Introduction:

I went to Waza National Park in northern Cameroon expecting to record a story of the displacement, dispossession, and expropriation of local populations, as has now become almost standard in the human geography and political ecology literature (e.g. Peluso 1993; Neumann 1998; Brockington 2001). These expectations were turned on their heads as I sat down to speak with a group of women on my first day in the field. One of the women said, “The biggest problem that we have is that the park is not guarded.” Each woman in the home was nodding and clicking her throat in agreement. Other men and women in that village and other villages surrounding Waza National Park made similar statements, many calling for the return of the park’s most brutal park manager. How could this be? Why would people whose ancestors had been disposessed land and natural resources be calling for stricter park management and more frequent patrols of park boundaries?

To answer these questions, this paper takes a longer view of conservation and dispossession than many critics of protected areas have thus far, analyzing socio-natural relations in the Waza region by looking at the changing interrelationships between territory, access, and subject production over time. Territorialization, an act of asserting and demarcating control over a particular geographic space which results in the control of the people and natural resources within that space, is integral in producing subjects of different kinds, controlling what they have access to, and under what circumstances (see Sack 1986; Vandergeest and Peluso 1995; Sivaramakrishnan 1997; Peluso and Vandergeest 2001; Sikor 2001; Wadley 2003; Peluso 2005;
Moore 2005; Roth 2008; Elden 2010; Corson 2011). Access, the ability to benefit from things, may vary based on how and in what ways a space has been territorialized, as can the mechanisms for gaining access (e.g. licit vs. illicit) (Ribot and Peluso 2003). Gaining access to territorialized land and resources can be contingent on subjectivity, (e.g. through negotiations and relationships based on ethnicity, race, gender, and citizenship). At the same time, territorialization produces spatially explicit subjectivities—the products of the ongoing, historically and contextually contingent objectification of humans by other humans (see Foucault 1982). For example, depending on how land and resources have been allocated and where territorial boundaries have been drawn, a person could be a hunter or a poacher, a citizen or a foreigner, a squatter or a resident. As this paper will show, the enforcement of territory and its concomitant subject productions can vary widely across space and time and can be contingent on the area’s history and ecological characteristics (Sivaramakrishnan 1997; Wadley 2003; Roth 2004; Corson 2011).

By taking this longer view of territory, access, and subject production we are able to understand how the present pivots on past productions\(^2\) of subjects and place by multiple actors through various struggles and practices. I hope to show that that studying conservation areas is about more than what conservationists call “parks and people;” it concerns understanding protected areas as parts of complex agrarian and political systems—controlling people’s access to the places and resources they need to survive. It is also about how these vast landscapes, which by design are emptied of people, have potential impacts on surrounding residents and resource users’ long term personal security. These vast empty spaces play into and are affected by larger processes of violence, property-making, and political support for park abandonment. A historical analysis of shifting territories, access, and subject production allows us to understand why, when state and NGO management of conservation areas are lost, local people whose ancestors originally managed these lands may not simply “take them back.” Understanding these places in terms of their longer trajectories as agrarian territories and understanding their violent productions and re-productions, makes it obvious why such an easy “fix” to such a violent and historically embedded issue is impossible.

\(^2\) I owe Donald Moore (2005) homage for this lovely turn of phrase.
Using the Waza region as a case study, I will consider how territorialization, which by its very definition creates insider and outsider subjectivities, has changed over time, and has affected how and in what ways this landscape and its natural resources have been accessed, by whom, and under what broader political, economic, and ecological circumstances. The production of Waza National Park is only one part of this longer trajectory in the region. It adds to this larger story by providing insights into who gets to be an insider or an outsider within particular territories at certain moments in history. Here, I examine state and local categorizations of sometimes vaguely construed ideas of "insiders" and "outsiders."

Insider/outsider subjectivities are contingent on who is producing them (what are the power relations and how are they positioned), the sites being referenced, and the contextual political economic circumstances of a historical period. Exploring the dynamics of insider/outsider subject formation allows me to use a flexible analytic that helps distill relational spatial and temporal dynamics of power in particular (but also changing) geographical and political contexts.

As I will show, insider/outsider subjectivities are historically, politically, geographically, and contextually contingent categories that are constantly being produced and reproduced over time by different actors for different reasons. As power relations shift, so do the definitions of insiders and outsiders (see Foucault 1980). Contained within these categories are prescriptions of how these subjects should act, and how they should be treated (e.g. persecuted or protected). These knowledges, categorizations, or subjectivities serve to order and influence people’s daily lives and how they think about and categorize themselves in comparison to other people, the state, and their environments (Foucault 1982, 781). These subjectivities shape the means and mechanisms of deriving benefits from resources (access), the physical and economic security of subjects in space (territoriality), and the ways in which laws, codes and social norms protect and rule behavior.

My consideration of the Waza agrarian system is organized chronologically, stretching between the late 19th century and 2010. Within each historical moment we will see how different authorities produce laws, territories, and systems of enforcement that define insider and outsider subjects. As we will see in each epoch, agrarian change is heavily influenced by the powerful forces of state building and economic interest. Beginning in the pre-colonial era, I demonstrate
that long before the creation of Waza National Park, territoriality, subjectivity, and access were intimately linked as territory produced powerful subjectivities that determined who was an outsider that could be enslaved and who was a protected insider. German colonial rulers re-enforced and reproduced these subjectivities and territorial productions as they sought to rule northern Cameroon. This socio-natural landscape was then dramatically altered in the French period when colonial administrators enclosed the Zinah-Waza Reserve (predecessor to Waza National Park). This reserve’s territorial restrictions created new insider/outside subjects as Europeans were the only legally recognized insiders to this territory. As time went on, however, those living adjacent to the colonial Zinah-Waza Reserve and later Waza National Park negotiated limited insider subjectivities for themselves—insiders for whom laws were more flexible and use of the park was more possible. In contrast, outsiders from distant villages or countries seeking natural resources inside of the protected area’s boundaries and lacked the ability to negotiate were those who were the most severely punished by park management for infractions of park law. I conclude by showing that as territorial control for Waza National Park waned, the relative advantages of those who had worked to achieve insider status over those who were deemed outsiders were lost. Resolving the paradox noted above, I show that as Waza became an open access space wherein territorial lines were blurred and their concomitant subjectivities and their relative advantages became meaningless, local people began to see their food security and physical security put in jeopardy, pushing them to call for more park management.

**Territory, Insiders and Outsiders in the Pre-Colonial Period**

Before the 19th century, territory in the Waza region was largely defined by sedentary, agricultural leaders who controlled access to and use of the vast and rich savanna and floodplain. These leaders would grant land and protection to nomadic or transhumance Fulbé pastoralists in return for tribute and grazing dues as well as husbanding local cattle and following local customs (Moritz et al. 2002). Those who broke with custom or were unable to negotiate access successfully were sometimes violently expelled from local leaders’ village territories.

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3 Often referred to as Zumaya, Massa, Musgum, Guiziga, Mundang and Tupuri ethnic groups (Moritz et al. 2002)
4 In this region, transhumance pastoralism takes the form of people migrating between their home villages and broader pasture lands at different periods of the year—this means they are partially nomadic. Often women and children stay in the villages year-round while men migrate for better pasture.
(Mohammadou 1988, 173; Moritz et al. 2002). Without sanctioned access and promised protection, these pastoralist groups were exposed to potential theft and violence (Abubakar 1977; Moritz et al. 2002, 130). Thus, gaining temporary insider access was an important part of these nomadic pastoralist groups’ successful use of the floodplain.

Heavily influenced by Usman dan Fodio, a political and social revolutionary who founded the powerful Sokoto Caliphate, Muslim Fulbé leaders in the Waza region overthrew these sedentary leaders through religiously legitimated warfare (*jihad*) between 1803-6\(^5\) (Moritz 2012; 196). Fodio and his Muslim Fulbé followers also reorganized land control into administrative centers called *Lamidates* that were linked together in a centrally controlled federation (Smith 1966; Moritz et al. 2002). This hierarchical and centralized administrative structuring was based on medieval Muslim caliphates (Njeuma 1973; Kintz 1985; Moritz et al. 2002). Territories at this time were not rigidly defined or static, but instead represented those (sometimes shifting) areas which were settled by insiders of the Muslim faith or under the control of a Muslim ruler as opposed to potentially raided so-called pagan areas\(^6\) (Masud 1986; Roitman 2005). To maintain the continued support of the Fulbé groups that remained nomadic, sedentarized Fulbé leaders granted them access to grazing land and protected Muslim and non-Muslim Fulbé from ongoing slave raids (Awogbade 1983; Stenning 1959, Moritz et al. 2002). Fulbé leaders also used their control over access to naturally occurring salt-licks\(^7\) to gain political capital and income from their subjects (Rudin 1938; 275).

Slaves were incredibly important to these rulers—their capture and ownership were “prerogatives of kingship and power” (MacEarchern 2001, 138). Enslaved bodies acted as the main units of wealth and exchange in this region—tributes and bride-prices were paid in slaves (Nicod 1927; Stenning 1959; Geschiere 1982; Eckert 1998, 136). Slaves were also used for farming, domestic work, and soldiers in the military (Eckert 1998, 136). Beyond domestic use, slaves were traded with distant states in North Africa and beyond for enormous profit and exotic products (Austen 1990, 321-28; MacEarchern 2001, 138; Roitman 2005, 111). As the Atlantic

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\(^5\) The nature of this *jihad* is discussed by Smith (1980), Hogben, and Tringham who characterize it as a Fulbe and state-building movement. Masri (1977) characterizes it as purely political and not religious (see Masud 1986, 62 for further explanation of these debates).

\(^6\) Usman dan Fodio pushed for a stricter interpretation of Islam amongst territorial leaders—forbidding un-Islamic customs with Islam, drawing a strict line between believers and unbelievers (Keddie 1994, 479).

\(^7\) Salt licks are important to maintaining the appetite and weight of cattle.
slave trade intensified after the seventeenth century, the importance of slaving rose in the Waza Region in order to meet international and local demand (Austen 1990, 321-28; Roitman 2005, 111). Gaining enough slaves to fulfill these needs was difficult to do because Shari’a Law makes it illegal for Muslims to enslave other Muslims. Wanting to both abide by Shari’a law and accumulate wealth, Fulbé Muslim leaders of the time fostered a kind of commonsense in which territories under their control became territories of “belief” or “Lands of Islam,” populated by insider subjects under their rule (Masri 1977; Masud 1986, 70; Roitmann 2005). At the same time they created territories of “unbelief” where even Muslim bodies could be enslaved according to this logic (Burnham and Last 1994, 322; Roitmann 2005, 121). Those who were insiders and belonged within the “land of Islam” were safe from slave raiding, while outsiders, those who resided within the “land of unbelief” were targeted to become slaves (Masud 1986, 70; Roitman 2005, 111). The word Fulani (pertaining to Fulbé people) came to mean “free” and Muslim while non-Fulani people were deemed haabe or slaves (Burnham 1996, 47).

Conversion to Islam was not an assurance of freedom. Territory defined one’s status as an insider or an outsider and thus, one’s capacity to be enslaved. Flight from the non-Muslim territory to the Muslim territory was the only means by which one could assure one’s freedom (Willis 1985, 21; Roitman 2005, 122). Even within defined or claimed territories, frontiers between Muslim and non-Muslim populations and spaces were created or identified for the purpose of accumulating more slaves. For example, the Mandara Kingdom was able to maintain peace with its neighbors by allowing them to perform slave raids in its southern “pagan” districts (Abubakar 1983; Lockhart 1996, 20). Property in the “land of unbelievers” could also be seized, even if its owner was Muslim (Tabiu 1989, 386; Roitman 2005). Here we see that territory and subjectivities had insider/outsider dimensions, even under a pre-capitalist political economic system. We also see the emergent theme of legality, illegality and differential enforcement of territorial access for the control of subjects.

In the pre-colonial period, people in the Waza landscape were highly mobile. The constant desire to spread Islam, gain control over territory and natural resources, as well as the desire to produce new bodies to enslave led to the continued creation of frontiers on the

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8 Islamic law based on the teachings of the prophet Muhammad and the Quran.
9 Dar al-Harb (the land of unbelief) and dar al-Islam (the land of Islam) (Roitman 2005)
landscape through *jihad*. These frontiers were produced and maintained by *jihadis* who were highly mobile because of their frequent invasion of new regions (Burnham and Last 1994, 322; Roitman 2005, 120). At the same time, populations deemed to be in the “land of unbelief,” beyond the frontiers created by Muslim leaders, often fled to escape enslavement either into the “land of Islam,” where they would have to participate in the *jihad* themselves, or into remote areas like mountains and swampy floodplains where they could hide from their aggressors (Weiss 2000a).

Violent productions of territory and subjects in the Waza Region’s pre-colonial era did not disappear as the region was colonized by European powers. Rather, these past constructions laid the foundation for subsequent territorial and subject productions in the German and French colonial periods that led to the creation of the Waza protected area. Even in the post-colonial period, these past productions of territory and subjectivity influenced how Waza was incorporated into or ignored by national political strategies.

**Territory, Insiders and Outsiders in the German Colonial Period (1902-1915)**

New territories were simultaneously inscribed on the Central African landscape by British, French, and German colonizers in the scramble for Africa at the end of the 19th Century.10 While the British gained control of land west of the Mandara mountains and the French gained the territory east of the Chari River, Germany gained control over the slender region in between that is home to Waza National Park today. It was only after German forces subdued Fulbé emirates through military action in 1902 that they were able to establish a colonial administration in this region, however (Weiss 2000a, 145). Realizing that northern Cameroon did not hold the wealth of natural resources they had imagined it to have,11 the German administration sought out the most efficient way to maintain control over this region with limited personnel, military supplies, and funds. This region would be held in reserve for labor and future capitalist production of livestock and agricultural goods (Eckert 1998; Weiss 2000a). To meet these ends, German colonial administrators fit the existing dynamics of territory

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10 In northern Cameroon this territorialization was facilitated by their collective defeat of the powerful Mahdist regional leader, Rabuh, who had conquered the Bornou Empire in 1893 and sought to conquer Sokoto Empire as well. The Europeans defeated Rabuh in 1900 (see Babikir 1954; Njeuma 1994, 121; Issa 2001b).

11 The region was not found by the Germans to be a place where “wealth is at hand and where we earn without pain” (Bauer Mission 1902 cited in Mohammadou 1994, 64).
and subjectivity to their colonial endeavors—the well-known strategy of indirect rule (Mamdani 1996; Atangana 1997; Moritz et al. 2002; Knoll and Hiery 2010, 94). Muslim Fulbé rulers who already dominated the landscape were transformed into insiders by German authorities\textsuperscript{12}—deemed culturally superior to non-Muslim “pagans” who were seen as lacking organizational capacity (\textit{Residentur Adamaua, Jahresbericht} 1904-05, cited in Weiss 2000a, 162; Eckert 1998, 141). Governor von Puttkamer (1895-1906) instructed colonial administrators in northern Cameroon to “rule, if possible, very little, rather leaving this to the indigenous rulers who stand next to the [colonial administrator] who is their protector and advisor” (von Puttkamer 1912, 307).

The Germans controlled these northern Islamic rulers in an unusual way, however. Technically, the German colonial state declared slavery illegal in Cameroon, but they strategically “failed” to enforce the law. Indeed, Governor von Puttkamer declared that the “unhindered existence of … domestic slavery” be allowed to continue in northern Cameroon (von Puttkamer 1912). Thus, if they wanted to put pressure on a particular Muslim leader, German officers could threaten to enforce the law and take away his slaves (Weiss 2000a, 152; Dunaway 2010, 24). This threat became increasingly weighty as other colonial European powers in North and Central Africa pushed for abolition, causing the price for slaves to rise and making them ever more valuable to African leaders in the early 20th century (Stieber 1904, cited in Weiss 2000a). Here again we see the theme of legality, illegality and differential enforcement of territorial access for the control of subjects emerging in a different period and under different political economic circumstances.

Reinforcing the insider/outsider dynamics that existed before the colonial period, the German administration understood their new territory in three categories: areas under Fulbé Muslim rule, non-Muslim areas subdued by Muslim rulers, and non-Muslim communities living in remote and unreachable mountain areas or swamps who were not subject to Muslim rule (Weiss 2000a). Within German territory, Fulbé, or those under Fulbé control were subject to German rule and regarded as insiders to the colonial regime while those who had eluded subjugation were deemed outsiders and deemed outlaws or threats. Seeking to gain control over

\textsuperscript{12} Often this transformation was done by force—battles were fought to subdue these leaders and they were made to lay down their swords and swear allegiance to the German government (see Mohammadu 1994, 55 for more description).
the whole population of northern Cameroon through Muslim Fulbé leadership, the Germans encouraged and supported these leaders in subduing recalcitrant “pagans” (Residentur Adamaua-Bornu 1905/6; Weiss 2000a; Van Beek 2012, 30). For example, Muslim leaders were able to attain German military support to continue raiding populations beyond the frontiers of their territories telling the Germans that these pagan groups were criminals--thieves, kidnappers, highway robbers, marauders and dangerous elements (Weiss 2000a, 162, 189).

Despite these tactics and their (at times) violent territorialization of northern Cameroon, German administrators never gained full control over this region. Continued regional wars, uprisings, and conflicts made German administration in northern Cameroon quite difficult and patchy. If anything, their lax stance on slavery and governance in the region, compared to neighboring French and British colonies, made the division between insider Muslim populations and outsider populations even more stark, particularly as WWI caused a collapse in German administration in the north in 1915 (Eckert 1999, 143). Amidst this chaos, Muslim leaders continued to create new territories and thereby enslavable subjects beyond their boundaries (Goodridge1997 cited in Weiss 2000a). It was into these shifting territories that the French plunged after WWI, intent on spreading French culture, Christianity, and formal governance.

**Territory, Insiders and Outsiders in the French Colonial Period**

After Germany’s defeat in WWI, German Cameroon was divided between the British and the French by the League of Nations. When the French first arrived in northern Cameroon they sought to territorialize this region themselves; intending to govern this territory and its people rather than simply hold it in reserve for future surplus production as the Germans had done. To do this they established distinct administrative boundaries to maintain order (Roupsard 1987, 24). Within these territorial subdivisions, the French colonial administration sought to create fixed, countable populations grouped by ethnicities in stable villages for the purposes of taxation, control, and production (Burnham 1975, 585). To achieve this goal, the French instituted a mix of direct and indirect rule that they called *la politique indigene* wherein some lower-ranked traditional leaders were placed under the control of a French officer (Moritz et al. 2002). Though in some circumstances these new management systems bypassed the powerful Fulbé chiefs (*laamiibe*) in the Far North Province, for the most part they had little effect on their elite positions—*laamiibe* remained colonial insiders (Van den Berg 1997; Moritz et al. 2002).
Finding northern Cameroon and its highly mobile populations disorderly and difficult to control, the French instituted forced settlement or re-settlement programs (regroupement) to drive mobile or scattered populations into single villages, carried out military-implemented vaccination campaigns for smallpox and sleeping sickness, policed roads, and established military bases in the region as means of rule and surveillance over the population of this region (Farinaud 1945:3, 113; LeVine and Nye 1974:50-60; Feldman-Savelsberg et al. 2000; Seignobos and Iyebi-Mandjek 2000, 112; Roitman 2005, 132). Despite these attempts at sedentarization and control, much of northern Cameroon’s population remained mobile—nomadic peoples avoiding regroupement, and sedentary populations moving regularly due to constant alliance and frontier formations, enslavement, segmentation of groups, and displacement of entire villages due to raiding, war or exploitation by laamiibe, as well as drought, epidemics, marriage, pilgrimages, the need to find funds to pay the French Head Tax, and long distance trade (Beauvilain 1989, 553; Roitman 2005, 135, 8). The mobile population swelled enormously as the French substituted money for slaves as the primary source of wealth and means of exchange in the region, and issued decrees in 1916 to end slavery in the colony, they effectively unenclosed the bodies that slavery had transformed into property, freeing them from bondage (Seignobos and Iyebi-Mandjek 2000; Roitman 2005). Non-Muslim populations that had formerly hidden in mountains and swamps to escape enslavement also began moving into the more exposed, fertile plains in the region (Beauvilain 1989; Iyebi-Mandjeck 1993; van Est 1999; Roitman 2005).

These freed people constituted a new class of outsider subjects, often having no lands of their own and having been transported far from home. The mobile, homeless lives that “freedom” created were directly contradictory to other intentions of the French to rule and profit from settled populations of northern Cameroon through taxation, and labor for agricultural production of grain and cash crops such as groundnuts and cotton (Pahimi 2012, 86). Seeking a means of subsistence, these populations smuggled cloth, kola nuts, and cattle between

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13 These numbers may have been in the tens of thousands. It is estimated that in French Africa (between Senegal and Mauritania) there may have been more than 3 million slaves at the beginning of the 20th Century—over 30% of the population (Klein 1998; Quirk 2009, 42)
14 Some enslaved people stayed on with the families who originally acquired them, working on a voluntary basis (NAE resident, Ogoja 1938 cited in Ohadike 1988, 453). In other cases first-generation slaves returned to their homelands (Cordell 1988, 167)
15 Some were transported more than 500km from their points of capture (Eckert 1998, 135)
Cameroon, Chad, and Nigeria—evading French taxation and regulation (Roitman 2005; Pahimi 2012). Pilgrims, armed robbers, freed slaves, and other mobile groups such as nomadic pastoralists also moved between these three countries, evading paying the French Head and/or Livestock Tax, or being incorporated in other systems of rule (Roitman 2005; Pahimi 2012). The territorial boundaries established by the French and British, demarcated by mountain ranges and rivers, did not act as physical barriers to these people—the Logone River and the adjacent Waza floodplain offered corridors for the movement of people and goods within and across this dry section of Cameroon (Ndembou, 2001, 8; Pahimi 2012, 89). While fixed populations were deemed insiders by the French colonial administration, the region’s mobile population—called la population flottante (the floating population) by the French administration, were criminalized—transformed into subjects outside the law (Monographie Departementale, Departement Diamare 1965, 12, ANY/1AA229 cited in Roitman 2005).

For example, in 1924 vagabondage was made illegal and mobile people with no fixed home or visible means of making a living could be imprisoned up to six months (Decret du 6 mai 1924 portant repression du vagabondage au Cameroun). Here we see definitions of insider/outsider subjects redefined by the new authority in the region, the French colonial government.

**Enclosure and Re-enclosure: Producing new insiders and outsiders**

To address the new problems created by freeing slaves but not providing social or economic safety-nets for them, the French sought other ways to control people in northern Cameroon. One of the ways the French colonial administration did this was through territorial land control, establishing the Zinah-Waza Reserve—the forerunner of Waza National Park—in the 1930s. The creation of this enclosure was intended to allow the French to control a space whose swamps were historically used to hide from authority and subjugation and that had been sites used to illegally transport cattle. The explicit goals of establishing the Zinah-Waza reserve

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16 The still-dominant Fulbé also continued to psychologically and socially differentiate between themselves and riimaybe (freed slaves) (Eguchi 1993).

17 There is inconsistency between historical accounts over the precise date the reserve took place and the name of the reserve itself. While Kieffer (1953; 270) states that the “Reserve de Waza” was created November 19, 1932 by the order of the High Commissioner, Djarma (2002) states that the “Zinah-Waza Reserve” was formed the 24th of March, 1934, as does the Cameroonian Ministry of Tourism, while Sholte (2005; 75), citing the Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa south of the Sahara (1953) states the “Waza-Zina Hunting Reserve” was formed in 1935, and Drijver (1991; 132) states the “Waza Hunting Forest Reserve” was formed in 1936. These different dates and names may be due to patchy record keeping, or may be due to the fact that after its initial inception, the reserve was expanded upon before it became a national park in 1968 (a date everyone can agree upon).
(as stated by the French Acts that established it) were to a.) Control the illegal traffic of cattle into Nigeria; b.) Stop the installation of camps along the wetlands inside of the limits of the reserve; c.) Provide a barrier between the irregularly vaccinated cattle herds from the Far North and the regularly vaccinated herds from the South; d.) Ensure the regeneration of trees as well as aforestation in this area; e.) Promote tourism to this region by allowing for the multiplication and security of large mammals (Arrêté no 71, 24 March 1934; Arrêté no 264 9 September 1935; Arrêté no 297 30 July 1938; Mbenkum 1997). These goals show that the French were explicitly trying to preserve and produce various means of capital accumulation—being better able to tax trade, and fixing local populations to specific territories, collecting revenues from tourist ventures and protecting investments in cattle herds in the Southern Regions of the country, in addition to protecting the region’s “natural” environment.

State territoriality in the Zinah-Waza Reserve was distinct and sustained, inscribed on the landscape with guard posts, signs, and cement markers delimiting park borders—a classic example of fortress conservation. This protected area introduced a new kind of territory to this area, a space produced to be uninhabited. The residents of the sixty villages within the zone the French targeted for the Zinah-Waza Reserve were the agrarian subjects that the French would have supported as insiders almost anywhere else in northern Cameroon, but where these villages were (territorially) changed all this. They were made outsiders to the homes, ponds, and territories they had constructed on the landscape. Their livelihoods—pasturing cattle, farming, fishing, hunting, and vegetable gathering within the reserve’s limits—were now crimes. Though most area residents alive today are too young to remember the creation of the reserve in the 1930s, quite a few remember that their grandparents or great grandparents were displaced by its creation. Some of the oldest still remember the colonial management of this space. One such villager remembered, “he [colonial manager] suspended everything, the fish, grass cutting, no one, no one could go into the park and do this kind of work….” Another man remembered that his grandparents “were given three days to leave. If they [government officials] came and found people still inside of the park they [the villages] were burned. All the villages were chased out.” Displaced villagers were forced to move to the protected area’s periphery. Legally, wild animals were more welcomed as insiders than Cameroonian nationals were.
As was the case in most protected areas on the continent at the time, divisions between park insiders and outsiders followed racialized lines. Hunting, both for sport and to supplement the pay of colonial administrators\(^\text{18}\) in the Zinah-Waza protected area was sanctioned only for Europeans. Particularly after WWII, as transportation options modernized and safari tourism became more organized and professional, Western elites began visiting Francophone Africa for hunting expeditions in droves (Djarma 2002a, 2002b; Roulet 2004). Cameroon’s stable geopolitical situation, its higher level of development, as opposed to other Francophone Central African countries, the diversity and beauty of its landscape, and the abundance of wildlife there brought more foreign tourists to Cameroon than neighboring Chad or Central African Republic (Roulet 2004). Tourism in northern Cameroonian reserves also benefited from the construction of an airstrip the French colonial period. Air France offered flights from Paris to near-by Fort-Lamy four times a week in the 1950s—marketed as only a weekend away from Paris (Freed 2011). The Zinah-Waza reserve drew in Europeans from places like Italy, Spain, Belgium, Germany and France, padding the pockets of hunting guides\(^\text{19}\) and tour operators as well as the colonial state.

When Cameroon achieved independence in the 1960s,\(^\text{20}\) the first president, Ahidjo (a Muslim Fulbé), re-enclosed the Waza protected area. Declaring the reserve a national park in 1968, Ahidjo symbolically rejected European power over Cameroon by making all hunting, previously the sole privilege of white colonists, illegal in this area. The national park symbolized a “reclaiming” of the land by Cameroonian people, but to the benefit of the national, not local level. Constructing a palace within park limits and using it to host summits and visiting foreign dignitaries, Ahidjo used this enclosure to symbolically and physically link Cameroon’s north with the distant southern Capital, Yaoundé where most of the nation’s government offices were. Despite his “reclaiming” of space, Ahidjo’s re-territorialization of the protected area did

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18 Many foreign residents were known to leave the northern cities of Ngoundéré, Garoua and Maroua to enter the bush to hunt on the weekends. Villagers in towns surrounding Waza National Park today remember that some white hunters only took their trophies and left the meat of their kills for the townspeople. These more “altruistic” people aside, many Europeans used these hunts to stock up on meat for the week (Roulet 2013). This practice was prevalent enough that it was a subject of public debate between those who hunted for meat and those who were “sport” hunters within Cameroon at the time (Roulet 2013).

19 See Marsh’s (2005, 94-104) descriptions of just some touristic uses of Waza National Park/Reserve in the 1950s-60s. Others were described to me by former government officials involved in tourism and security in the region, tour guides, and villagers.

20 The French part of Cameroon achieved independence in 1960 while the British controlled part of Cameroon did not attain independence until 1961 at which point these two regions unified into a single nation.
not make Europeans outsiders. It simply altered their access to the natural resources within Waza through the ban on hunting. The park’s large numbers of charismatic animals—elephants, lions, antelope, and bird species, along with the country’s relative security as compared to its neighboring nations, continued to attract thousands of (mainly European) tourists to the region each year (Djarma 2002b, 62; Marsh 2005; Interviews 2010).

Meanwhile, just as it had been under colonial rule, people who crossed into the park and were caught faced arrest, imprisonment, loss of livestock (cows found in the park were shot or confiscated), fines, or violence from park guards. In the early to mid-1990s the violent enforcement of the park enclosure reached its apex. Former park guards describe this time in military terms, one park guard saying that they “fought a war with Nigerian poachers.” At one point the park manager instructed his guards to bring the heads of poachers to him in order to prove their victory over these hunters. Admitting to carrying out these heinous orders, one guard remarked, “…their heads were too heavy to carry so we took their ears.” The mutilated bodies of these hunters from places distant to the park are still buried in unmarked graves inside the park. The same park manager was also known for searching homes adjacent to the park for evidence of hunting, fishing or gathering within the protected area’s limits.

**Negotiating Insider Subjectivities and Privileges**

Although historical users of the protected area had lost authority over the management of park land, they did not lose their access to this land and its resources entirely. While in the eyes of the state, park guards, permitted researchers, and paying tourists were the only legal insiders of the park, local people were able to attain limited insider status based on their long-standing use of the Waza territory. These park users were able to attain this limited insider status and thereby access to the park and its resources in three ways: buying extra-legal authorizations to use park resources from park guards; investing in longstanding personal relationships with guards; and using shared identities or promoting less threatening identities to curry favor and access from park guards. Here again we see the theme of legality, illegality and differential enforcement of territorial access for the control of subjects emerging in yet another period and under different political economic circumstances. Park guards and managers, local representatives of state authority and the law, had become gatekeepers of insider/outsider subjectivities and licit/illicit activities within park boundaries. These interpretations of the law
varied at different scales, however. At a national level, local people remained outsiders to this protected area.

Most frequently, local natural resource users would buy extra-legal “authorizations” or pay extra-legal “taxes” to park guards in the form of cash or benefits sharing. These authorizations allowed local people limited access to fish, gather wood or vegetables, harvest thatch, or graze their animals within park territory. Often, being able to gain these authorizations for access was based on long-standing relationships with guards who lived in villages for long periods of time. In some cases guards were stationed in villages that were very distant from towns, hospitals, and large markets. Some were entirely inaccessible during the rainy season except by canoe. Thus, a careful trust and/or interdependence arose between villagers and guards in certain places. The bonds that formed were, in some cases, very strong. For example, a guard originally from the southern part of Cameroon moved back to the village he had guarded near Waza for his retirement rather than returning to his natal village because of the strong friendships he had forged there. The relationships that formed in these ways were critical for some villagers to attain limited insider status to the park. For example, reflecting the sentiments of many of my interviewees, one man told me, “yes, the park was well guarded, [but] it was possible to get a few things…you had to know guards to get authorization.” Villagers noted that based on their relationships with local people, guards would recognize when they were in need and help them by granting authorizations to collect resources from the park.

Local natural resource users also drew on shared identities (e.g. ethnic backgrounds, home villages, familial ties, or political affiliations) with guards or park managers to negotiate access to park resources. Insider subjectivities changed based on the identity of the guards stationed in each village or in the position of park manager. For example, while a Fulbé park manager was in place, Fulbé herdsmen fondly remember that they were allowed to enter the park with their cattle without concern. Similarly, the two Kotoko park managers are reported to have allowed Kotoko fishermen to enter the park and harvest from the waterholes there, much to the chagrin of other fishing groups in the region. Women used gender as a means of negotiating access to park resources over men, claiming that they were less detrimental to the park and its

21 Being able to gain these authorizations was a point that was often brought up proudly by village leaders. One leader told me, “park management would stop someone from going inside [the park] unless they had an authorization. This is something we are proud of. Because of this we are OK with animals making trouble.”
resources because of what they sought to collect there and the distances they were willing to travel. For example, one woman told me, “At our level here, we always get authorization. Women only. Men don’t get the authorization because they can actually ruin the things there [the park]. But us, the women, we get the authorization because they know we won’t go far. We are afraid.” Some women believed that they were favored by park officials over men because men traditionally hunt and fish while women traditionally used the park to seek out plants to use for thatch, brooms, food, and fodder for small livestock. Despite these negotiations, very few local people’s livelihoods were principally based in the park—most people still farmed, fished, or pastured their cattle outside of the park’s limits. Instead, the park represented a reliable resource (for firewood, vegetables, fish, and some pastureland) for some people and for others acted as a pool of reserved resources to be accessed in case of emergency.

Drawing on gendered, ethnic, political, and village affiliations was not possible or useful for all of the natural resource users living in and around Waza National Park. In many cases local people may not have wanted to negotiate (and/or pay) for authorizations to use natural resources within the park’s boundaries. Many people described entering the park at night or hiding themselves if they saw park guards. Other local resource users noted that they were able to predict when park guards would come and thus, could plan their secret forays into the park accordingly. These people described their actions as “stealing” (guju) and themselves as “thieves” (gujjo) while entering the park without authorization. Park guards could fine or imprison unauthorized local natural resource users or shoot their cattle if they were caught in the park. Indeed, Scholte’s 1995 survey shows that local communities cited “intimidation by the Waza NP authorities” as among the ten main problems they faced (Scholte 2009, 15). That said, these local natural resource users were often still able to draw on their identities as community insiders to evade the most severe punishments, or decrease fines if they were caught. This was an advantage that outsiders to the region—often simply called “people from far away” or “strangers”—did not have. It was these people more remote to the park that suffered the most brutal, and sometimes deadly, punishments meted out by park guards. No villager or pastoralist I spoke to reported park guards killing or shooting local resource users. Probably because the risks to these outsiders were so high, very few villagers I spoke to reported “people from far away” coming to use the park unless they were organized, large scale poachers between the 1960s and the 2000s.
As a result of the violent exclusion of outsiders from the park territory, local insiders were able to attain relatively exclusive access to protected area resources to support their livelihood activities. One man put this particularly well saying, “when the park was well protected we alone could steal from the park.” Limited access to fish ponds, pasture lands, vegetables, grasses and wood within the park’s boundaries was vital to the survival and food security of local people. Indeed, Sholte (2009, 16) points out that “were the park really closed for exploitation, villages would not be able to stay where they were.” Similarly, villagers frequently commented on the continued importance of this territory even after its enclosure by the state. For example, one woman told me, “If there were no advantages we would not stay here [next to the park]. We live because of the park.”

**Crumbling Territory, Changing Subjectivities**

After over seventy years of exclusionary conservation, Waza National Park’s fortress began to crumble in the mid-2000s. This crumbling did not happen all at once. Rather, political will and funding for the park deteriorated over time, beginning with a change in leadership from Cameroon’s first president, Ahidjo who had been a champion for the park to his successor Paul Biya in 1982. Biya was intent on distancing himself from his northern predecessor and his pet projects after a power struggle\(^{22}\) ensued between them. Interestingly, the tensions between Biya’s Christian Beti ethnic group and Ahidjo’s Muslim Fulbé group had existed since the pre-colonial era as Fulbé *jihads* had forced Beti people into Cameroon’s southern forests (Alexandre 1965; Mbembe 1996). These national-level tensions had local effects—in this transition, much of the political will to protect Waza National Park disappeared. A government official involved in tourism told me that, “Biya doesn’t care about the park [Waza].” Similarly, a representative of an international NGO who had worked in Cameroon for an extended period of time stated, “There is a political aspect to Waza and the Extreme North. After the first president of Cameroon left, there was no support for this park.” Upon Biya’s rise to the presidency in 1982, Ahidjo’s palace in Waza National Park was closed, never to be re-opened. In his thirty-one years as president Biya has never visited Waza.

\(^{22}\) For more on this power struggle see Konde (2012)
Exacerbating this loss of national political support, economic crisis hit Cameroon in the mid-1980s. Pressured into structural adjustment by the IMF and World Bank, the Cameroonian government slashed government spending in all sectors (Konings 1996, 253). Due to a hiring freeze (part of these spending cuts), park guards who died or retired were not replaced. In Waza, the number of park guards dropped from nineteen in 1997 to eight in 2001 (Saleh, pers. comm. Cited in Bauer et al. 2003, 114). An employee of the Ministry of the Environment and the Protection of Nature stated bluntly, “With the economic crisis and structural adjustment programs with the World Bank and IMF, guarding [in Waza] stopped.” Scholte (2005, 83-84) notes that as park guard numbers dissipated, unarmed and informally trained village guides, local guards who were once complementary to the management of Waza National Park, increasingly became the only representatives of park authority in the area. With an almost non-existent budget, the maintenance of the 600km of roads within the 170,000 ha park became extremely difficult to maintain (Mbenkum 1997). The deterioration and disappearance of roads in the park made guarding it very difficult and a lack of radios (walkie-talkies), vehicles able to traverse Waza’s difficult terrain, and adequate camping materials made guarding even harder (Djarma, 2002b; interviews 2010).

Acting in response to declining governmental management of the Waza territory, authorities at an international level entered the picture – NGOs like WWF, agencies like the US Embassy and the Netherlands Foreign Affairs Ministry, as well as the World Bank, UN Development Program, and the IUCN all stepped in to maintain Waza National Park’s guarding and improve its infrastructure. A collaborative project of many of these institutions, Project Waza Logone began a well-meaning co-management project in the park whose aim was to incorporate local natural resource users in the protection of area resources. Project staff attempted to determine who was “local,” and therefore an insider granted limited access to park resources in return for helping protect wildlife. These incomplete definitions of insider subjects were neither well delineated nor upheld systematically, however. As the long-inscribed territorial lines between protected and unprotected area were blurred as the project sanctioned some resource use in the park, Project Waza-Logone’s attempt at co-management was understood by many in the wider Waza region to be a signal that anyone could use park resources without permission.
As international conservation priorities changed from charismatic megafauna and “biodiversity hotspots” to climate change mitigation in the early 2000s, NGOs and other international organizations pulled their funding away from Waza’s savanna landscape and shifted their programs towards Cameroon’s southern—more forested—regions. International authority in the park all but disappeared. For example, describing this shift, an NGO agent told me that “Waza doesn’t represent too much now. Politically speaking and internationally it is not important because it is not forested. Global warming is the most important thing now.” As these new themes in international conservation took hold and the Project Waza Logone was phased out in 2005, it was replaced by smaller, domestic NGOs like CFAID (Cellule de Formation et d’Appui aux Initiatives de Développement), AIDR (Association d'Appui aux Initiatives de Développement Rural) and ACEEN (Association Camerounaise pour l'Education Environnementale). Though these NGOs are committed to development and the conservation of natural resources, their work with Waza National Park is mainly limited to the floodplain surrounding the park, and not the park itself.

While they lasted, non-governmental organizations and international institutions paid for vehicles, guard radios and a radio tower, park guard and community eco-guard training, salaries and equipment, the partial re-flooding of the park, environmental education of local populations, creating management plans and ecological surveys of the park. When these funds dried up, projects ended, and staff went home, regular patrols in the park ended too. Only a few biological researchers were left working in the park. These researchers lacked the funds and the political clout to change the deteriorating management in Waza National Park, despite their best efforts. Further, experiencing severely reduced pay (WRI (2000) estimates up to a 40% pay cut for employees in the environmental sector after the economic crisis), certain natural resource managers lost interest in protecting park resources and instead began looking for additional ways to supplement their income like selling natural resources harvested within the park’s limits at market, or selling permits for large-scale and long-term cattle pasturing within the park’s limits.

In effect, Waza’s territory had been abandoned by 2006. Without armed park guard presence on the ground (as opposed unarmed village guards), authoritarian delineations (however personal or arbitrary) between insiders and outsider were lost. The lines between insiders and outsiders were no longer violently enforced by armed park officials. These lines now only
existed in the ideas of long-term natural resource users of Waza National Park as they differentiated between insiders and outsiders, strangers, or foreigners who posed a very real threat to their lives and livelihoods.²³

**Open Access and its Consequences**

As I have shown here, French and Cameroonian creation and maintenance of the Waza protected area violently diminished local institutions and management of this territory over a long period of time. After the Waza protected area was enclosed local natural resource users considered themselves to be legal outsiders without authority, often calling themselves thieves or their actions stealing when they entered the park to harvest resources. When the government abandoned the park due to the changed locus of political power and economic crisis and then international institutions also abandoned the park due to a shift in what was fundable in the conservation world, local leaders did not step up to take back the management of the Waza territory. Local leaders did not do this work because they lacked the authority to do so and because they lacked the weaponry to challenge well-armed poachers and other armed users of the park. Further, after several generations of living in the villages they were relocated to after the establishment of the protected areas, conceptions of what was village land and territory to be controlled and managed by local authority had shifted—for the most part, these leaders deemed management of park land as “for the state.”²⁴ When I arrived in 2009, Waza National Park had become an open access space, one without well-defined property rights or actors with the authority (or capacity) to exclude other users (see Berkes 1996, 94). In effect, Waza was unenclosed.

With the loss of guards protecting the park people local resource users considered outsiders (whose ranks included environmental refugees fleeing places like Chad and Niger,²⁵

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²³ People frequently (and angrily) remarked that without park guards “outsiders,” people from other countries, poachers, etc. could freely enter the park whereas with strict park management these people would have been barred entry and chased away—see below.

²⁴ The exception here are fisher people who still had clearly visible remnants of their ancestor’s fishing holes within the park—continued to manage, fight over, and defended these holes.

²⁵ Lake Chad, once a vital source of water for pastoralists, fishermen and agriculturalists in Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, has shrunk considerably (25,000 km² in 1963 to 1350 km² in 2008) and no longer exists in Niger (Afifi 2011, 103 and NASA 2008). Pastoralists who formerly used this lake have moved southward in search of greener areas (Appolinaire et al. 2012). Many of the people who leave Niger to find more secure agricultural land, pasture or fishing areas go to Cameroon, Nigeria and Chad due to their similar culture and languages (Afifi 2011, 111).
political refugees from surrounding nations, decommissioned officers from places like Chad, Libya, and Sudan, militants from Nigeria, and the unemployed created by the region’s economic crisis) began entering the park in large numbers (Delancey et al. 2010, 142; interviews 2010). An updated version of la population flottante\textsuperscript{26} had reappeared in this space. Villagers and pastoralists who were once deemed partial insiders by park guards lost their limited but relatively exclusive access to park resources predicated on their insider subjectivities. Local natural resource users worried that without park guards to exclude them, these outsiders would take all the food resources—land, water, fish, tubers, and small wildlife that they depended on to supplement their food supplies, or to support them in times of emergency. People practicing the full gamut of livelihood activities complained about threats to their food security posed by these outsiders. Women noted that without park guards people from other countries had harvested many of the wild vegetables they had traditionally depended on. Fishermen also noted that as management had declined, more and more people had begun using their fishponds, often damaging fishstocks by overharvesting. The influx of cattle in the park was also a constant grievance. Fishermen complained that these cattle herds entered fish ponds in the park, crushing their fish traps, ripping their nets and muddying the water which made fishing more difficult. Further, pastoralists complained that “[before] there were many grasses, but now there is almost nothing left for our cows to eat. We used to be able to steal what we wanted from the park.”

Beyond food insecurity, local people’s physical security came under threat as Waza National Park became a space without clear excluding authorities. During periods of strict enforcement park guards were often the only government officials present in the most remote parts of the Waza region, acting as de-facto police in this area and seen, especially in retrospect, as protecting local villagers and pastoralists. Without the presence of these guards, Waza’s uninhabited interior and its periphery became un-protected—drawing in members of la population flottante who instead of seeking out natural resources sought to make a living as cattle smugglers and thieves who targeted homes and travelers at a scale local people had not

\textsuperscript{26} See Roitman (2005) on a new population flottante elsewhere in northern Cameroon.
seen before. Kidnapping, a phenomenon as yet unseen in this region, also began at a frightening pace. The emptiness that Waza offered—free of government, international, or local authorities—made it an ideal space for these new violent actors to use as a place of refuge or as a base of operations. These actors used the empty park territory to hold hostages taken from local villages and pastoralist camps whilst awaiting ransom, to hide while waiting to steal from villagers or herdsmen, or a place to transport stolen cattle. Afraid of these violent actors, and thus unwilling or unable to negotiate with them, local people have become outsiders to the park within which they once held limited insider status.

Local people I spoke with would emphasize the emptiness of this space as creating the conditions under which these new violent actors in the landscape could perform their nefarious acts. Reflecting many of these sentiments, a resident of a village neighboring the park told me, “the bandits hide in the bush. They hide in nature where there is uninhabited space. The park provides them with a place where there is no one.” The reason that local people dwell on the fact that Waza is empty, uninhabited and abandoned so much is that areas like this are rare in the Far North Province, Cameroon’s most populated. Waza’s long history of strict exclusion and criminalized human habitation made this area one of the only large spaces in the Far North Province that lacks permanent inhabitants. Thus, there are very few other places that one travelling with groups of kidnapped victims or troops of stolen cows, could hide so readily in this province. When describing why such activities took place within the park people would remark that “there are no houses in the park, the bandits profit from [take advantage of] this.” The park’s permanent water sources and wildlife and plant resources make hiding out for prolonged periods even easier. Though these new members of Cameroon’s population flottante may be creating new kinds of authority in the region—including historical park insiders from this space through threat of violence or fear—how (and if) this authority will be formalized or maintained remains to be seen. Ironically, the actions the French colonial government took to prevent mobile populations who skirted the law from hiding out in Waza’s rich swamps and pasturelands

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27 The Far North boasts a population of over ninety people per square kilometer (Recensement Cameroun 2005, p. 8).
28 This is true except for a single village—Baram which has been allowed to stay in the park over the years due to its support of the first president of Cameroon, Ahidjo, as well as its continued negotiations with park management and staff. Villagers from other towns claim that Baram has a magic to it that makes park staff forget it is there as soon as they leave it. Whether or not this is true, Baram remains, but it is relatively close to the edge of the park.
actually created the conditions under which similar types of people began using the protected area in the 2000s.

**Understanding the Waza Paradox**

Taking the long view of legality, illegality and the differential enforcement of territorial access it becomes apparent that negotiating access with powerful territorializing agents based on one’s insider status has been an important part of survival and the accumulation of wealth for natural resource users in the Waza region for hundreds of years. Of course, the dynamics of who was negotiating with whom, over what, and under what circumstances shifted dramatically over the course of history, but the importance of territorial enforcement and its concomitant subject-making can be clearly seen in the concern people in the Waza region showed about their loss in 2009/10. In this un-enclosed territory, lacking authorities to exclude people from it or negotiate with for access to it, local people had become highly concerned about their food and physical insecurity. In the face of these fears it becomes far more apparent why, contrary to much of the people and parks literature that speaks about the antagonistic relationships between park guards and local people, the residents of Waza National Park were calling for more park guards in 2009/10.

Understanding the long and violent history of territorialization and subject production in the Waza region helps us understand why, when state and NGO park management declined, local authorities were not willing or able to manage this space. Due to decades in which state authorities held a monopoly on force and weapons, due to the spatial re-positioning of village sites, and due to long, and violently inscribed territorial boundaries of state property, local people (however bitterly) began to think of the park as state property, and its protection the state’s job. Without weapons or legal authority at a national level to exclude others from the park, local chiefs and villagers were left with few options. Representing these views, one villager told me,

> We are occupied with [care about] the park, but what can we do? If we find people who are destroying the park, what can we do? We cannot stop them. Because we can’t stop them, we can tell the authorities that they should stop them. If they don’t do anything, if they don’t stop them, we don’t have the ability to do anything.
Adding to these views a traditional leader noted,

The people who come here armed, we cannot stop them. They come from … far away and they are well armed. We are barehanded. What can we do? They come ready for war…there are people who try to send information to the government, but the government has done nothing about this. We are barehanded. We do not have guns and cannot do anything.

Given these testimonies and many others, this case study pushes against the arguments of well meaning activists who insist on giving protected area land back to the people who were dispossessed of it, or to allow them access through “co-management.” In the Waza case it becomes apparent that simply removing state and international authority over park lands may not be enough to empower local people to protect themselves and these precious places. An intricate understanding of local histories, territorializations, access mechanisms, and subject productions may allow for more fruitful and effective interventions. Waza stands as a warning for the thousands of protected areas that have been violently enclosed and violently maintained all over the world.

**Concluding remarks**

It is easy to think of Waza as a unique case—a remote and desolate spot surrounded by countries at war, situated in an unyielding, unpredictable climate, and subject to the whims of the global market, international/national politics, and mercurial NGO donors. However, the shifts in territory, access, and subjectivity that have altered this space and the lives of its surrounding populations are happening elsewhere. In other parts of Central and West Africa, parks created in colonial and post-colonial periods that lack the presence (or enforcement) of state authority are becoming magnets for violent actors and un-regulated resource users (Dunn 2009, 440; Bouche et al. 2012, 7001). Under similar circumstances, violent actors seem to be stepping into protected areas in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, and Congo (e.g. Gettleman, 2012; Webster 2012). Underfunded and/or under-policed protected areas in India, Central and South America, and the United States are also sites of extra-legal and often violent activities perpetrated by actors who wish to remain unseen (Greenough 2003). Murder, kidnapping, drug
and human trafficking, rape, theft, and other kinds of violence are happening in these places that have been, by law, emptied of human inhabitants and guarded strictly for decades.

Though critical conservation studies literature has done an excellent job raising awareness about the immediate impacts of exclusionary conservation, here I have shown that the effects of park abandonment can be equally, if not more damaging to local populations than the initial creation of these protected areas. The Waza case study may provide a view of a new era of conservation—one in which national parks, especially those without forest cover, are un-enclosed as they lose government and international funding and support. The unknown and unintended consequences of these un-enclosures portend to be numerous and frightening for local people. They also have serious consequences for the preservation of nature or biodiversity—the original (ostensible) reasons most exclusionary protected areas are created in the first place. For example, species common in other protected areas in Cameroon like hartebeest, bushbuck and buffalo are now extinct in Waza (Foguekem et al. 2010). Lions, Grimm’s duiker, and Bohor reedbuck may be facing extinction as well (De Longh et al. 2010; Tumenta et al. 2010).

The lesson here is that government use of national parks to attain control over lands and people has serious social and ecological effects that extend into the future, well beyond their initial creation. Taking a historical view of territory, subjectivity and access—seeing national parks as one type of land control situated within a longer political ecological trajectory—helps us understand who is able to benefit from various legal and practical territorial components of agrarian landscapes, when and how. Today almost 160,000 protected areas now cover sixteen million square kilometers of land—a lot of agrarian territory (IUCN and UNEP-WCMC 2012). Studying parks, therefore, is integral to understanding broader agrarian landscape transformations and their implications for human security and ecological integrity.
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