common symbol or fetish for defining social groups and collective identification among Dominicans.¹¹⁷ It would be more precise to say that society was marked by the privileges of whiteness over blackness than of whites over blacks (the latter, in any case, not a category with a consistent meaning and imagined as transparent in the Dominican Republic). The same individual was endowed with the privileges of whiteness relative to a person darker than themselves and with the disadvantages of blackness relative to a person lighter than themselves. Far more historical and sociological work needs to be done, however, to define the contours of those privileges and disadvantages.

On the one hand, then, the central role of people of African descent, particularly in the countryside, in an early creole or proto-national society and subsequently in Santo Domingo's independence revolutions against Haiti (1844) and Spain (1865) helps explain Dominican racial formation in the post-independence period, when no system of legal racial exclusion or segregation and no collective nonwhite identity congealed in this mostly Afro-American nation; no community evolved that was symbolized by color among people of African descent. On the other hand, the precise impact and forms of discrimination and prejudice produced by a simultaneous preoccupation with a continuum of color gradations, how this mode of racism has varied over time, space, and class, and what its social and political implications have been, have yet to be fully explored.

What at this point seems evident, though, is that the Dominican Republic's seemingly contradictory histories of integration and discrimination have deep roots that developed in the virtual absence of plantation slavery after the 1500s and were conditioned by a majority population that was both free and of African descent almost two hundred years before the abolition of slavery in 1822. These histories gave rise to racial identities and modes of racism wherein physical characteristics have generally not differentiated social groups or constituted communities associated with common histories and experiences. Instead, they have stratified individuals infinitely along a racist color

continuum of physical appearances or "beauty." Thus, a colorist mode of racism has prevailed, but, in general, those considered Dominican have not been divided by race in the sense of collective ascriptions of otherness.¹¹⁸

The contemporary Dominican Republic has frequently been interpreted by scholars as a nation in which people of African descent deny that they are black and in which an internal racism is displaced onto Haiti and Haitians. Yet if we take seriously the notion that race is a historical construct and not a cross-cultural essence, and that communities can be imagined in multiple and disparate ways, then this type of "false consciousness" argument is untenable. Dominican history is intriguing precisely because a collective black identity was not constructed among people of African descent and because society to this day is not divided into racial communities, even though it is marked--again in ways that need to be more precisely delineated--by a racist color continuum. Certainly, this racial formation reflects Dominicans' efforts to distance their identity from that disparaged in global and elite racist discourses, as well as the dynamics of Haitian-Dominican relations. As I have elaborated elsewhere, in the late nineteenth century, elite discourses increasingly disdained cultural practices associated with Africa and constructed Haiti and Haitians as an "African" and "black" nation or *raza*, in putative contrast to all Dominicans (no matter their color). And this anti-Haitianism, moreover, would become a popular discourse under the Trujillo regime and remain so subsequent to his rule.¹¹⁹ But, above all, I am arguing here, contemporary Dominican racial formation, its contradictory modes of racism and racelessness, have followed a long trajectory extending back to the early and extensive history of escape from slavery and of freedom in *los montes*. And in this respect it finds analogies with other spaces in the Americas constituted largely by free people of African descent long before the abolition of slavery.

Beyond Santo Domingo: Preliminary Notes Toward a Comparative Framework for Racial Formation in the African Diaspora

Peculiar historical conditions certainly distinguish the Dominican case. And colonial Santo

Domingo's short, early history of plantation slavery overlaid by an extended subsequent period in which free people of color were the majority makes it the most dramatic example of what might be identified as a free people of color society. Nonetheless, this case may open up a comparative framework for thinking about race in the Americas. In particular, it suggests the importance of the history and demographics of free people of color as a potentially critical variable in shaping racial meanings. It also reveals how both modes of production and jurisprudence have played powerful roles in determining the prospects for free people of color and therein how racial communities and identification were or were not formed. And finally we see how everyday social realities have shaped racial discourse and identities; that is, how understandings of race have arisen from historically specific social relations and associations rather than simply from the diffusion or contestation of ideas or, still less, from self-evident physical or biological groupings. It is beyond the range of this essay to venture into a comparative treatment of race. Nor do I wish to propose any type of rigid formula for determining racial formation. Yet this framework emerging from the history of Santo Domingo seems of a piece with what has been suggested by work on other cases in the Americas.

For instance, historian Aline Helg also finds evidence in her work for the pivotal role of the size of the free population of color in racial formation (or in what might be termed racial consciousness from a less constructionist perspective, as suggested in some of Helg's formulations). She writes that "in Venezuela and Caribbean Colombia, where most of the colonial population was free [and] of color, African ancestry and blackness have not been acknowledged" in the national period.¹²⁰ Historian Jay Kinsbruner portrays analogous dynamics in Puerto Rico, where free people of color were the largest segment of society at the end of the 1700s and in the early 1800s. Kinsbruner's work highlights a relative lack of collective identification on the basis of African descent on the island in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as well as a particular "variety" of racism, "shade discrimination." This form of racism has operated along a continuum of "degrees of blackness" and whiteness, which Kinsbruner terms, mistakenly I believe, a "manifestly more subtle

[prejudice]...than in the United States."¹²¹

At the opposite end of the spectrum from the Dominican Republic is the history of much of the United States. There, people of full European descent and those of any African descent were bifurcated first between the enslaved and the free (with free people of color composing only a small percentage of the country and being tightly circumscribed by law) and then by de jure and defacto segregation. Under such circumstances, corresponding communities of descent or "races" almost inevitably arose. Individuals of any African descent were likely to imagine that others of any African descent shared with them important experiences in the past, present, and future. "The black man is a person who must ride 'Jim Crow' in Georgia," W.E.B. Du Bois wrote in 1940, affirming a sociological and historically contingent rather than scientific or natural basis for blackness, and more broadly race, in the United States.¹²²

In Saint Domingue, as already discussed, communities were imagined in yet another fashion that reflected existing social realities. Here, the development of a massive plantation economy corresponded with the evolution of increasing racism in law and practice. Yet free people of color became overall a relatively wealthy and highly educated class, similar in size to the white population (though both groups together only constituted perhaps 15 percent of the population), and in possession of a substantial portion of the colony's slaves and plantations. Subject to intense racism from whites yet also far from the position of slaves (indeed they were often their masters), free persons of African descent formed a distinct group often self-identified as the *gens de couleur (libre)*--(free) people of color--and frequently referred to as well, particularly by others, as "the mulattos," notwithstanding the substantial number of free "blacks." This imagined community was integrated neither in a common world of blackness with slaves nor a common world of freedom with whites.¹²³

The colonies of Spanish and even Portuguese America were essentially lumped into one entity in Tannenbaum's comparative framework. Certainly, manumission, as he argued, was higher across this region than in the rest of the Americas, in part as a result of the latter's radically

innovative legal restrictions on it. But this divergence also stemmed from fundamental differences in economic conditions and needs for social control (by holding out the hope to slaves of acquiring legal freedom). Furthermore, there was great variation within Latin America and even within individual nations, both across space and over time. In Cuba, for instance, as I have already emphasized, a major slave plantation economy developed in the nineteenth century and free people of color composed only approximately 15 percent of society. Cuba also became an immigrant nation, with massive forced and unforced migrations of, respectively, Africans in the nineteenth century and Spaniards, Haitians, and Jamaicans in the 1880 to 1930 period.¹²⁴ These conditions gave rise to relatively transparent-seeming, discrete racial identities and communities differentiating whites from people of color (and, in some spaces, "mulatto" from "black" individuals). And Cuban racism also produced far greater violence and de facto segregation than found elsewhere in the Spanish Caribbean.¹²⁵ On the other hand, however, Cuba's first three centuries after colonization had been characterized by relatively few and small plantations; independence was won in 1898 by an integrated multiracial army largely staffed and led by persons of color; and Cuba became, in large part as a result of those forces and the nature of the war for independence, the only major slave society to establish effective universal male suffrage soon after emancipation.¹²⁶ Through the island's revolutionary struggles for independence (which began in 1868), a powerful discourse had developed representing the Cuban nation as a combination of races, of whites and persons of color. And yet this discourse of mixture generally did not efface the existence of distinct races or peoples (*razas*) among Cubans so much as it envisaged a new society formed by their integration.¹²⁷ In the early twentieth century, Cuba was arguably closer to the United States than to the Dominican Republic in terms of racial identification and its predominant mode of racism.

Brazil represents still another contradictory trajectory of slavery, freedom, and racial formation. Although for centuries it was one of the world's major slave societies for centuries, it comprised diverse forms and histories of slavery that offered varying degrees of autonomy and possibilities for manumission and self-purchase. By the early 1800s free people of color formed a

large part of the population, and a plurality or near plurality in several important regions, such as Minas Gerais, which was dominated by gold mining.¹²⁸ Also, free people of color constituted a noteworthy portion of Brazil's slave owners, indeed a third of them in Minas Gerais. These owners controlled, though, only 16 percent of the slaves in this region. Thus, this was not Saint Domingue, but nor was it at all similar to the United States.¹²⁹

Brazil's heterogeneous histories as both a world of slaves and of free people of color left a varied and perhaps particularly indeterminate legacy for racial formation. It was, for instance, culturally as well as politically feasible for activists and writers of color in the early twentieth century to portray Brazilians both as forming a new people produced by the fusion of Afroamerican and Euroamerican elements and also as a union of distinct peoples--the latter more analogous to race and nation formation in Cuba, the former more to the Dominican Republic.¹³⁰ Brazilians of African descent developed a race-based political party in 1936, as Cubans of color had in 1908 (both parties were quickly repressed). Yet overall outside observers have pointed to--and have been variously perplexed and dismayed by--the "relative absence of unified racial identity among Afro-Brazilians," as political scientist Anthony Marx writes, and hence of race-based politics in twentieth-century Brazil.¹³¹ Finally, in Brazil both a color continuum and a two or three-tier racial order appear as salient--perhaps almost equally salient--modes of race and racism.¹³²

Broad comparative treatments of race and racism have been stymied in recent decades for reasons ranging from the challenges of gathering primary sources for such a wide-ranging project to the discursive prison house generated by the "Tannenbaum thesis" and subsequent debate. In that prison house, the exploration of divergent, historically specific histories of slavery, racial meanings, and faces of racism across the Americas were conflated with interpretations positing that different regions had more or less racism than others. In that context, discussing differences in racial formation has seemed problematic indeed. Yet a blindness to difference is also problematic, as it dehistoricizes and essentializes race and racism. And viewing the world through the lens of U.S. histories of slavery--plantations, manumission restrictions, and a small free population of color--and

the predominant U.S. histories of racism--inter alia, the centrality of segregation, violence, exclusion from images of the nation, and a "black"- "white" binary opposition in identity and community formation. It can blind us to other histories beyond the plantation, permit other modes of racism-- such as what might be dubbed "colorism"--to remain in silence and unchallenged, lead some observers to underestimate still the power of racism in Latin American history, and cause many to judge Latin Americans of African descent for supposedly lacking consciousness of racism and of their "true" racial identity. Thanks to the rigorous, sedulous work of many scholars of racism, the ubiquity of racism in the history of the Americas can hardly be doubted.¹³³ Yet the multiplicity of historically specific modes of racism and racial identification, their convergences and divergences, await further investigation in comparative perspective.

NOTES

¹. The classic formulation of a Latin American versus an Anglo-American system of race and slavery is Frank Tannenbaum, *Slave and Citizen* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1992 (1946)). For histories that problematize and controvert Tannenbaum's comparative sketch of race and slavery in the Americas, see, e.g., Franklin Knight, *Slave Society in Cuba during the Nineteenth Century* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970), ch. 4; Verena Martínez-Alier, *Marriage, Class and Colour in Nineteenth-Century Cuba: A Study of Racial Attitudes and Sexual Values in a Slave Society* (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan, 1974); Aline Helg, *Our Rightful Share: The Afro-Cuban Struggle for Equality, 1886-1912* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); Juan Francisco Manzano, *Autobiography of a Slave* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1996); David Brion Davis, *The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), ch. 8; Thomas Skidmore, *Black into White: Race and Nationality in Brazilian Thought* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974); George Reid Andrews, *Blacks and Whites in São Paulo, Brazil, 1888-1988* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991).

². Ira Berlin, *Many Thousands Gone: The First Two Centuries of Slavery in North America* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1998), 6.

³. Herbert Klein, "Nineteenth-Century Brazil" and "Population Tables," in David Cohen and Jack Greene (eds.), *Neither Slave nor Free: The Freedmen of African Descent in the Slave Societies of the New World* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972), 321, 335-39; Aline Helg, "The Limits of Equality: Free People of Colour and Slaves during the First Independence of Cartagena, Colombia, 1810-15," *Slavery and Abolition* 20, no. 2 (1999), 24; Jay Kinsbruner, *Not of Pure Blood: The Free People of Color and Racial Prejudice in Nineteenth-Century Puerto Rico* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), 28-29. My use of the term "of color" does not exclude those of full African descent, although this is how the term has occasionally been employed, as in late eighteenth century Saint Domingue censuses. Nor do I use the term to imply a particular status, e.g., "people of color" as free rather than enslaved, as was often the case in the colonial world. See Laurent Dubois, *Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2004), 70, *passim*.

⁴. In Santiago de Cuba, the free population of color composed the city's largest group in 1808. Rafael Duharte, "Cimarrones urbanos en Santiago de Cuba," *Del Caribe* 2, no. 5 (1985), 11; Franklin Knight, "Cuba," in Cohen and Greene (eds.), *Neither Slave nor Free*, 289. During Spain's brief period of rule in New Orleans during the second half of the eighteenth century, the free population of color grew dramatically, reaching almost 20 percent of society. Thus, it can be seen similarly as an intermediate case. Kimberly Hanger, *Bounded Lives, Bounded Places: Free Black Society in Colonial New Orleans, 1769-1803* (Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 1997), 18.

⁵. Kathleen Higgins offers a related interpretation for eighteenth-century Sabará, Brazil, in "*Licentious Liberty*" in a *Brazilian Gold-Mining Region: Slavery, Gender, and Social Control in Eighteenth-Century Sabará, Minas Gerais* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), 174.

⁶. This distinction is drawn from scholars of ancient slavery, specifically Moses Finley and Keith Hopkins. Berlin, *Many Thousands Gone*, 380. Finley argued that the ancient Greeks and Romans transformed slavery from a "primordial fact" into something new and wholly original in world history (and something rare throughout history), namely, an institutionalized system of large-scale employment of slave labour in both the countryside and the cities." Moses I. Finley, *Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology*, 67.

⁷. Berlin, *Many Thousands Gone*, 8, 96, *passim*.

⁸. An analogous interpretation of Caribbean Colombia and Venezuela has been suggested by Aline Helg in "The Limits of Equality," 24, *passim*. Drawing on Benedict Anderson's formulation of the term, I use "imagined community" to signify common identification among people who do not necessarily know each other but who nonetheless infer a sense of similarity and similar experiences (past, present, or future) on the basis of certain shared characteristics (from the

genealogical to the literary, e.g. all subscribing to the *New York Times*, etc.). On the nation as an "imagined community," see Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).

⁹. See note 1.

¹⁰. See Richard Turits, *Foundations of Despotism: Peasants, the Trujillo Regime, and Modernity in Dominican History* (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 2003), chapter 1.

¹¹. On increasing racialization following the development of a sugar plantation economy in Cuba, see, Martínez-Alier, *Marriage, Class and Colour in Nineteenth-Century Cuba*. See also Gwendolyn Midlo Hall, *Social Control in Slave Plantation Societies: A Comparison of St. Domingue and Cuba* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1996 [1971]), 119-35; *infra*. On the other hand, the preponderant role of men of color in Cuban wars for independence in the 1868-1898 period--a history Cuba shares with the Dominican Republic--and the discourse of racial integration that emerged along with these struggles may have been made possible by forms of inclusion in the nation dating back to the pre-plantation era. Historian Alejandro de la Fuente's work on colonial Cuba points in this direction. See Alejandro de la Fuente, "Slave Law and Claims-Making in Cuba: The Tannenbaum Debate Revisited," *Law and History Review* 22, no. 2 (Summer 2004). This suggests that, along with profound divergences, certain shared histories of race continued to be important in the Spanish Caribbean even in the late nineteenth century. On discourses of racial integration in Cuba during subsequent periods, see Alejandro de la Fuente, *A Nation for All: Race, Inequality, and Politics in Twentieth-Century Cuba* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Ada Ferrer, *Insurgent Cuba: Race, Nation, and Revolution, 1868-1898* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999). Also noteworthy in this respect is that while the United States reinforced interracial marriage prohibitions after the abolition of slavery, Spain eliminated these restrictions in Cuba in 1881 during the years of emancipation. (The king's decision was made in the context, as historian Hannah Rosen and I have found, of local pressures from both civil and ecclesiastic authorities who faced numerous couples of different "color" or "race" seeking marriage during this period.) [[Confirm details](#)] See the multiple documents related to the end of these restrictions in Archivo Nacional de Cuba (ANC), Gobierno General, leg. 3046., nu. Au. On the United States, see Hannah Rosen, "The Rhetoric of Miscegenation and the Reconstruction of Race: Debating Marriage, Sex, and Citizenship in Postemancipation Arkansas," in Pamela Scully and Diana Paton (eds.), *Gender and Emancipation in the Atlantic World* (Durham: Duke University Press, forthcoming).

¹². See also Silvio Torres-Saillant, "Tribulations of Blackness: Stages in Dominican Racial Identity," *Latin American Perspectives* 25, no. 3 (1998), 126-46.

¹³. In the 1600s, though, as Ira Berlin has shown, places like New York had patterns of race and slavery with forms of fluidity that have not normally been associated with Anglophone America. "Slaves had the right to hold property of their own--which greatly enhanced the ability to expand their independent economic activities...As a regular practice, slave owners conceded the right of slaves to select their owners, so that slaves might live near kin or change an unsatisfactory situation." Berlin, *Many Thousands Gone*, 52-54.

¹⁴. For a related argument made for Brazil, see Carl Degler, *Neither Black Nor White: Slavery and Race Relations in Brazil and the United States* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1971), 213-21. On Brazil, see also Higgins, "Licentious Liberty," esp. 42, 151-52, 216.

¹⁵. For comparative purposes, see Hall, *Social Control in Slave Plantation Societies*, 127-35; Jalil Sued Badillo and Ángel López Cantos, *Puerto Rico Negro* (San Juan: Edición Cultural, 1986, 2001), 298; and Higgins, "Licentious Liberty," 151-52.

¹⁶. Justo del Río Moreno and Lorenzo López y Sebastián, "El comercio azucarero de La Española en el siglo XVI. Presión monopolística y alternativas locales," *Revista Complutense de Historia de América* 17 (1991), 39-78; Mervyn Ratekin, "The Early Sugar Industry in Española," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 34, no. 1 (1954), 1-19.

¹⁷. See Carlos Esteban Deive, *La Española y la esclavitud del indio* (Santo Domingo: Fundación García Arévalo, 1995); Genaro Rodríguez Morel, "The Sugar Economy of Española in the Sixteenth Century," in Stuart B. Schwartz, *Tropical Babels: Sugar and the Making of the Atlantic World* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 103-104, 107, 113; Jalil Sued Badillo, "The Island Caribs: New Approaches to the Question of Ethnicity in the Early Colonial Caribbean," in Neil Whitehead (ed.), *Wolves from the Sea: Readings in the Anthropology of the Native Caribbean* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1995), 67. [revisit the following to check and make more precise:] It is hard to summarize the evolution of Spanish policy on the enslavement of Indians in the 1492-1542 period. I would argue, though, that, essentially, the crown sought to stop enslavement of the inhabitants of any lands it expected to settle and colonize actively (such as the Greater Antilles) rather than just claim and raid. The crown had hoped that social and political control, religious indoctrination, and maintenance of the local population on which it depended for labor would be possible if enslavement was prohibited (unfortunately that was not sufficient protection from exploitation and other perils). By the 1540s, with the near elimination of the Indian population in much of the Caribbean and in the context of Spain's exploding world empire and colonial ambitions, the decades-old conflict between active colonization and slave raiding was won by the former with the first truly strict and broad laws against enslavement of all of Spain's Indian subjects. Soon thereafter, almost all slaves were of African descent in Spanish America, notwithstanding the continuing legal possibility--and occasional reality--of white and other slaves (inter alia, Greeks, Filipinos, Berbers, and Spanish Muslims). See note on the racialization of slavery below.

¹⁸. "Relación de la isla Española enviada al Rey D. Felipe II por el Lic. Echagoian, oidor de la Audiencia de Santo Domingo," *Boletín del Archivo General de la Nación* 4, no. 19 (1941), 446; Roberto Cassá and Genaro Rodríguez, "Consideraciones alternativas acerca de las rebeliones de esclavos en Santo Domingo," *Ecos* 2, no. 3 (1994), 162.

¹⁹. Genaro Rodríguez Morel, "Esclavitud y vida rural en las plantaciones azucareras de Santo Domingo. Siglo XVI," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 49 (1992), 94, 99-100.

²⁰. See also Rodríguez Morel, "The Sugar Economy of Española in the Sixteenth Century," 103.

²¹. "Relación de la isla Española enviada al Rey D. Felipe II por el Lic. Echagoian," 446; Rodríguez Morel, "The Sugar Economy of Española in the Sixteenth Century," 104. Other estimates of the slave population made in the mid-1500s by Church and state officials range from 12,000 and 30,000 (Cassá and Rodríguez Morel, "Consideraciones alternativas," 162n; Carlos Esteban Deive, *La esclavitud del negro en Santo Domingo (1492-1844)* (Santo Domingo: Museo del Hombre Dominicano, 1980), vol. 2, 602-605). Unfortunately, there is no precise and reliable figure for the number of slaves.

²². Chaunu, *Sevilla y América*, 77. Santo Domingo's pre-Columbian peoples were virtually extinguished in the first fifty years after European contact as a result of these pioneering colonizers' violent exploitation of the population, the new diseases they ushered in to which Indians had no immunity, and, perhaps most distinctively, their swift demolition of the island's social and political structures. Noble David Cook, "Disease and the Depopulation of Hispaniola, 1492-1518," *Colonial Latin American Review* 2:1-2 (1993), 214-220. [Provide more sources and perhaps figures on contact population and reasons for extinction.]

²³. Seemingly not included, for instance, were the 5000 Amerindian slaves local officials acknowledged in 1545, most of whom, again, had been forcibly transplanted from elsewhere in the Caribbean and Latin America over the last few decades (Sued-Badillo, "The Island Caribs," 67). On the identification of persons of partial and even full Indian descent as "Spanish" (and also presumably "black," especially in the case of slaves), see Lynne Guitar, "Cultural Genesis: Relationships among Indians, Africans and Spaniards in Rural Hispaniola, First Half of the Sixteenth Century" (Ph.D. diss., Vanderbilt Univ., 1998), 290-93. See also Stuart Schwartz, "Spaniards, *Pardos*, and the Missing Mestizos: Identities and Racial Categories in the Early Hispanic Caribbean," *New West Indian Guide* 71, 1&2 (1997).

²⁴. Dr. Cuenca, Pres. de la Audiencia de Santo Domingo, a V.M., 15 April 1578, AGI, Audiencia de Santo Domingo, leg. 51, ramo I, doc. 10 (a transcription of this document was generously lent to me by historian Genaro Rodríguez Morel); Javier

Malagón Barcelo, *Código Negro Carolino (1784)* (Santo Domingo: Taller, 1974), 143; Deive, *La esclavitud del negro*, vol. 2, 402, 419-20; Deive, *Los guerrilleros negros*, 43-44, 73, 251.

²⁵. Quoted in Hugh Thomas, *The Slave Trade* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 25.

²⁶. Turits, *Foundations of Despotism*, 28-29; Rodríguez Morel, "The Sugar Economy of Española in the Sixteenth Century," 104-08.

²⁷. Chaunu, *Sevilla y América*, 68-80; Frank Peña Pérez, "Despoblación y miseria en Santo Domingo en el siglo diecisiete," *Investigación y Ciencia* 1, no. 1 (1986), 83-92; Juan Bosch, *Composición social dominicana* (Santo Domingo: Alfa y Omega, 1991), 117.

²⁸. For the most complete treatment of slavery in Santo Domingo, see Deive, *La esclavitud del negro*.

²⁹. See Antonio Sánchez Valverde, *Idea del valor de la isla española* (Santo Domingo: Editora Nacional, 1971 (1785)), 169-171.

³⁰. Larrazábal Blanco, *Los negros y la esclavitud*, 183-84. In 1785, Antonio Sánchez Valverde referred to 12-14,000 slaves out of a total population of roughly 125,000 persons. Sánchez Valverde, *Idea del valor de la isla española*, 169. One dubious population estimate published in 1822 indicated that as much as 29 percent of the population was enslaved in 1794. This figure is based on an estimate of 30,000 for the slave population, which would be 16,000 more--more than double--the estimate for the slave population in 1783, 14,000 (which is a more plausible figure). Yet it is doubtful that more than a few thousand slaves entered Santo Domingo during that 11-year period. See Carlos Larrazábal Blanco, *Los negros y la esclavitud en Santo Domingo* (Santo Domingo: Julio D. Postigo e hijos Editores, 1975), 184.

³¹. Berlin, *Many Thousands Gone*, 52-53, 124, 186-87, 212; Tannenbaum, *Slave and Citizen*, 69-71. Tight restrictions on manumission, measures that brought slavery closer to a seemingly unchangeable hereditary essence (and thus were consistent with imagining slavery in racial terms), diverged from the pattern of slavery in most of world history and were a salient departure from the legacy of Roman law. M.I. Finley, *Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology* (New York: The Viking Press, 1980), 19. For comparative purposes, see Bernard Lewis, *Race and Slavery in the Middle East: An Historical Inquiry* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1990), esp. 6-10. Lewis describes the multiple prospects for manumission and self-purchase in the Islamic Middle East but controverts romanticized portraits of race in the Middle East.

³². One of Santo Domingo's leading figures in 1784, Colonel Joaquín García lamented how industrious slaves supposedly "in a few years acquire with the tacit or expressed permission of their owner, or [y] against their will, what was needed for their ransom [*rescate*]. They ask for a valuation [of their worth by a third party] and with that for their freedom, leaving the master without him...just when he would have most used him, after having gone through all the risks with regard to temperament, disease, and time spent in instruction." Malagón, *Código Negro Carolino*, 89. For comparative purposes, see Kimberly Hanger *Bounded Lives*, 19, 25-27, 49-51, 70-71, 186. Hanger found that in Spanish Louisiana during this period, owners were obliged to accept self-purchase by slaves and at the price fixed, if necessary, by the courts. She calculated that one out of every seven compensated manumissions was contested by slave owners. The norms governing the cost of freedom for slaves varied across time and space within Latin America and were established largely by customary rights and legal precedents won by slaves; only in exceptional cases was self-purchase established through positive law. On the uncertainties of customary rights to self-purchase in nineteenth-century Brazilian courts, see Sidney Chaloub, "Slaves, Freeman, and the Politics of Freedom in Brazil," *Slavery and Abolition* 10 (1989): 64-84. See also de la Fuente, "Slave Law and Claims-Making in Cuba"; Hubert H.S. Aimes, "Coartación: A Spanish Institution for the Advancement of Slaves into Freedom," *Yale Review* 17 (1909): 412-31; and Tannenbaum, *Slave and Citizen*, 54.

³³. Survey of notarial and judicial records in the AGN, Archivo Real de Higüey and Archivo Real de Bayaguana. Also parish registers identify a number of free persons who had been born in Africa, thus suggesting the possibility in some cases of relatively rapid manumission. See, e.g., the 1755 entry in a marriage registry for Juan Francisco of Guinea. Archivo del Arzobispado, Santo Domingo (AA), Libro de Matrimonios no. 1, Santa Cruz del Seybo, 27 April 1744 to 15

August 1783, entry 134.

³⁴. Low liberty prices were justified in some manumission deeds as putative gifts in return for slaves' devotion to their owners. For two examples of slaves (one male, one female) who purchased their liberty at half their estimated value of 300 pesos (in 1699 and 1775), see Deive, *La esclavitud del negro*, vol. 2, 412.

³⁵. Survey of records in the AGN, Archivo Real de Higüey and Archivo Real de Bayaguana. [break this down by age etc.]

³⁶. Raymundo González, "Campesinos y sociedad colonial en el siglo dieciocho dominicano," paper presented at the Quinto Congreso Dominicano de Historia, Santo Domingo, 24-27 Oct. 1991 [doublecheck and change to published version]; Dorvo Soulastre, *Voyage par terre de Santo-Domingo, Capitale de la Partie Espagnole de Saint-Domingue, au Cap-François, Capitale de la Partie Française de la même isle* (Paris: Chaumerot, 1809), reprinted in *La Era de Francia en Santo Domingo: Contribución a su estudio*, ed. Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi (Ciudad Trujillo: Editora del Caribe, 1955), 58. [revisit.] In a now seemingly inscrutable prohibition, the *Código Negro Carolino* (see below) restricted slaves from paying partial contributions toward their freedom beyond "half or two-thirds of their value" (presumably in agreements between master and slave for the latter's self-purchase over time (in installments), a practice known as *coartación* and also common in Cuba). This would appear to have responded to complaints that some slaves sought to reduce as much as possible their enslavement without paying their final installment and completely eliminating their slave status. Slaves may have anticipated certain benefits to purchasing partial freedom; for instance, it meant that the price for one's liberty was securely set well in advance, and, as Alejandro de la Fuente describes for Cuba at least, if one was, e.g., half-enslaved, one was subject to only half-time labor. (Most of those able to pay for even part of their freedom were probably hired-out laborers, so partial freedom may have meant less owed each month to their owner.) At the same time, remaining a slave meant one was exempt from conscription in the free black and mulatto militias as well as from a tribute that, in theory at least, all free people of color, unless individually exempted, were supposed to pay to the crown. See Malagón, *Código Negro Carolino*, 203; de la Fuente, "Slave Law and Claims-Making in Cuba," [get page number--near endnote 51]; Deive, *La esclavitud del negro*, vol. 2, 410; Kinsbruner, *Not of Pure Blood*, 24-25, and Encina, Tit. V, Ley 1 and Tit. VII, Leyes 5 and 10 [complete citation]. It is also conceivable that some people chose to remain partially enslaved because they depended on their owners patronage to secure certain jobs.

³⁷. Malagón, *Código Negro Carolino*, 89; Deive, *La esclavitud del negro*, vol. 2, 408.

³⁸. See e.g., AGN, Archivo Real de Higüey, leg. 27, exp. 137.

³⁹. Alejandra Liriano, *El papel de la mujer de origen africano en el Santo Domingo colonial, siglos XVI-XVII* (Santo Domingo: Centro de Investigación para la Acción Femenina, 1992), 53-55.

⁴⁰. See Sánchez Valverde, *Idea del valor de la isla española*, 170-2; Malagón, *Código Negro Carolino*, 202-3; Deive, *La esclavitud del negro*, vol. 2, 405, 407-408; Larrazábal Blanco, *Los negros y la esclavitud*, 180. See also M.L.E. Moreau de Saint-Méry's report of frequent manumissions motivated by "illicit affection" in his *Descripción de la parte española de Santo Domingo* (Ciudad Trujillo: Editora Montalvo, 1944 (1796)), 92.

⁴¹. Malagón, *Código Negro Carolino*, 202; Hanger, *Bounded Lives*, 19, 35-7; Higgins, *Licentious Liberty*, 160-62. For an example of an owner who did not free the child he fathered--and recognized he fathered--with a slave (presumably he was not his only heir), see Deive, *La esclavitud del negro*, vol. 2, 417. [Boletín del AGN published this case--obtain that and check details.]

⁴². One documented example of this is for a relatively poor slave owner who had migrated to Puerto Rico from Santo Domingo following the Haitian Revolution. See Adam Szaszdi, "Apuntes sobre la esclavitud en San Juan de Puerto Rico, 1800-1811," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 23 (1967), 1445n. See also Deive, *La esclavitud del negro*, vol. 2, 408.

⁴³. Moreau de Saint-Méry, *Descripción de la parte española de Santo Domingo*, 94, 92. This assertion is repeated in Fray Cipriano de Utrera, "La condición social del negro en la época colonial," *Eme Eme: Estudios Dominicanos*, no. 17 (March-

April 1975), 54.

⁴⁴. Leading figures also criticized the bequeathing of freedom to slaves as a supposedly misguided act of piety that they claimed increased the number of vagrants and hurt the economic well-being of the deceased's family. See Sánchez Valverde, *Idea del valor de la isla española*, 170-72; Malagón, *Código Negro Carolino*, 88-90, 96-98.

⁴⁵. Malagón, *Código Negro Carolino*, 88.

⁴⁶. These cases involved slaves who had paid the price of *coartación* (see note above). Raymundo González, "Esclavos reclamaron su libertad en los tribunales de justicia," *El Caribe*, 14 Dec. 1991; personal communication with González, 23 June 1999. See also Chaloub, "Slaves, Freeman, and the Politics of Freedom in Brazil"; Rebecca Scott, *Slave Emancipation in Cuba: The Transition to Free Labor, 1860-1899* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1985), 13-14, 105-107; de la Fuente, "Slave Law and Claims-Making"; Aimes, "Coartación." [[obtain and doublecheck Raymundo's article](#)]

⁴⁷. See Chaloub, "Slaves, Freeman, and the Politics of Freedom in Brazil"; de la Fuente, "Slave Law and Claims-Making in Cuba"; Aimes, "Coartación."

⁴⁸. As historian Sidney Chaloub wrote of nineteenth-century Brazil, "manumission through self-purchase was a customary right blacks had wrested from their masters, somewhat surprisingly, in their everyday struggles under slavery. Once it became customary, masters would learn repeatedly from daily experience that there was no possible return." Sidney Chaloub, "Slaves, Freeman, and the Politics of Freedom in Brazil," *Slavery and Abolition* 10 (1989), 70-71. Along similar lines, historian Angel López Cantos wrote of Puerto Rico, "Despite the opposition of part of society that blacks redeem themselves [from slavery], it occurred continually during the entire eighteenth century." Sued Badillo and López Cantos, *Puerto Rico Negro*, 298.

⁴⁹. Malagón, *Código Negro Carolino*, 89. Court records reveal other ways in which slave holders felt that prevailing social forces had undermined their power as masters, and had done so to their and the economy's detriment. For an interesting case in Seybo in 1774 in which a "mulatto slave," Salvador del Rosario, forced his owner, don Lorenzo de Castro, to sell him to another master in light of abuse (specifically punishments without just cause), see ANC, Real Audiencia de Santo Domingo, Legajo 67, exp. 10. During the hearing, Lorenzo de Castro reproached slaves as well as those who supported them against their masters for "staining the reputation of their masters...[so that slaves could] go from one owner to another until they obtained an owner that let them live a dissolute and easy [*viciosa y olgada*] life, which is what in general all the slaves on this island enjoy and which is one of the principal causes of its shameful decadence."

⁵⁰. Also, as one leading resident of Santo Domingo complained in the late 1700s, runaway slaves were harbored illegally and welcomed into the countryside by rural denizens supposedly out of a "misguided notion of harbor charity." Malagón, *Código Negro Carolino*, 95. On the harboring of runaway slaves, see also pp. 118-123, 143.

⁵¹. For a general treatment of stateless spaces and the ways certain populations have been "illegible" to the state, see James Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition have Failed* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1998).

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. Raymundo González, "Esclavos 'ocultos' fueron fuente de conflicto durante la colonia," *El Caribe*, 1 May 1993. In the sixteenth century, when the state was still financing efforts to recapture runaway slaves, most were obliged to live in highly militarized, concentrated communities for self-protection. A dozen or so important maroon communities (*manieles*) were founded in Santo Domingo during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. In 1542, the archdeacon of Santo Domingo reported that thousands of cimarrones were living in these villages. But after the mid-seventeenth century, as plantations vanished and the state stopped sponsoring military expeditions against maroons, runaway slaves no longer were compelled to organize themselves in such defensive communities. See Deive, *Los guerrilleros negros*, esp. 43-44, 73, 251.

⁵³. Raymundo González, "Autonomía de la vida rural fue una característica de evolución de sociedad dominicana en siglo XVIII," *El Caribe*, 10 Aug. 1991, and "Frontera ganadera y dispersión rural caracterizan siglo XVIII dominicano," *El Caribe*, 24 Aug. 1991; Turits, *Foundations of Despotism*, ch. 1.

⁵⁴. And this gave rise to a variety of racist representations (and underrepresentations), constructions of "beauty," popular aphorisms, and forms of privilege and stigma that would persist after independence from Haiti in the 1840s, albeit in highly paradoxical fashion. H. Hoetink, *The Dominican People, 1850-1900: Notes for a Historical Sociology* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1982), 188-92; Carlos Deive, "El prejuicio racial en el folklore dominicano," *Boletín del Museo del Hombre Dominicano* 4, no. 8 (1977).

⁵⁵. In the early 1500s, Spanish slave laws, policies, and specific permissions to import particular slaves to the Americas, identified not only "black" slaves but also "white" slaves (most but not all of whom were Spanish Muslims and Berbers) as well as Indian slaves (tens of thousands of whom, again, were imported from other parts of the Caribbean and Latin America to Santo Domingo, above all). Racial slavery, at least to the degree the Americas would soon know it, was a subsequent innovation in world history, and a substantial number of white slaves, including many Turks and Greeks, were found within Spain itself through the seventeenth century. At the time, there was no restriction or taboo in Spain on the enslavement of whites--e.g., those captured in "just wars"--but rather on fellow Roman Catholics. Although whiteness was already a long-standing racial trope, it was certainly not yet the basis for collective identity that it would come to be, and it was freedom not slavery that one could say was imagined to be limited to one group. In the Americas, though, slavery would increasingly and quite rapidly become synonymous with blackness. On white slavery, see Malagón, *Código Negro Carolino*, 137; Domínguez Ortiz, 1952, 380-81; Guitar, "Cultural Genesis," 199-200.... [[Add primary sources, fix references](#)]

⁵⁶. For colonial demographic observations, see C. Lyonnet, "Estadística de la Parte Española de Santo Domingo, 1800," in *La era de Francia*, ed. Rodríguez Demorizi, 191; Larrazábal Blanco, *Los negros y la esclavitud*, 184; Frank Moya Pons, *El pasado dominicano* (Santo Domingo: Fundación J.A. Caro Alvarez, 1986), 102-3; Roberto Cassá, *Historia social y económica de la República Dominicana*, vol. 1 (Santo Domingo: Alfa y Omega, 1992), 109; Jan Lundius and Mats Lundahl, *Peasants and Religion: A Socioeconomic Study of Dios Olivorio and the Palma Sola Movement in the Dominican Republic* (New York: Routledge, 2000), 405.

⁵⁷. [[Provide statistics here.](#)] The lack of formal marriage and the prevalence of what was considered sexual promiscuity in the countryside was decried by Church authorities from the capital, who came periodically to the towns for *santas visitas* (pastoral visits) to try to regulate church and popular practices. Visita pastoral de Fray Fernando y su secretario Fray Gaspar Ascanio, ANC, Fondo Miscelánea de Expedientes, legajo 10, n.e.; AA, Libro de Matrimonios no. 1, Santa Cruz del Seybo, entry 186, 11 Jan. 1760. Consensual unions were doubtless more common than formal marriage in the countryside given, inter alia, the associated costs and the minuscule number of priests outside the main population centers. [[Investigate more how many were married, compare marriage numbers with population estimates, with burial records, etc.](#)] In one case where a couple could not pay the required fee for the marriage ceremony's candle (and possibly for a dispensation for consanguinity as well), fifteen days of work for the church were demanded instead. AA, Libro de Matrimonios no. 1, Santa Cruz del Seybo, entry 185, 8 Jan. 1760.

⁵⁸. See AA, Libro de Matrimonios no. 1, Santa Cruz del Seybo, 27 April 1744 to 15 August 1783.

⁵⁹. For instance, Juan Francisco of Guinea married Andrea de la Candelaria (not identified racially) in 1755. AA, Libro de Matrimonios no. 1, Santa Cruz del Seybo, 27 April 1744 to 15 August 1783, entry 134.

⁶⁰. In Saint Domingue, we find a somewhat analogous practice of deracialization for wealthy people of African descent. Historian Stewart King writes: "It was quite common for wealthy people of mixed ancestry...to appear in the notarial record without any racial identifier appended to their name." This "invulnerability to racial categorization," however, not only appears to have been a less frequent occurrence, but also, presumably, a less powerful one than in Santo Domingo, given that, unlike in the Spanish parish records, "whites" were identified in the French notarial records. Thus lack of racial

identification would presumably suggest African rather than (full) European descent. Stewart R. King, *Blue Coat of Powdered Wig: Free People of Color in Pre-Revolutionary Saint Domingue* (Athens: Univ. of Georgia Press, 2001), 160-61.

To use the terms "intermarriage" or "interracial marriage" to describe unions across African and European descent in this context may reflect more an outsiders' (or "etic") construction than an insiders' (or "emic") one. If we do not start from the assumption of distinct hierarchical social groups and communities based on African versus European descent, as I am suggesting may have hardly prevailed in the everyday life of rural Santo Domingo, we should not be able to conclude that mixture of those of African versus European descent would necessarily have been seen as relations between two *groups*, and thus as intermarriage. (One could argue that this is also the case today in most sections of Dominican society, though this is not to say that there is, nor was, no shade or color consciousness and prejudice differentiating *individuals*, a pattern discussed below).

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. An inventory of the records of the Archivo del Arzobispado compiled by historian José Luis Sáez, however, does list one book of baptismal records from the 1635 to 1670 period solely for slaves for the parish of the Sagrario de la Catedral in Santo Domingo. (Unfortunately, this book has been lent out of the Archivo to a priest since 1996 and thus I have been unable to examine it.) The inventory also reports that only one baptism register for the 1590 to 1635 period from this same parish has survived (I have not been able to examine this register yet either), and it reportedly recorded the baptisms only of whites. If this is true, it suggests that there was another register only for slaves from this earlier period as well. Or was that other register instead for all people of color? It is not clear in which of these books free people of color were listed, or, in other words, whether the division reflected in these books was one of race or status. What also is not clear is why only baptism records were divided. Marriage records from this same period in this parish [confirm] were not divided by either race or status. After 1670 [1673?], there were no divisions of any kind in parish records. If 1670 [1673?] was indeed a turning point for the full integration of parish records, it coincided closely with the full disappearance of the slave plantation economy. Note that there are no records from prior to 1590, as they were destroyed during the invasion led by Francis Drake in 1586. For comparative purposes, note also that in certain parishes of Bahia, Brazil, baptismal books were also not divided, at least after 1828--despite rules requiring it and in contrast to practices in other areas, such as Rio de Janeiro. Personal communication with Jean Hébrard, 5 March 2004. See also Jean Hébrard, "....," *Cahiers du Brésil Contemporain* (April 2004) and Mary Karash, *Slave Life in Rio de Janeiro* (1987). [fix citations]

62. Note the one exception to this pattern in Santo Domingo given in the previous endnote. On the French Caribbean, see Bernard David, "La population d'un quartier de la Martinique au début du dix-neuvième siècle d'après les registres paroissiaux: Rivière-Pilote, 1802-1829," *Revue française d'histoire d'Outre-mer* 60, no. 220 (1973): 330-63; Laurent Dubois, *A Colony of Citizens* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 254.

63. The governor doubtless meant to say "blacks" rather than "slaves," though the confusion of "slave" and "black" is perhaps telling. *Calidad* was a term commonly used by officials in this period when identifying what we would generally deem today either race or color. See e.g., Causa criminal de oficio contra José Santiago de Rivera alias el Brujo, ANC, Audiencia de Santo Domingo, leg. 120, n. 15. Santiago de Rivera was an accused thief identified as "de condición libre de calidad pardo," literally "of free condition (status) and of pardo quality."

64. Martín de Mueses, Escribano Real Público, Gobierno y Guerra, to the Gobernador and Capitán General, 16 June 1815, and Carlos Urrutia, Gobernador and Capitán General, to the Secretario del Supremo Consejo de Indias, 16 June 1815, Archivo General de Indias, Sevilla (AGI), Indiferente General, leg. 1534.

65. Anthropologist Verena Martínez-Alier described the power of race as a "symbol for other socially significant cleavages in society." See Martínez-Alier, *Marriage, Class and Colour in Nineteenth-Century Cuba*, 75-76, 6, passim.

66

. Kinsbruner, *Not of Pure Blood*, 24. [Elaborate specific laws and references] [Also add Cassá on Sánchez Valverde's never reaching the highest level in the church because, C. believes, SV was ultimately considered of color?]

⁶⁷. Christine Rivas, "The Spanish Colonial Military: Santo Domingo: 1701-1779," *The Americas* 60. no. 2 (Oct. 2003), 254-55; Hoetink, *The Dominican People*, 183. [Add here histories from 1762 documents from Audiencia de Santo Domingo and Bayaguana/Higuey protocolos showing both prejudicial white objections to de facto forms of racial equality and protests by people of African descent against such as wrongful prejudices (indeed as racism) and treating free people of color as if they were slaves.]

⁶⁸. Such tensions between law and practice appear to have existed from early on, indeed already in the late 1500s. Although to a possibly lesser degree, officials complained at that time about free blacks' putative impudence and violation of legal racial restrictions, such as prohibitions on their owning, operating, or being served wine in taverns. See Dr. Cuenca, Pres. de la Audiencia de Santo Domingo, a V.M., 15 April 1578, AGI, Audiencia de Santo Domingo, leg. 51, ramo I, doc. 10 (document and its transcription courtesy of Genaro Rodríguez); Malagón, *Código Negro Carolino*, 143; Deive, *La esclavitud del negro*, vol. 2, 402, 419-20; Deive, *Los guerrilleros negros*, 43-44, 73, 251.

⁶⁹. Moreau de Saint-Méry, *Descripción de la parte española de Santo Domingo*, 93-94; Frank Moya Pons, "Dominican National Identity: A Historical Perspective," *Punto 7 Review* 3, no. 1 (otoño de 1996), 15; Silvio Torres-Saillant, "Creoleness or Blackness: A Dominican Dilemma," *Plantation Society of the Americas* 5, no. 1 (1998), 31; Deive, *La esclavitud del negro*, vol. 2, 553-598; Hoetink, *The Dominican People*, 183; Leslie Rout, Jr., *The African Experience in Spanish America: 1502 to the Present Day* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), esp. 136-56.

⁷⁰. See, e.g., the 7 Sept. 1738 marriage record of Francisca del Rosario to Joseph de Altagracia, identified as "slave morenos" of the "free morenos", Captain Juan Mendes and Ana Santiago. AA, Libro de Matrimonios 4, Catedral (Santo Domingo), 1718-1741.

⁷¹. See, e.g., Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi, *Milicias de Santo Domingo, 1786-1821* (Santo Domingo: Editora del Caribe, 1978), 111-12. [Add, if possible, Spanish official objecting to mulattos in university, reply but they are the "blancos of this land," as well as indiv. whites objecting to lack of deference by blacks in Higuey/Bayaguana protocolos.] On definitions of whiteness, cf. Hoetink, *The Dominican People*, 183, Malagón, *Código Negro Carolino*, 168. My source for the term "blancos que da la tierra" is historian Raymundo González. Personal communication, 23 June 1999.

⁷². J.B. Lemonier Delafosse, *Segunda campaña de Santo Domingo: Guerra dominico-francesa de 1808* (Santiago, D.R.: Editora El Diario, 1946), 151. See also Jonathan Brown, *The History and Present Condition of St. Domingo*, vol. 2 (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1971), 286. [Check & include Brown quotation?] Analogously, the trope "blacks of the land" was used to identify--and racialize the status of--Indian slaves in eighteenth-century Brazil. Barbara A. Sommer, "Colony of the *Sertão*: Amazonian Expeditions and the Indian Slave Trade," *The Americas* 61, no. 3 (Jan. 2005), 406n. "Whites of the land" was also a term found in Brazil, but I have not been able yet to pin down its historical uses.

⁷³. Rivas, "The Spanish Colonial Military," 254-55. [I have the case she refers to.]

⁷⁴. James F. King, "The Case of José Ponciano de Ayarza: A Document on Gracias al Sacar," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 31, no. 4 (Nov. 1951), 640-47.

⁷⁵. Hoetink makes this assertion in *The Dominican People*, 183.

⁷⁶. See, e.g., Joaquín García's quotation below treating *negros* and *pardos* as a single social entity.

⁷⁷. King, *Blue Coat of Powdered Wig*, 84; Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*, 60-71; James, *The Black Jacobins*, 37-42.

⁷⁸. Laurent Dubois, *Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2004), 134, 156. [add other, dogeared pp. too?]; C.L.R. James, *The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L'Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution* (New York: Vintage, 1963), [confirm with specific pages]. Despite the alliances eventually formed

between slaves and free people of color during the Haitian revolution, the population remained divided, to a large extent, between three groups: "blacks" (those who were slaves at the time of the revolution), "whites," and "people [or "men"] of color" (those already free when the revolution began) or "the mulattos." See Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*, 190-91, 210. At the same time, distinctions in colonial Saint Domingue were drawn at times, as in the 1782 census, between "free blacks" and free people of mixed European and African descent ("people of color, mulattos, etc."). (The term "people of color" could signify either all free persons of color or, as here, only those with some European descent--a reflection, again, of the conflation of mixed descent and freedom.) See Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*, 70, 81, 130, 151.

⁷⁹. King, *Blue Coat or Powdered Wig*, 94.

⁸⁰. If we can accept historian Stewart King's conclusion, "free blacks were almost as numerous as free persons of mixed race." King, *Blue Coat or Powdered Wig*, 160. Cf. James, *The Black Jacobins*, 43. For a call for the emancipation only of "mulatto slaves" (as well as "equality for all [free] non-whites") by a group of activists of color see Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*, 131.

⁸¹. Preliminary survey of records in the AGN, Archivo Real de Higüey and Archivo Real de Bayaguana.

⁸². On this understanding of race, see, again, Martínez-Alier, *Marriage, Class and Colour in Nineteenth-Century Cuba*, 75-76, 6, passim.

⁸³

. Raymundo González, "Libertos en la sociedad esclavista," *El Caribe*, 30 Nov. 1991; personal communication with González, 23 June 1999. [check his article again, maybe pers. comm. not nec]

⁸⁴. Turits, *Foundations of Despotism*, esp. chs. 1-2.

⁸⁵. [Citation needed. Give ex. from protocolos, inheritance of land, etc.]

⁸⁶. Laws in Virginia even restricted free people of color from learning to read and write. See Brenda E. Stevenson, *Life in Black and White: Family and Community in the Slave South* (Oxford University Press), ch. 9, esp. 275-77. [See also Ira Berlin: Georgia laws; DBD review of Stevenson (filed with creolization/social death?)]. Herbert Klein and Francisco Vidal Luna similarly contrast the position of free people of color in Brazil and the U.S. See Klein and Vidal Luna, "Free Colored in a Slave Society: São Paulo and Minas Gerais in the Early Nineteenth Century," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 80, no. 4 (Nov. 2000), 940.

⁸⁷. Pedro Bonó, *Papeles de Pedro F. Bonó*, ed. Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi (Barcelona: Gráficas M. Pareja, 1980), 192.

⁸⁸. Scott, *Seeing Like a State*, 1-2, passim.

⁸⁹. Also during the eighteenth century, the state sought to ensure systematic punishment of slaves and fined numerous slave owners who failed to meet its norms for fairness and rigor. [provide citation to documents from ANC]

⁹⁰. Pedro Catani to D. Pedro Porlier, 15 Nov. 1788, AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 968. Cited in Raymundo González, "Campeños y sociedad colonial en el siglo XVIII dominicano," paper presented at the Quinto Congreso Dominicano de Historia, Santo Domingo, 24-27 Oct. 1991. [Article version?]

⁹¹. Pedro Catani to His Majesty, "Informe sobre la comisión para capturar al negro incognito," Santo Domingo, 25 May 1793, AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 998. Copy courtesy of Raymundo González.

⁹². Malagón, *Código Negro Carolino*, xviii-xix, xlvi, li, 159. See also Louis Sala-Molins, *L'Afrique aux Amériques: Le Code Noir espagnol* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992); Liliana Obregón, "Black Codes in Latin America," in

Africana: The Encyclopedia of the African and African American Experience, ed. Kwame Anthony Appiah and Henry Louis Gates, Jr. (Redmond: Basic Civitas, 1999).

⁹³. Malagón, *Código Negro Carolino*, 111.

⁹⁴. Malagón, *Código Negro Carolino*, 97-98, 94.

⁹⁵. Malagón, *Código Negro Carolino*, 94-95, 98.

⁹⁶

. The term *tercerón* (from the Spanish root for "third") was defined in the Code as the offspring of a *pardo* and a "white person," or the "third" generation, based on a definition of the first generation as that of the "white and black" parents of a *pardo* (the second-generation). Similarly, the Code defined "quadroon" as the fourth generation of mixture between a white person and a person of African descent. The fifth generation was named *mestizo* (mixed), and those in the sixth generation were "to be considered whites." Malagón, *Código Negro Carolino*, 168. Note that each of these racial terms have had discrepant meanings over time. "Quadroon" came to be defined, e.g., among census officials in the U.S. in 1890 as a person with "one-fourth black blood" (thus equivalent to a *tercerón* in the Code's schema) rather than the fourth generation. Melissa Nobles, *Shades of Citizenship: Race and the Census in Modern Politics* (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 2000), 188. Similarly, in the French Caribbean, the term *tierceron* identified the child of a white and a mulatto, though the more common term for this racial classification was *mestif* or *métif*, and *quarteron* or *carteron* generally signified the child of a white and a *mestif*, but may have been employed at times like *tierceron* and *mestif*. See David, "La population d'un quartier de la Martinique au début du dix-neuvième siècle d'après les registres paroissiaux," 345; King, *Blue Coat or Powdered Wig*, 166-67; Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*, 68.

⁹⁷. The quotation continues that such individuals were "stealing [jobs] from the white and *color medio* population." The term *color medio* (literally "middle" or "in-between color") doubtless referred here to those persons of African descent with sufficient European mixture, or distance from slavery, to be imagined along with "whites" in opposition to the population of "blacks, *libres*, and slaves," in other words to be considered *blancos de la tierra*. Malagón, *Código Negro Carolino*, 184.

⁹⁸. Malagón, *Código Negro Carolino*, 175-177. [Analyze additional material on this in Code and perhaps integrate following in text:] Along these same lines the *cabildo* (town council) of Santo Domingo agreed on a plan in 1786 to resettle free blacks in the countryside in the village of San Lorenzo de los Minas on the outskirts of the capital (founded in 1676 by maroons from Saint Domingue) and to oblige them to become commercial agriculturalists. Deive, *La esclavitud del negro en Santo Domingo*, 420-21).]

⁹⁹. Government control over manumission had been envisaged earlier by local leaders in a 1768 black code proposed by the secular *cabildo* (municipal council) of Santo Domingo. But higher authorities (the *fiscal* and the *audiencia*) objected to the code's inspiration in French laws, and the project was never realized. Malagón, *Código Negro Carolino*, 50-51, 123-24, 162, 164, 171-2, 184, 202-3.

¹⁰⁰. In 1789, the crown promulgated the slave code, "Real Cédula de su Magestad sobre la Educación, Trato y Ocupaciones de los esclavos, en todos sus dominios de Indias e Islas Filipinas," but formally suspended its implementation in 1794, in the wake of opposition from local officials and slave owners in Cuba, Venezuela, Colombia, Louisiana, and Santo Domingo, who considered it too liberal in terms of the legal protections that it granted slaves. Furthermore, this suspension was declared in the context of fears, rebellions, and war provoked by the Haitian Revolution, including, for instance, a large slave conspiracy in the central frontier regions of Santo Domingo in 1793. Malagón, *Código Negro Carolino*, liv-lxi; "Autos seguidos sobre la Insurrección pretendida por los negros esclavos en Híncha (Santo Domingo)", 26 de marzo de 1793. AGN, Archivo de la Nación de la República Dominicana cortesía del Archivo Nacional de Cuba, leg. 4, signatura 43. [Add in text here about slave and peasant rebellions in this period. Also mt discuss the reasons some slaves gave for why they did not participate in the conspiracies and rebellions; that they were good christians etc. (as discussed with Alejandro, showed that they had learned the dominant discourse at least--ie some integration of sorts, as

also with large number of slaves who were legally married...)]

¹⁰¹. Analogous dynamics also may have been at work in 1800s Cuba when the colonial state, Cuban elites, and the growth of a plantation economy itself established new limits on the rights and opportunities of free people of color. In this context, free people of color played important roles, together with slaves and whites, in the series of revolts, conspiracies, and ultimately revolution that erupted throughout the nineteenth century. My hypothesis is that, in general, states were effective at restricting manumission and harshly repressing free people of color without generating massive political ferment only when those measures were imposed early on so as to forestall the development of a large or powerful free population of color--the path followed, in general, in the British colonies. On Cuba, see Robert L. Paquette, *Sugar is Made With Blood: The Conspiracy of La Escalera and the Conflict between Empires over Slavery in Cuba* (Middleton: Wesleyan Univ. Press, 1988), esp. chs. 4 and 9; Matt David Childs, "The Aponte Rebellion of 1812 and the Transformation of Cuban Society: Race, Slavery, and Freedom in the Atlantic World" (Ph.D. diss.: Univ. of Texas at Austin, 2001); Franklin W. Knight, "The Free Colored Population in Cuba during the Nineteenth Century," in *Slavery Without Sugar: Diversity in Caribbean Economy and Society Since the Seventeenth Century*, ed. Verene A. Shepherd (Gainesville: Univ. Press of Florida, 2002); Martinez-Alier, *Marriage, Class and Colour in Nineteenth-Century Cuba*; Hall, *Social Control in Slave Plantation Societies*.

¹⁰². Turits, *Foundations of Despotism*, 44-47. The impact of the Haitian occupation is evident in Church records (preserved in the Archivo del Arzobispado in Santo Domingo). Once the country was annexed by Haiti in 1822--just months after it had declared its first independence from Spain--all racial categories, color descriptions, and references to (past) condition of servitude dropped out of the records and did not subsequently reappear. Following independence from Haiti in 1844, civil registers of births, marriages, and deaths (housed at the Archivo General de la Nación) also made no racial distinctions. (This contrasts with Cuba, for instance, where race continued to be indicated in marriage and baptismal records [check the relationship between civil and church, former starts in 1905] until the late twentieth century, and marriage books remained separated by race in certain regions for decades following independence from Spain in 1898.) [clarify details and give sources, see M. y A. 9/17/04.]

¹⁰³. These political leaders, though, would be variously stigmatized by opponents for their lineage, physical appearance, and supposedly dubious nationality. And at the start of the twentieth century, with economic growth, an emerging national bourgeoisie, and the diffusion of scientific racism throughout the west, whites would reassert political dominance, for instance occupying the presidency until Rafael Trujillo seized power in 1930. Deive, "El prejuicio racial," 90, passim; Hoetink, *The Dominican People*, 189-92.

¹⁰⁴. See, e.g., the *Censo de Puerto Plata* (1871) housed in the Archivo General de la Nación in Santo Domingo, which lists a person's nationality, profession, age, and marital status, but not race or color. [Confirm: Race was used, though, during the period when the country was briefly annexed again to Spain (1861-1865)] [doublecheck 1844-1861 period for any state records using race: church clearly did not. Also check for any other remaining censuses from the entire period.]

¹⁰⁵. Rodolphe Garczynski, "Life in Santo Domingo City," *Appletons' Journal* 9, no. 223 (June 28, 1873), 839-42. I am indebted to Aldo Lauria-Santiago for sharing a copy of this article with me. On aesthetic racism in the Dominican Republic, see also Deive, "El prejuicio racial," 80-84. Sociologist Harry Hoetink portrayed Dominican society from early on as an infinite continuum of racial distinctions based on "shade" and other physical features whose polarities were associated with either European colonists or enslaved Africans, rather than as a predominantly two or three-tier (black-mulatto-white) racial order. See Harry Hoetink, *Caribbean Race Relations. A Study of Two Variants* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1971); Harry Hoetink, "'Race' and Color in the Caribbean," in Sidney Mintz and Sally Price, *Caribbean Contours* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1985).

¹⁰⁶. In addition to skin color, these forms recorded stature, hair, eyebrows, eyes, forehead, nose, beard, ears, both mouth and lips, and even voice. Prisoners were similarly identified in Cuba at this time. See Aisnara Perera Díaz and María de los Angeles Meriño Fuentes, "Nombrar las cosas..." (manuscript, notes 32 and 46). See also Alejandra Bronfman, *Measures of Equality: Social Science, Citizenship, and Race in Cuba, 1902-1940 (Envisioning Cuba)* (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 2004), [p. ??--Is this, in fact, in her book? or cite instead: Personal communication with Alejandra

¹⁰⁷. Estado Demonstrativo de los Crímenes, Delitos, y Contravenciones Habidos Durante el Año de 190? [date not completed in document], AGN, Procuraduría General, Corte de Apelación, Santo Domingo, Registro de Presos, 1; Relación de los marinos inscrito en el registro de matrículas en esta Comandancia, Comandancia del Puerto de Barahona, 19 de abril de 1897 and Estado demostrativo de los marinos inscrito en la matrícula de este Puerto [[verify title \(deteriorated document\)](#)], Comandancia del Puerto de Puerto Plata, 13 April 1897, AGN, Ministerio de Guerra y Marina, leg. 55-56, exp. 2, 1897-1898.

As discussed in the text and note 95 below, popular use of the term *indio* in the Dominican Republic, at least in the twentieth century, appears not to have signified identification as an Indian or a person of Indian descent, but rather to have been used as a trope for color applicable to lighter-skinned persons of African (and European) descent. Yet the origins and evolution of this trope in the Dominican Republic and its various similar meanings and uses in a number of Caribbean nations remain to be charted over time, space, and class. Early on, it was doubtless linked to claims regarding indigenous lineage, however exaggerated or false, among (or for) people of African descent, claims found in varying degrees across the Americas. For instance, some free people of color in prerevolutionary Haiti and former Haitian slaves who escaped to freedom in Santo Domingo claimed to be *indien*, the latter presumably to ensure their free status [[double check Silié's piece; ask him about this](#)]. See Suzanne Sylvain-Comhaire, "Influences indiennes dans le folklore haïtien," *La Revue* (Port-au-Prince) 7 (Jan. 1938), 7-8; H. Hoetink, "The Dominican Republic in the Twentieth Century: Notes on Mobility and Stratification," *New West Indian Guide*, vol. 74, no. 3&4, 224-25; Rubén Silié, "El hato y el conuco: Contexto para el surgimiento de la cultura criolla," in Bernardo Vega et al., *Ensayos sobre cultura dominicana* (Santo Domingo: Museo del Hombre Dominicano, 1988), 164. Censuses in 1790s Guadeloupe used the term "red" for free people of color, conceivably an analogous use of Indian-ness as a trope for those of African descent who were not enslaved (Laurent Dubois, "'The Price of Liberty': Victor Hugues and the Administration of Freedom in Guadeloupe, 1794-1802," *William and Mary Quarterly* 56 (3rd series), no. 2 (April 1999), 363-64, 388). According to Alden Vaughan, Indians themselves became consistently labeled as "red" [[where precisely?](#)] beginning in the late eighteenth century. See his essay in *American Historical Review* (1982) [[confirm and give full citation](#)]. Early twentieth century intellectuals varied in their emphasis on or discounting of the portion of Indian descent among Dominicans. For an example of the former, see José R. López, *América Antilla: Geografía de la América Antilla y en particular de la República Dominicana* (Santo Domingo: Francisco A. Palau, 1921), 51. [[confirm title](#)]

¹⁰⁸. Relación de los marinos inscrito en el registro de matrículas en esta Comandancia, Comandancia del Puerto de Barahona, 19 de abril de 1897, AGN, Ministerio de Guerra y Marina, leg. 55-56, exp. 2, 1897-1898.

¹⁰⁹. Estado demostrativo de los marinos inscrito en la matrícula de este Puerto [verify title], Comandancia del Puerto de Puerto Plata, 13 April 1897, AGN, Ministerio de Guerra y Marina, leg. 55-56, exp. 2, 1897-1898 [[ojo: document incomplete, hence missing data for nos. 21-31--total is actually 64 troops](#)]

¹¹⁰. Nómina del personal del Crucero "Independencia," 3 April 1897, AGN, Ministerio de Guerra y Marina, leg. 55-56, exp. 8, 1897-1898; *infra*. Across the Americas, the term "griff" had various uses but generally referred to a person almost entirely of African descent. On its specific use in the colonial French Caribbean (the child of a black and a *câpre* parent--*câpre* being in turn a child of black and a mulatto parent), see David, "La population d'un quartier de la Martinique au début du dix-neuvième siècle d'après les registres paroissiaux," 345.

¹¹¹. The Dominican state appears to have been influenced by the U.S. occupation in its turn toward official racial classification, though Dominican color discourse remains evident, for instance, in the use of the terms *indio* and *mestizo* instead of "mulatto." Census takers in 1920 were instructed to note a person's "race or color" and calculate the total number of "whites, blacks, *mestizos*, *indios*, yellows, and others" in their assigned areas. See Secretaría de Estado de lo Interior y Policía, Dirección del Primer Censo Nacional, *Instrucciones generales para los inspectores, sub-inspectores, enumeradores y relativas al uso de cada planilla* (Santo Domingo: n.p., 1920), 23. Note also that identification cards (*cédulas*) used under the U.S. occupation described individuals as, inter alia, *indio oscuro* (dark brown or literally dark Indian). Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, photograph following p. 96. When the 1920 census was published, though, the term *indio* was not used, only *mestizo*. Secretaría de Estado de lo Interior y Policía, *Primer Censo Nacional de*

República Dominicana, 1920 (Santo Domingo: Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo, 1975), 128. And subsequent censuses continued to organize people into a three-tier racial schema.

¹¹². The 1920 census included--for unexplained reasons--*los amarillos* ("yellows," those of Asian descent) among the *mestizos*. The 1919 census for the municipality of Santo Domingo, on the other hand, did not; it listed 15 *amarillos*, 5,917 *mestizos*, 7,656 blacks, and 792 whites. *Primer Censo Nacional de República Dominicana, 1920*, 128; José R. López, *Censo y Catastro de la Común de Santo Domingo, Informe* (Santo Domingo: n.p., 1919), 51; Jean Price-Mars, *La República de Haití y la República Dominicana: Diversos aspectos de un problema histórico, geográfico y etnológico* (Madrid: Industrias Gráficas España, 1958), vol. 1, 181. [get the actual census instead.]

¹¹³. M. Ubaldo Gómez, "El color de los dominicanos," *Bahoruco* 3, no. 106 (20 Aug. 1932), 18-20.

¹¹⁴. Other terms for "color or race" used in death records for immigrants from this period include: *trigueño* (e.g. for an individual from Puerto Rico), "white" (e.g., for individuals from Spain and France), "yellow" (e.g., for an individual from China), *moreno* (e.g., for a Haitian man), and "black" (e.g., for a woman from Martinique with a Saint Thomasian father). See the *certificados de defunción* of the Secretaría de Estado de Sanidad y Beneficencia, nos. 70, 78, 154, 5, 60 and 145, 25, n.n., in AGN, leg. 280-81, Secretaría de Estado de Relaciones Exteriores, 1924. That Haitians were among those identified as *indio* in the 1920s is especially striking given the conventional argument in the existing literature that Dominicans of color supposedly identified themselves as "Indians" (*indios*) and only Haitians as "blacks" (*negros*). Indeed much has been made of the multiple categories of *color* in the Dominican Republic, particularly the intermediate category of "indio" that over time came to include even darker-skinned Dominicans--those identified in social contexts as *moreno*--on the *cédula* and other forms (forms based, at least partly it appears, on self-identification). Some scholars have pointed to this as evidence of a false racial or ethnic identification with Indians and a denial of African ancestry among Dominicans that became a legal institution during the Trujillo regime. Certainly the frequent denigration and suppression of the important role of Afro-Caribbean practices in Dominican history and culture has been a salient form of Dominican racism. However, although its origins, uses, and resonances have yet to be fully explored, the term *indio*, has long been employed in everyday conversation as an adjective with no clear indigenous identification or denotation (beyond the metaphorical) for a somatic and skin color range within a continuum of physical appearance, namely, somewhat lighter-skinned than the mean but still non-white. To be precise, *indio* has not served as substitute for "black." "Moreno" has generally been employed to describe the color of darker-skinned Dominicans in everyday conversation while "black" has been used as a racial category in official statistics (but rarely for "color" on the *cédula*). Few Dominicans, in fact, disavow being of at least partial African descent. Nonetheless, the absence of a collective black identity, and apparently of any collective identity or notion of community based on color, is an anomaly within the African diaspora that begs further exploration. Also note that the term "indio" was in common use, including among Dominican officials, since at least the late nineteenth century. *Supra*. For an alternative perspective, see Ernesto Sagás, *Race and Politics in the Dominican Republic* (Gainesville: Univ. Press of Florida, 2000), 67, 76, *passim*.

¹¹⁵. Edward L. Ayers, *In the Presence of Mine Enemies: The Civil War in the Heart of America, 1859-1863* (New York: Norton, 2003), 21.

¹¹⁶. The 1896 *Plessy v. Ferguson* U.S. Supreme Court ruling upheld legal segregation even in the case of a New Orleans "octoroon," Homer Plessy, whose "mixture of colored blood," as his counsel put it, "was not discernible." Similarly, the Census Board subsequently decided that the classification of "mulattoes," "quadroons," and "octoroons" in the 1890 census was "of little value and misleading," hence their removal from the 1900 census (though "mulatto" reappeared briefly in 1910 and 1920). Nobles, *Shades of Citizenship*, 62, 67-69.

¹¹⁷. [Note, though, the exceptional spaces within DR and historicize the particular circumstances that seem to have led a few local neighborhoods (such as Villa Mella in the capital and parts of Baní) to have become places popularly identified as "black" or more "African" culturally, and where some residents have had a type of local black identity. Thanks to Jesse Hoffnung-Garskof for emphasizing this.]

¹¹⁸. See also Silvio Torres-Saillant, "Tribulations of Blackness: Stages in Dominican Racial Identity," *Latin American*

Perspectives 25, no. 3 (1998), 126-46; Moya Pons, "Dominican National Identity," 14-25.

¹¹⁹. Richard Turits, "A World Destroyed, A Nation Imposed: The 1937 Haitian Massacre in the Dominican Republic," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 82, no. 3 (Aug. 2002); Turits, *Foundations of Despotism*, ch. 5.

¹²⁰. Helg, "The Limits of Equality," 24.

¹²¹. Kinsbruner, *Not of Pure Blood*, 8-9, 28-29, passim. I say "mistakenly" because Kinsbruner's terminology may imply that shade discrimination is a lesser--rather than qualitatively different--form of prejudice and discrimination than, say, racism against persons of African descent in the U.S. It seems intellectually and morally problematic to treat racism as a single phenomenon that exists across historical milieus in greater or lesser degrees rather than in different forms and spaces, and with different ramifications.

¹²². See Kwame Anthony Appiah, *In My Father's House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1992), 40.

¹²³. See Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*; James, *The Black Jacobins*.

¹²⁴. [Provide figures and citations.]

¹²⁵

. See Ferrer, *Insurgent Cuba*, 10-12, 196, passim; de la Fuente, *A Nation for All*, 31, 37, passim; Helg, *Our Rightful Share*; Alejandra Bronfman, *Measures of Equality: Social Science, Citizenship, and Race in Cuba, 1902-1940* (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 2004).

¹²⁶. See de la Fuente, *A Nation for All*, 12-13.

¹²⁷. Ada Ferrer, *Insurgent Cuba: Race, Nation, and Revolution, 1868-1898* (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1999), 4, passim.

¹²⁸. Higgins, "Licentious Liberty"; Francisco Vidal Luna and Herbert Klein, "Slave Economy and Society in Minas Gerais and São Paulo, Brazil in 1830," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 36, part 1 (Feb. 2004), 3; Herbert Klein, "Nineteenth-Century Brazil," in *Neither Slave nor Free*, 313; "Population Tables," in *Neither Slave nor Free*, 336.

¹²⁹. Vidal Luna and Klein, "Slave Economy and Society in Minas Gerais and São Paulo," 18-20.

¹³⁰. Paulina Laura Alberto, "Afro-Brazil: Africa and the Cultural Conditions for Citizenship in Brazil, 1920-1982" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 2005).

¹³¹. Anthony Marx, *Making Race and Nation: A Comparison of the United States, South Africa, and Brazil* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998), 253; Michael George Hanchard, *Orpheus and Power: The Movimiento Negro of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, Brazil, 1945-1988* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1994), 5, passim. See also France Winddance Twine, *Racism in a Racial Democracy: The Maintenance of White Supremacy in Brazil* (New Brunswick: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1998).

¹³². Twine, *Racism in a Racial Democracy*, 89-109.

¹³³. See, e.g., Andrews, *Blacks and Whites in São Paulo* and other sources cited in note 1.