

To seminar participants:

Thank you for the opportunity to present my paper. It is a pared down version of chapter 2 from my forthcoming book, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order, 1914-Present* (Princeton University Press, 2009—a table of contents is provided below). The chapter is a pivot for an aspect of the book’s argument: that many basic ideas underlying what many discuss as Cold War modernization crystallized during the ideological struggles of the 1930s and 1940s. Many of the concepts seen as part of a postwar approach to modernization were extant and, in the U.S. case, non-state groups were often in the lead in applying these ideas at home and abroad. Chapter 1 makes this latter point, discussing activities of groups like the Rockefeller Foundation in various parts of the world.

As further context, the chapters that follow trace how these ideas (and many NGOs long invested in them) were mobilized for developmental tasks in World War II and the Cold War by the American state. With this came the creation of a set formal and permanent overseas development bureaucracies. Despite this state activism, modernization remained a multisided activity, continuing to engage a host of non-governmental and international actors a roster including foundations, universities, businesses, missionaries, and voluntary organizations. This approach was central to later U.S.-led “nation building” programs in places like South Korea and South Vietnam. In the 1960s and 1970s the intimate connection of modernization to the war in Vietnam, growing criticism of Western concepts of mass consumption assumed to be the end goal of programs of development, as well as an environmental critique that highlighted development's ecological and human costs sundered this approach.

I look forward to the workshop and your comments.

*The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order,
1914-Present*

Introduction

Chapter 1

The Rise of an American Style of Development, 1914-1937

Chapter 2

Liberalism’s Spine: “Modernisation” to meet the Challenge of Totalitarianism, 1933-1944

Chapter 3

A World to be Remade: Point Four and Modernization as National Policy, 1943-1952

Chapter 4

“The Proving Ground”: Development and U.S. Policy in Northeast Asia, 1945-1960

Chapter 5

“The Great American Mission”: Modernization and the United States in the World, 1952-1960

Chapter 6

A TVA on the Mekong: Modernization at War in Southeast Asia, 1960-1973

Chapter 7

“Everything is Going Wrong”: The Crisis of Development and the End of the Postwar Consensus

Chapter 8

New Developments: From the Cold War to the “War on Terror”

**Liberalism's Spine:
"Modernisation" to meet the Challenge of Totalitarianism, 1933-1944**

David Ekbladh

Draft:

Please do not cite, quote, publish or distribute without author's permission

The economic millennium... will not be brought about by hoping for it.
Eugene Staley, 1939

"Spineless," essayist Odette Keun called her fellow liberals in the face of ideological challengers to their legitimacy.¹ Keun was among commentators during the 1930s who shouted for liberals to take heed of the dual menace of fascism and communism. Of French birth and Dutch parentage, Keun had been raised in shifting settings and traveled voraciously. Part of an international collection of liberals heavily invested in domestic and global politics she was alarmed by the threat posed by "totalitarian" ideologies. More importantly, she feared liberals did not fathom the reality their ideological foes had to be confronted and contained on a variety of levels. She used terms with which many of her ideological kin would have agreed. Keun sketched liberal society as that based on private property and initiative with the "resourceful" intervention of government that, at the same time, protected all individuals against excessive control by either business or government while maintaining rights of conscience, thought, and expression.² Embattled, liberals had to show the capacity of this social, political, and economic system to carry societies to higher standards of living, just as their opponents appeared to have done.

This had to be done in the midst of a global economic crisis that had left the credibility of liberalism in tatters. They could base their appeal on improving conditions by harnessing those catalysts of modernity, science and technology. However, communist and fascist opponents displayed considerable prowess with those same forces. At the time, many saw the best types of

political and social organization to control these forces in those opposing camps. Internationally there was a swelling acceptance of the government intervention or planning popular under communist and fascist regimes. But these carried the deep marks of statism, something that challenged foundational elements of liberalism itself: individual rights and private property. As this liberal reconstruction of societies—increasingly referred to as “modernisation” by the early 1940s—was given a new role in global affairs, the international debates over means to this modern end was always present. Liberals had to find methods that claimed to reconcile a jumble of concerns. Regardless, as the decade wore on the demand for development became urgent. Liberals had to demonstrate they were masters of modernization—at home and abroad—if their system was to survive.

In 1937 Keun offered her answer to this problem. Her proof did not come from typical organs of international affairs or was found in New York, London, Geneva, or some other cosmopolitan locus. Rather, Keun was inspired by the environs of Knoxville, Tennessee. After seeing a developmental “experiment” in the South, Keun marked the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) as a rallying point for liberals. It was a specific program that served to demonstrate how a broader program of liberal development could be achieved domestically and internationally. The TVA was not entirely new; it was an amalgam of many ideas and assumptions worked out by various constituencies internationally over preceding decades. Yet, it was a unique variant of development and incredibly significant in an ideologically charged period. Claiming the best elements of planning mating both mechanical technologies and social control, TVA proposed an acceptable solution to the dangers of statism within an attractive package of participatory, liberal democracy.

Keun’s intervention is interesting, at the very least for the brio and prescience of some of its arguments, but also for its connection to decisive shifts in U.S. geopolitics. The TVA and development programs like it offered a means to parry the influence of fascist and communist models

of development. The remedies for the liberal dilemma suggested by Keun and grasped by others demonstrate how larger concepts and practices of development, which could claim liberal politics and be draped with claims of exceptional American origins, became established means to achieve strategic aims. Her commentary was part of a broader mobilization of evolving liberal ideas about development into a new global mission for the United States. It was inspired by the imperative to articulate and deploy an Americanized liberal brand development to woo those around the world yearning for what George F. Kennan in 1932 dubbed the, “romance of economic development.”³

This need would endure well beyond the 1930s. There is agreement now that the Cold War was a global competition between liberal capitalism and state communism. Such a struggle can easily be recounted in part through those efforts to offer peoples around the world economic and social development in manner representative of each side’s ideology.⁴ However, this type of developmental antagonism hardly began with the bipolar struggle. Liberal development, symbolized by the TVA, already had established a strategic significance during the 1930s. World crisis transformed the American imagination about what development should accomplish and how it should be achieved. By virtue of its resources and ideas the United States assumed it was required to lead efforts, newly labeled “modernisation,” with unambiguously global ambitions. Through this period, into the Cold War, and beyond, when threatened by movements or ideologies, liberals turned to claims of the ability of their system to deliver the promise of development.

The Depression smashed liberal pieties. It closed a decade of liberal internationalist ascendance. After World War I a menagerie of new parliamentary states appeared in East and Central Europe, Japan enjoyed a liberal interlude, and the international economy was shaped by a capitalism dominated by laissez faire principles. So the speed with which the global capitalist economy unraveled and inability of liberal governments to contain the aftershocks raised sudden and acute questions. Edmund Wilson felt the ideological nadir in 1931, “What we have lost...not merely

our way in the economic labyrinth but our conviction of the value of what we are doing.”⁵ Reinhold Niebuhr, at the emergency’s trough, noted the inability of a “senile” system to deal with the difficulties besetting a modern, integrated, and mechanized world demonstrating, “western society is obviously in the process of disintegration.” In 1933, Harold Laski saw a globe despoiled, breeding “a temper of feverish haste” where, “the spirit that denies has triumphed over the spirit which affirms.” Noting this was reminiscent of other revolutionary moments in history, he appreciated the temptations of other systems. He felt “the only answer capitalism can make to...is... proof that material benefits it can secure and definitively greater than those of an alternative system.”⁶

Liberals believed technological wonders of an interconnected world economy—air travel, mass communication, and industrial production—ushered in by science and engineering and their promise for general prosperity were being squandered by outmoded politics. For one of the most devout, Raymond Fosdick, traditional liberalism seemed devoid of the means to contain the hazards industrial society that was, by its nature, globally interdependent. This failure left “the world...very sick.”⁷ Free market capitalism, extolled only years before as the surest means to progress was questioned by a chorus of voices, “on all sides of the political frontier.” Nationally focused economic policies quickly came to be seen as wrongheaded and inefficient—a damning perception among more technologically minded progressives.⁸ For others liberal capitalism’s exploitative and wasteful characteristics were simply aggravated by the crisis. Governance of modernity seemed beyond the capacity of liberalism. This view did more than challenge specific policies or particular governments. It struck at the basic, systemic ideas behind liberal democracy and capitalism as means to organize societies.⁹ In a true test of its ability, universal liberalism appeared to have universally failed.

Liberals were thrown onto the defensive internationally, beset on one side by a crisis that had exposed the failures of capitalism and on the other by ideologies that claimed to master the

intricacies of modern life and mapped a route to the future. They seemed to truly understand development with approaches that reverberated around an unsettled globe. It was the era of the Autobahn, the Agro Pontino, and the Five Year Plan—state sponsored development to implant prosperity. Liberal societies had to contend with a spectrum of active and appealing ideological challengers with convincing claims to have social, political, and economic systems better attuned to modernity. Critiques of liberal life ran deep. Excesses of capitalism were attacked as was “parliamentarism” and even a basic building block of liberal belief, the individual. Fascist and communist approaches had dramatic force on the world scene, an appeal enhanced by the capitalist implosion.¹⁰ Both were based on utopian visions of the future. Each promised results with social and economic regimentation that were often discussed in opposition—and more ominously, as successors—to a tired, bankrupt liberalism.¹¹

Even in the United States liberalism was not insulated from the appeal of its challengers. Fears of novelist Sinclair Lewis that Americans could be lured to embrace autocracy were not pure fiction.¹² The accomplishments of fascism were on display and lauded in the heartland of the United States itself. An example was “A Century of Progress,” a World Fair in Chicago during 1933. It was one of a species of international fairs showcasing faith in progress brought by science even as exhibitions trumpeted political differences and, occasionally, reticence toward technology in the wrong hands. The fair repeated the era’s received wisdom that modern technology reshaped the landscape as well as its human inhabitants in a profound and far-reaching manner. Science and technology created new ideas and structures surrounding the individual, which “affects his environment, changes his whole habit of thought and living.” Transformation was all encompassing demanding, “individuals, groups, entire races of men fall into step with...the march of science and industry.” Lewis Mumford repeated such conventional wisdom in his opus the following year.

Machine society demanded a “reorientation” of human life but could only promise, “well or ill as the social groups that exploit it promise well or ill.”¹³

As might be expected, the fair lauded industrial accomplishment in the United States even as the Depression scraped bottom. Nevertheless, some of the strongest praise for international technical accomplishment was reserved for Italy, where Mussolini’s regime retained the early positive impression it made in American public opinion.¹⁴ Listed first in the international section, Italy was described as “vibrant with the heroic deeds of Fascism speaks more resoundingly, more intelligently and more forcefully ...than... any foreign nation participating.” Benchmarks of modernity— engineering, physics, aviation, astronomy, and medicine in the Italian example convincingly conveyed “the message Fascism has for the world.”¹⁵ The world could be convinced it was not just the trains being made to run on time, but broader change was being brought by a regime with a new ideology that could cultivate modernity in seemingly inhospitable terrain. Mussolini’s government brought new roadways as well as the massive reclamation program to clear the Pontine Marshes south of Rome for agriculture and planned communities. An assault on malaria, a disease long seen as a drag on social and economic growth, was continued (with help from a somewhat conflicted Rockefeller Foundation) as part of a campaign to create a fascist modernity. While historians have exploded much of the cant exported by the regime, at the time fascism was seen to provide a model by which a poorer nation could be redeemed.¹⁶

Those looking for other examples of a smooth road to modernity could also find elements to admire in Nazi Germany. Drunk on a militant nationalism worshipping a mythic Germanic past, the Nazi regime was nevertheless infatuated with modernity. While private property and markets were not abolished, the government became the prime mover in the economic sphere. A multitude of government supported programs in science and industry brought technical advances in such areas chemicals, metals, rocketry, and aeronautics. Construction of the Autobahn heralded a concrete

effort to motorize German life, signaling the arrival of a new, advanced, and prosperous society. All was done with an urge for autarky to create an economic unit secure from the unsettled international marketplace and militarily self-sufficient. Through these and other policies the Nazis sought to remold society. Their vision of modernity was tied to a brutal Social Darwinism that saw races grappling for survival and projected a grim racial worldview into policies at home and abroad. However, this struggle also required the transformation of the Germans themselves. Educational, cultural, and industrial policy was aimed at creating a fascist new man, modern in outlook and primed for the struggles the Nazis sought. While the gruesome nature of Hitler's racialist policies quickly became apparent, scholars now also question whether his economic program produced a sustainable recovery in the mid-1930s. Nevertheless, many at the time saw an enticing model for political and economic life in the German example.¹⁷

Its mirror opposite was the imposing visage of the Soviet Union. Stalin's industrialization in the 1930s riveted global audiences.¹⁸ And this industrialization was modernization in step with a communist melody. State planning was the indispensable tool by which socialism would be etched into the Soviet empire. In theory, central control would eliminate the waste, inefficiency, and inequity embedded in capitalism, allowing socialist modernity to take hold. Stalinism was the development of a new civilization intent on the construction of gargantuan steel mills and entire cities and explicitly focused on altering the most intimate of individual activities. Where and how a person worked, spent their leisure time, or was educated had to change to fit the socialist version of modernity. Their very perceptions would to be transformed as an integral part of the modernization process.¹⁹

National in scope, the impression was global. The communist goal of converting a "backwards" society into the exemplar of socialist modernity was done in direct ideological competition with liberal capitalism. Stalin's steel city of Magnitogorsk and the Dneprostroi

hydroelectric program demonstrated to many state planning had quickly mastered the “brute force” technologies of industrial society. Because of its ostensible success, in a bleak decade, the Soviet Union could offer proof that it was the true inheritor of the enlightenment. Carrying the baggage of a persistent global crisis, capitalism could legitimately be cast as a drag on progress. From the early 1930s liberals and internationalists were aware of the appeal of the Soviet planning model. There was plentiful Soviet propaganda about the technological wonders springing up in its empire. Added to this were the attentions of a swath of activists, commentators and scholars who detailed the wonders of Soviet industrialization. It all seemed to show communism, not the liberal West, had successfully harnessed the forces of science and technology to forge a universally applicable model of development that would lead humanity to a better world.²⁰

With the rise of these competing development visions, a new migratory pattern for reformers took shape. Progressives, grimly aware of the limitations of liberal capitalism, flocked to the USSR to see this new society rise and borrow ideas they could apply at home.²¹ One of the more radical was Stuart Chase, an advocate of a “third road” away from the precipice of economic collapse that laissez faire capitalism had driven the nation. Chase was part of the global journey to find an example of how a planned society might look. Chase called for an American turn to central planning based on expert knowledge to do away with the excesses and inefficiency of the capitalism system. His 1932 book, *A New Deal*, lacked a tangible example of what such a drastic shift might entail but it discerned stirrings in its oft-quoted closing:

The groups are actually beginning to form. As yet they are scattered and amorphous; here a body of engineers, there a body of economic planners. Watch them...If occasion arises, join them. They are part of what H. G. Wells calls the Open Conspiracy. Why should the Russians have all the fun of remaking a world?²²

Ironically, while Chase investigated the Soviet example he found in full form what he imagined at home. It was “spiritually refreshing” to behold the Tennessee Valley Authority in its

early stages. Chase hoped it might be segue to a “Great Transition” to planning. Although linked to earlier reform ideas, TVA marked a new turn from unvarnished and destructive competition to an effort “schooled in science” for the common good. Its dams and power plants were imposing but were only the “bony skeleton.” It was in the “flesh and blood” where real change was taking place. TVA sponsored programs were revamping local life with new crops, agricultural practices, electric power, and education. Most of all, this sprang from a special type of “planning based on consent.” He told readers of *The Nation* the TVA was, “the New Deal’s best asset,” an invaluable commodity that would have a career elsewhere.²³

Other progressive dipping into international reform currents for inspiration also greeted the TVA with excitement. Typical was Julian Huxley. English by birth and a biologist by training, he had fashioned himself into a popular science writer and commentator on current events. Experienced on the topic of development, having reviewed conditions in British colonial Africa, he was among an international cohort transfixed by the possibilities of social and economic planning as means to deal with pathologies exposed by the Depression. Like numerous others he initially turned to the Soviet Union. A visit to Russia in 1931 revealed the Soviet Five Year Plan and its, “new spirit, the spirit of science introduced into politics and industry” that “heralds the birth of a new kind of society, a society which is coherently planned.”²⁴

Returning to a Britain facing an unremitting depression, Huxley felt a solution could only be found in, “wholesale planning.” He immediately registered the appearance of “Roosevelt’s gigantic experiment... remolding industry and life in general, within the planned region of the Tennessee Valley.”²⁵ The TVA embodied the type of reform that melded economic growth with social change with a flexible style of planning for which Huxley and others had yearned. Eager to see hopes made real, Huxley beat a path to Tennessee in 1935. He was thrilled to witness an integrated “experiment in applied social science” blended with the claims of “grass roots” democracy. While he recognized

it was controversial, the TVA seemed to have answered hard questions of individual liberty bound up with development. American South provided needed proof that broadly conceived development based on planning could effectively be implemented in a liberal, democratic society.²⁶ More importantly, Huxley saw the “experiment” as an American take on development that was potentially international in application. Huxley, like others, was coming to see it as a fulfillment a global demand for large- scale transformation based on rational state planning drawn from a specific American example.²⁷

The commentary of Chase, Huxley, and others regarding the TVA betrays the struggle between models of socio-economic development in the period. Liberals were groping for a means that demonstrated planned economic and social development was possible without autocratic methods. What would make the TVA so influential globally it would become nearly synonymous with liberal development itself was a claim it could reconcile destabilizing forces in a framework of liberal politics.

The TVA has rightly been called, “the granddaddy of all regional development projects.” Proposed in 1933, it promised a new model through social and regional planning. However, the TVA was not new in terms of its means to the end of development. In fact, part of its almost immediate popularity was TVA’s blending of existing elements of existing development thinking into one comprehensive package. It counted itself part of a heritage of ambitions to use water resources to help modernize the “backwards” American South. The immediate impetus for it came from various plans for the Wilson Dam at Muscle Shoals, Alabama to be a mechanism for economic improvement. The dam, originally planned for World War I, had been completed too late to play a part in the conflict. Industrialist Henry Ford considered buying it in the early 1920s and making it the commercial keystone of a “new Eden of our Mississippi Valley.” After this private scheme

miscarried, progressives pushed the federal government to put the dam's electric power to public use, only to be fought to a standstill by private utilities.²⁸

Franklin Roosevelt broke this logjam. After a personal visit to Muscle Shoals, Roosevelt proposed a sweeping plan in 1933 as part of his "First New Deal." Although inspired by earlier ideas put forward by Senator George Norris, FDR's plan reached far beyond Muscle Shoals. It would create a regional program to build more dams for flood control and power generation; distribute that hydroelectric power; produce fertilizer; support agricultural programs; promote public health; further education, combat soil erosion and deforestation; and dig an inland waterway on the Tennessee River. Essentially, it was a massive, integrated program for regional modernization. It all was necessary because, in Roosevelt's continuing estimation (affirmed by the National Emergency Council) the South was "the nation's No. 1 economic problem." Such a burden demanded government intervention. All was to be overseen by a government sponsored public corporation, the Tennessee Valley Authority.²⁹

Indeed, it was development project par excellence, utilizing elements long employed in America's own "nation building." A significant element of the New Deal project was harnessing the natural resources of the region for its development goals. The environment would provide many of the resources instrumental to the process. Rivers were particularly attractive. They appeared as vast, untapped sources of potential energy to serve modernization. Such thinking helped fuel expansion in the late nineteenth century American West. Vast water projects, made possible by the imposition of massive technologies, were to settlement and commerce as well as the extension of political authority and a capitalist order. Damming rivers became a popular developmental pastime during the twentieth century, with perhaps 45,000 large dams erected worldwide. Such projects were touted as "multipurpose"—conceived of having numerous impacts beyond a specific technological program. For example, damming a river would provide for flood control while assuring its waters could be

mined for the “White Coal” of electric power and impressed for irrigation. Power culled from the river fed large scale or commercial farming, industrial development, or urban growth. Supporters regularly spoke of the positive effects such “resource exploitation” as means to stoke larger programs of economic and social development. From the start the staff knew they were attempting something big. They comfortably stated, “the TVA is...a *regional development agency*.”³⁰ (emphasis original)

A focus of the TVA’s mission was to turn the ornery Tennessee River from an unpredictable force into a docile servant of regional development. The river’s regular flooding was to be ended by a collection of 30 dams. The Tennessee would then offer hydroelectric power, irrigation, and navigable waterways. Yet, such ambitions were not exclusive to American engineers and managers. International colleagues also saw these resources as the means to provide for other programs for long-term development. Long before the TVA, various countries constructed dams to promote visions of progress cutting across their economies and societies. Contemporary Soviet hydraulic programs shared affinities for technology applied on a gargantuan scale. Germany’s engineers had considerable skill harnessing water for human ends, breeding a sense of superiority toward American counterparts viewed as less adept.³¹ Modification of nature did not end at the water’s edge. It would be continued by continued by agricultural reforms. Establishing modern farming brought new seeds, fertilizers, and machinery to the fields as well as a commitment to extensive and, very often, corporate agriculture. Attacks on the local disease ecology were one crucial element, because a healthy population was a productive one. To this end, malaria eradication was a key part of TVA’s work. Demands made on nature were not unique to the TVA, these sorts of efforts had longstanding international constituencies. Nevertheless, drafting of nature into its service is a reminder how wholesale environmental transformation was central to twentieth century development efforts.

In order to make the Tennessee Valley “exhibit A of the new America” the retrograde social attitudes would have to be altered along with the landscape. Above all, the region required a “new

education...to prepare it for the change.” Within the evolving modernization framework during the interwar years, multipurpose programs had to promote to social change. Educational reforms would cascade new ideas into rural life. Along with its grand technologies, the TVA had programs meant to change the perceptions of the people of the region (declared by some to be 100 years behind the rest of the country). In a region where the popular media casually referred to existing social and economic relationships as “feudal,” a strong dose of social change had to go hand in hand with the technologies brought by the TVA. Important members of its administration would regularly emphasize the social aspect of development as part of the mix: “the multi-purpose character of TVA program—the significance of this aspect of TVA in terms of developing multi-purpose people.” In the valley itself there was some apprehension with the onrush of such a massive experiment. But reticence was outweighed by hope the plan would bring needed economic opportunity.³²

The “unified” program of the TVA necessarily drove it into many aspects of life. Agriculture, industry, electric power, flood control, river navigation, public health, housing, malaria control, education, urban planning and a host of other smaller issues lay on its agenda. Among these, electricity has become a key part of how the TVA is remembered historically. The authority’s dams and hydroelectric power plants became its most recognizable emblems. The provision of electricity has been a major part of the story of the TVA. Historians have dwelt on the “power fight” between TVA and private electric companies and how the authority generated demand for its electrical current by marketing cheaper electric appliances to the residents of the valley.³³ Like other development efforts of the time, while technology was an important element in and of itself, its potential to foster social change within the wider development program was seen as indispensable.

Across the nation, progressive had long fought public utilities to put affordable electricity into the hands of people so they could use it to improve their homes, their enterprises, and themselves. Public power advocates firmly that cheap power and appliances brought into the home

would bring “social modernization” through electricity. A rational housework movement who asserted that electric power allowed the appliances that could free women of tedious work at home. At the same time, affordable current spurred decentralized manufacturing that might allow women who now had more time to enter the workforce and earn money, transforming social relationships at a basic level, the family.³⁴

While the TVA’s power program was hardly designed to emancipate women, it displays how one technological element was believed to produce social change. It was not solely a question of getting energy to the people in the valley, but instructing them on how to use it, as in many areas electricity use had been limited by high utility rates and unyielding poverty. The TVA’s program to provide affordable electric power and appliances to poorer communities operated under the assumption that providing these new technologies would modernize economic and social relationships. TVA and various local institutions in the valley provided a range of vocational and educational courses on how to best employ new electric appliances in business and day-to-day life. It even designed large refrigerators that communities could share. The assumption was poorer people did not fully understand how to employ these modern devices and had to be instructed. But this was itself a part of the extensive transformation such modernization sought. The reigning assumption was the instruction and use of modern technologies would eventually alter the outlooks of people.³⁵ Americans at the time would hardly have seen this as drastic as the type of change that was assumed to be needed in places like China. Nevertheless, the emphasis on electrical modernization does display how the provision and use of technologies was directly tied to social and psychological change in the agendas of those sponsoring development projects.

The transformational aspect of this evolving style of development reached out to embrace entire communities. The most visible attempt by the TVA was the model town of Norris, Tennessee, in the shadow of a dam sharing its name. The new, planned community provided TVA employees

modern homes with electricity and modern appliances—a dramatic improvement over most housing available in the valley. Norris had progressive schools and its own library. In the TVA’s calculus, towns like Norris were the logical outgrowth of modern development. As science and technology continued a rapid advance, the modern life they supported would transform behavior by changing where and, most importantly, how people worked, lived, and were educated. It was best to channel these changes with the forces of modern, rational community planning that would forestall haphazard growth and the dangers of decay. In its concern about housing and community development the TVA was not alone; it was gospel to New Dealers and many international progressive reformers. Community planning, like other elements, was part of a package, displaying how comprehensive change to communities and individuals marched in step with the imposition of large regional plans.³⁶

Education was part of this vision. It was a way of improving and modernizing the people of the valley. Schooling for children was indispensable but there was also a need to reach adults. The TVA, to enrich the labor pool, supported vocational training and adult education. This reached beyond improving workers’ capacities. Poorly educated and informed people would not be able to comprehend the intricacies of this approach and, therefore, would be less inclined to support it.

There was a belief at high levels in the TVA administration that:

[T]he citizen, whether he be farm owner or tenant, industrial or building trades worker, merchant, banker, school teacher, manufacturer, or what not, has a vital part to play in understanding and solving our national problems. If he does not understand and appreciate the need for an integrated and well-directed effort toward their solution, he will fail to do his part, either as an individual or as part of a larger group in whatever daily livelihood or activity he or they may be engaged. This understanding cannot be assumed; it must be the result of the individual’s assimilation of a reaction to the facts of modern living and modern problems.³⁷

Accordingly, the TVA established a “General Education” component to “increase the employees’ store of knowledge” and “develop powers of observation and critical judgment of one’s own activities in relation to the well being of society” but “stimulate a develop a desire for further

study.” All carried assumptions that would later appear in postwar modernization theory. People assumed to have passive or fatalistic worldviews would be given new skills and perceptions orient them toward the future and realign them with larger communities and national issues.³⁸ As Earle Draper, the man responsible for constructing the town, noted how the TVA would carry communities seen as backwards into a modern future. Norris was just, “one phase of that vast system of regional planning in the Tennessee Valley which is destined to bridge a social and economic gap of almost a hundred years.”³⁹

However, the town, like much of the TVA, did not always live up to such grand expectations. As construction concluded and workers moved on, the town, with its higher rents, eventually became a commuter suburb.⁴⁰ Norris would also become one of the most visible symbols of the TVA’s inability to reconcile reformist rhetoric with the dim realities of American racial prejudice. Promotion of social change did not mean challenging racism. It emerged as an all white community, as TVA officials had no desire to challenge the local segregationist regime. Acceptance of racial exclusion reflected the TVA’s larger failure to treat African-Americans equitably in terms of hiring, pay, and housing—chronic problems that did not escape the criticism of national civil rights groups.⁴¹ The training program segregated its classes by race. Recreational programs required that blacks use different areas of public parks or even excluded them from certain parks altogether. Even the library program discriminated, creating a separate, smaller library for blacks in Knoxville. Supporters, however, found it easy to turn a blind eye to the taint of segregation worn by the TVA.⁴²

They could also overlook other less savory aspects of the TVA. Hydraulic development meant flooding sections of the valley create reservoirs to feed power generators and slake the thirsts of agriculture. Such activity also had pronounced negative consequences on many individuals, often the least powerful. Over 125,000 people were displaced by the TVA’s construction projects—dams being the biggest culprit. Resistance, including rare outbreaks of violence, was sometimes the

grassroots response to the forced resettlement and other brands of dislocation brought by extensive development projects. Boosters evaded the issue but it reveals that, early on, the TVA provided hints to unintended consequences that would haunt similar attempts at modernization.⁴³

The raw scale of what TVA was attempting required far-reaching collaboration. Its efforts drew on an existing thicket of institutional resources lay mostly outside the state. Liberal planning advocates like Wesley Clair Mitchell, Charles E. Merriam, Frederic Delano, and Beardsley Ruml in the preceding decades had overseen the creation of institutional sinew indispensable to the New Deal. Their handiwork produced a range of influential institutions from the Social Science Research Council, Columbia University, the University of Chicago, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the National Bureau of Economic Research. These, in turn, had broken ground on numerous economic and social planning issues. These individuals and the institutions they cultivated as vital to a “make over” of liberalism from a classical nineteenth century ideology to a system interfacing with the demands of modern, urban-industrial society. Their ideas and programs were the product of a complex amalgam of government, business, voluntary groups, social science research and philanthropic activity. Their own research quickly defused into international trends in social reform. All collaborated to square economic growth with its social consequences while acknowledging the relationship between public-policy specialists with the government.⁴⁴

For a social science community immersed in this project the TVA had a siren’s call, believing it was impossible to discuss it, “without realizing the tremendous social implications it carries.” It was an outstanding example of the evolving integrated approach to development that utilized social sciences. Every breed of social scientist was needed to do the surveys and analysis on which would define what needed to be done in the valley—from education to resettlement. A collaborative outlook prevailed, where social scientists consciously integrated themselves with an assortment of politicians, bureaucrats, agriculturalists, and engineers arrayed in different institutions

and involved in the wider program. It was an attitude the TVA actively cultivated as collaboration offered tangible rewards. Early on, the Rockefeller Foundation and SSRC swiftly reoriented regional social science research to support a project seen as imperative. Howard Odum, a University of North Carolina sociologist who saw issues through a regional prism, found the pull to cooperate with the TVA irresistible. He mobilized and expanded social science research for the program with the express goal making the “materials already gathered and bearing on emergency problems which will arise in the early stages of the Government’s Tennessee Valley Project.”⁴⁵

It was a both continuation of the tradition of nongovernmental activism and preview of post-World War II development methods. The TVA required the assistance of local government, business, and what would now be called civil society organizations. This was particularly true in more socially oriented areas of its program. It required the help of local universities, public health organizations, foundations, and local governments, often working together, to execute complex educational or disease eradication programs—as was the case in the TVA’s far-reaching malaria control efforts.⁴⁶ During the Cold War a similar collaboration would prevail overseas between state and nonstate actors.

The social planning and collaborative aspects of the TVA are a reminder its overall program was much more than the provision of new industrial technologies. Development in the valley was striking similar to peer programs abroad. It was a total project, vast in its scope, where social and cultural change was integral. The dams and electric power plants it built were central elements of its program, but the modern social change they were to foster were equally important. This was to reach deeply and intimately into peoples’ lives and transform how and where they lived, worked, and how they saw the world. These assumptions would carry over into the postwar rush of development. But because the style of development the TVA epitomized was invasive it was politically controversial. After all, the Germans and Russians used planning to lay down imposing infrastructural projects and

employed their own brands of social engineering. Because the TVA was always situated in an international dialogue on development, it became increasingly important to enunciate those political aspects that set it apart.

Although many of the reforms supported by planning advocates owed much to international trends, they were promoted as exceptionally American variants. Unique American political traditions and particular in their history were highlighted to draw distinctions. In its emphasis on public-private cooperation in planning performed by the United States could be consciously set apart from statist counterparts in fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and imperial Japan. This has often obscured the international elements that fed into the TVA but that successful masking was one goal of supporters.⁴⁷

Making this distinction became increasingly important as the TVA was but one model in the vogue of state-centered economic and social planning during the years straddling World War II. During the 1930s, planning gained a growing following. Walter Lippmann warily noted “collectivism” had become the “dominant dogma of the age.”⁴⁸ Sociologist Karl Mannheim asserted there was “no longer any choice between planning and laissez faire, but only between good planning and bad.” Yet planning in many countries was often less about planning per se (at least in the comprehensive, rational manner described by its advocates) than who held vital levers controlling social and economic life. Despite a grab bag of meanings attached to the term, planning partisans held a common faith in the power and ability of the central government to direct people and resources to produce greater prosperity. In the liberal West, often was seen as counterpoint to the inadequacies of the free enterprise system laid bare by the Depression and later by war. Planning, for numerous reasons, clung to a reputation as the best mechanism to promote all forms of development.⁴⁹

Power was at the core of planning. This assured it would be dogged by controversy (that has not entirely dissipated today). Planning combined the raw power of technology with the imposing authority of the state, a brew some found noxious. Its embrace by the New Deal was ominous for its varied and vocal ranks of opponents. Programs like the TVA could potentially destabilize a host of local political and economic relationships while concentrating power in the hands of the central government. A more activist state caused obvious discomfort among business. Utility companies were goaded by the specter of government-financed competition and regulation. But antagonism was not limited to industry. Numerous poles of opinion saw it as a malignancy introduced into the American body politic. Culturally, certain Southern agrarians were uncomfortable with what they saw as alien methods it brought to their region. The social engineering at the TVA's core deeply worried others. Many saw a toxic import, the worst of opposing systems, into American life. It was reflexively denounced as "socialistic" and, as the term became one of derision, "totalitarian." Traditional American anti-statism motivated other critics. All saw the TVA as an early symptom of metastasizing centralized planning and feared if it found a host in the Tennessee Valley, it would soon infest the entire nation.⁵⁰

Although the Depression opened doors to reform experiments that might otherwise never been attempted, domestic opposition to those policies had critiques with traction. Supporters of the New Deal had to negotiate and define its position within American political traditions while explaining that it was an innovative approach to development standing apart from other options at work in the world. This was particularly true of the TVA, a program that took cues from planning and development concepts that were international in scope. To deflect attacks these global links had to be obscured—the TVA had to be domesticated. Advocates had to demonstrate it could produce economic growth and social change while remaining securely grounded in the best of American political life. The basis of this response was "grass roots" democracy, a popular cry across the New

Deal. Domestic debates threatening the very existence of the TVA forced an articulation of political elements that so engaged international progressives like Huxley and Chase.⁵¹

It fell to one of its early leaders, David Lilienthal to knit existing threads into a “TVA creed.” For all the imposing physical accomplishments much of the TVA’s appeal was a product of the rhetorical talents of Lilienthal. Son of an Indiana shopkeeper, Lilienthal was no stranger to reform. After study with Felix Frankfurter at the Harvard Law School, Lilienthal cut his teeth in Chicago with progressive labor lawyer Donald Richberg. His work on public utilities questions brought him attention and eventually an appointment to Wisconsin’s Public Service Commission in 1931. Throughout, Lilienthal remained loyal to his Brandeisian background—skeptical of distant, central authority but accepting an activist government as a positive force. Such a view fit the early posture of the Roosevelt administration and was a reason he was made one of the triad of directors of the newly created TVA in 1933.⁵²

Admirers described Lilienthal as a “wonder boy.” One indisputable talent thirty-three year old Lilienthal had was motivating supporters. Lilienthal’s activities made the organization a powerful symbol of the New Deal and the benefits brought by large-scale technological programs and scientific planning. It was Lilienthal who crafted the enduring terms by which the TVA gained much of its reputation as the best example of how liberal development could be implemented worldwide.⁵³ As the United States was a large and diverse country, its central government was bound to suffer from a “lack of knowledge of local conditions.” In view of this, bureaucracies centered in Washington had the potential, over the long-term, to be a threat to democracy. However, the answer was not to limit the authority of the government, but to change the way its powers were exercised. A decentralized administration of federal functions could overcome the dangers of a top-heavy and over centralized bureaucracy. Lilienthal saw the TVA as the boldest and best example of this decentralization. As a matter of course, he claimed its operations reached far down into the “grass

roots,” allowing decisions to be made in the field as well as utilizing local people and institutions in its programs. While smaller community bodies were franchised, Lilienthal’s idea of localism often meant the participation of established institutions like state and local government or regional universities. Nevertheless, decentralization provided administrative agility within the TVA unthinkable in a centralized bureaucracy; meaning technology and expertise could quickly and easily be dispersed for use by ordinary people. Lilienthal was clear that “cookie cutter” copies of the TVA could not simply be transferred anywhere they might be needed. The point lay in the basic “grass roots” concepts behind the institution. These ideas, because of their decentralized and inclusive nature, had potential to be applied in a variety of places and situations.⁵⁴

Lilienthal’s thesis fell onto prepared ground, in part because he was using common tropes. But it was also due to the fact it acknowledged tensions about harnessing what has been called the “juggernaut” of modern industrial society. Its power to transform—or harm—human life was already well appreciated. Lilienthal offered assurances that riding the juggernaut was possible, even beneficial. The United States appeared to have produced a concrete example of the integrated, large-scale, planned development many had long imagined could safely be encased in liberal politics. In its boosters eyes, this made the TVA an exceptional creation, a vision of development that could have only emerged in the United States. Nevertheless, Lilienthal’s thinking was flexible; the template for development arrived at in the American South had the potential for universal application.⁵⁵

The ready-made appeal of the TVA was a product of larger shifts in liberalism. The search for conviction was a continual part of the crisis for liberals. The imperatives of industrial society brought rolling changes to liberalism but the Depression demanded reformers stand at the forge and recast the intellectual bases of their worldview.⁵⁶ Internationalists who had invested heavily in the construction of a liberal order in the 1920s were dumbstruck by the potent stew of chauvinistic

nationalism, economic exclusion, and bleak racism stirred by the Depression. This compelled internationalist of all stripes to reformulate their own views and program to fit within an altered world. A spectrum of liberals in the United States and abroad was waking to the new realities in international life by the rise of authoritarian regimes. As expansionist policies of Japan, Italy, and Germany strained the international system, the statism, police powers and cults of personality credited to these regimes came to be seen as diametrically opposed to the core values of the United States. The ideologies were no longer a critique or a diplomatic nuisance but an existential threat to liberalism.⁵⁷

Symptomatic of this shift were efforts begun in 1936 by the Council of Foreign Relations, an epicenter of liberal internationalism, to study the origins and operation of what were initially termed “dictator states.” Included in this taxonomy were fascist Germany and Italy, as well as the USSR.⁵⁸ It was assumed this new and rapidly spreading form of political and social organization was an established fact in the global body politic. Opinion makers saw fascist and communist states linked by a common set of political, economic, social structures leading to disturbingly similar behavior domestically, despite some different international interests.⁵⁹

A new term for these states gained currency: “totalitarian.” Initially used by Italian fascists in the 1920s to describe their political and social worldview the term found quick, if vague, use to describe the ideologies challenging liberalism in the 1930s. By the end of the decade the major foundations, unsettled by the totalitarians, were shepherding public opinion toward global engagement.⁶⁰ Rockefeller, as part of this effort, began research programs to grasp, “the fundamental challenge which they represent.”⁶¹ Motivating these actions was an assumption all societies carried the latent bacillus for totalitarianism easily jarred to virulence by forces of modernity. This was not alien (indeed, it was foundational) to similar outlooks during Cold War.⁶² Economic and social development over the preceding century had produced democratic, liberal and individualist

revolutions at some points and authoritarian regimes. These trends needed to be mapped by the social sciences so that they could be understood and confronted. Such a view mated with a belief that development, impregnated with liberal concepts could inoculate societies, assuring the disease need never arise.⁶³

The fear of total state power abroad ran parallel to fears of the concentration of government power at home. Both assumed a corrosive impact on American life. On the international front in the later 1930s, political scientist Harold Lasswell effectively articulated an idea that illiberal fragmentation brought conditions where martial elites gained control of the levers of power, skewing societies. The argument was eventually extended to a fear that such devolution abroad might force the United States itself to adopt the domestic regimentation of its opponents to combat their influence.⁶⁴ During World War I, Woodrow Wilson and others had expressed similar fears that degenerative effects of German militarism and Bolshevism globally could alter American society domestically. Their answer had been an attempt to refashion international affairs to assure U.S. national security.⁶⁵ Elements of this formulation were in the calculations of the 1930s. However, the totalitarians were considered unique to human history and, because they appeared when modern societies were in crisis, likely to remain a persistent concern in international politics. If these ideas were allowed to advance unchecked abroad an unnatural “garrison state” would result at home. This formulation worked into the marrow of American geopolitical thinking in the late 1930s and endured through the Cold War.⁶⁶

Facing totalitarianism was more than an intellectual exercise. Historians have traced the critical shift in how liberals internationally recognized the threat from the newly defined “totalitarian” states in the late 1930s.⁶⁷ A commitment to international development was part of new U.S. globalism and was used to contain dangerous forces loose in the world. In the mid-1930s liberals internationally saw nationalistic economic policies as corroding the structure of international

life. For increasing numbers of American elites the peril was not abstract. The breakdown of international trade, exchange, and agreements negatively affected the United States itself. Internationalists from Henry Wallace to the members of the Institute of Pacific Relations argued that a fractured world economy offered little hope for prosperity through revived and integrated international trade. It was a formulation that eventually won over significant sectors of opinion. By 1936 Roosevelt was repeating such formulations, asserting, “a dark modern world faces wars between conflicting economic and political fanaticisms” which was logical as “without...liberal international trade, war is a natural sequence.”⁶⁸ Totalitarian states, organized around an unholy trinity of unalloyed statism, venomous nationalism, and stern autarky came to play the villains in this formulation. Before the outbreak of hostilities in Europe internationalists were articulating a need to take concerted action to promote and protect an integrated international economy dominated by liberal principles. It was Eugene Staley, a Tufts University economist with ties to the Council on Foreign Relations, who best projected American fears and the strategic need for international development in the critical years between 1937 and 1941.

Staley’s liberal internationalism was at his core. His 1923 undergraduate essay on Allied war debts, written at Hastings College in Nebraska, won a prize from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His admiration for Beatrice and Sidney Webb and the influence of John Dewey suffused his doctoral work at University of Chicago, where Staley sought to find a way to employ his discipline as a means to solve social problems.⁶⁹ As the global situation darkened during the 1930s, Staley engaged a cross section of international issues, proffering analysis echoing current debates over globalization. He agreed with contemporaries who believed technology was dramatically altering all aspects of life as it bound the world tightly together.⁷⁰ One of his mantras was this integration demanded the free flow of raw materials, capital, people, and knowledge. Those who impaired the normal flows of raw materials, capital, and the other lifeblood of the international

economy were standing in the way of progress and social welfare for all. Like debris blocking a rushing river, localist and nationalist economic policies disrupted the natural flow of the global economy. In the end, economic nationalists were fighting the forces of history. But they were more than inconvenient; they were potentially mortal for liberal societies. If such vices entrenched themselves in international life the fragmentation already wrought by the Depression would become permanent.⁷¹

Other dangers loomed. Staley joined other prominent internationalists involved in the peace movement in calls for greater international cooperation. But events were accelerating, rushing the world into what Staley feared would be an “era of totalitarian war.” A trend toward the establishment of “power economy,” where the ultimate goal was the expansion of military might was eroding commitment to the “welfare economy” focused on raising living standards for the population as a whole. International politics and trade were being skewed by aggressive policies, incited by economic crisis but increasingly becoming naked quests for national power. While nationalistic policies of the United States and others were a problem, the search for autarky by totalitarian states was cause for alarm. In the arenas of international trade and economic development, the threat to the United States of such “national localism,” was acute. Aggressive foreign policies and barriers thrown up by nationalistic economic programs emerging from polities corrupted by totalitarian ideologies had global impacts. This opinion was integral to a new geopolitical view that saw the maintenance of global system hospitable to American values as imperative to long-term security. As it had for so many other liberals, the shadow of the “garrison state” had darkened Staley’s gaze. Failure to bend the world to liberal principles would eventually force the United States the down the road to regimented social and political life to survive in an ideologically inhospitable world.⁷²

With the stakes so high, history needed a push. With nations increasingly caught up in nationalistic “war fever,” misdirecting resources to military spending instead of global trade and the

general welfare assumed to flow from it, international cooperation had to be renewed. However, this commitment required the cultivation of agreements and institutions as well as new capacities to guide growth. Capital and raw materials were spread unevenly across the globe and the requirement that they these move freely and easily could not be guaranteed in the darkening world of the 1930s. This movement was vital if a peaceful, healthy international economy was to be maintained. Cooperation of this sort had the added benefit of constructing a foundation for collective security against totalitarian aggression.⁷³

Staley's proposal to solve this problem was a comprehensive program of international development in form recognizable today. It presupposed systematic intervention in poorer areas of the globe to guide economic and social change. Through various means, technical knowledge would be injected into poorer areas of the globe to smooth the ground for freer movement of raw materials and commerce, assuring the stability of an open, liberal world order. Planning, made safe for free society, would make such expansion possible. Staley believed any effort necessarily required cooperation across a set of institutions.⁷⁴ Internationally, it was the task of governments as well as voluntary and international groups, including the League of Nations (which sponsored some technical aid missions to China and elsewhere), to increase the capacities of the peoples of poorer, often colonial, nations. Discussing his ideas, Staley chose not to dwell on the contradictions emerging from colonial development. Like many predisposed to development his attention was drawn to China, assailed by colonial powers but nominally independent and a major international flashpoint. It became his example of how international development might be conducted. If China received technical assistance on liberal terms that fit its perceived needs the country could eventually become a productive member of a liberal international economy.⁷⁵

Education in the technical arts would eventually unite a rank of modern, technologically minded persons with the capital that would foster growth. Staley shared a view common

internationally, that development was one interconnected process, linking the economic and the social. “Bringing roads and schools and technical institutes and machinery to China and India and Borneo” would create a, “self-reliant generation...equipped with modern tools for meeting their own needs and for exchanging with other peoples.” There was further reason to act. If liberal forces did not lead such development, these areas of the globe would fall under the sway of “nationalistic imperialisms.” Following these false prophets to the future would bring revolution and war that would not only harm peoples in the underdeveloped nations and, perhaps more importantly, continue dislocation within the international economy. According to Staley, the United States had to be the engine of history and drive the process. The “economic millennium” Staley scolded, “will not be brought about by hoping for it.” American leadership was an acknowledgement of its considerable economic and technical resources. It also reflected a bleak understanding that if the United States did not assume the role someone else—whose goals were deemed less savory—would do it. By default, global leadership and specifically command of world development lay in the hands of the United States.⁷⁶

As international affairs became more contentious after the outbreak of war in Europe, non-interventionists spoke of securing the United States by fortifying the Western Hemisphere. Interventionist liberals undermined these arguments by defining the sphere necessary for the defense of the United States as global rather than regional. One of the most effective voices was Staley’s. In the years before the U.S. entry to the war he energetically joined the acrimonious debates through newspapers, radio, and a flurry of public lectures. He drubbed a leading anti-interventionist, Charles Lindberg, as a confused dupe of Hitler’s divide and conquer strategy.⁷⁷ In an influential article in *Foreign Affairs*, Staley unraveled the limited, defensive formulations advocated by the likes of Charles Beard and Jerome Frank.⁷⁸ Dissenters could not see the “world was round.” Secure continents were now “myths,” as new technologies, particularly aircraft, made hemispheric defense

obsolete. Blindness to totalitarian (which by the beginning of the 1940s effectively meant German) success voided assurances that the economic, political, and social system of the United States could survive in one corner of the globe. Physical realities of geography could not be altered but “human meanings” given to those elements, “change.” Technologies rendering distance moot and forcing interdependence among nations at the same time furthered distortions of totalitarianism, creating a situation demanding the United States take the reigns of global leadership to secure itself. It was one element of a foreign policy accord bridging left and right, solidifying support for intervention, even among those who had no great affection for Roosevelt or the New Deal. In fact, this general strategic formulation with its imperative of U.S. global leadership found its way into Henry Luce’s defining essay, “The American Century” in 1941.⁷⁹

What is important is that a historically specific variant of international development that took cues and justification from the experience of the United States had a clear strategic rationale within a new American globalism. It was to assure and extend the sphere of liberal life against ideological challengers whose social and economic organization was corrosive to liberalism. Even with its international and private components, the role of the United States to push the whole program forward was seen as indispensable. Staley’s views matured in the international discussion in which the subfield of development economics was rising. They were a remarkably cohesive expression of ideas that would predominate postwar. Indeed, Staley has been credited for loading “international development” with its current meaning.⁸⁰ These formulations easily flowed into global reconstruction activity during World War II. Staley stated the global importance of international development to contain a totalitarian threat, but did not initially explain the specifics of implementation. However, that was a question other liberals were in the process of solving.

It is here that Odette Keun returns. Her wide-ranging travels were the basis of a number of books on world events in the 1920s and 1930s. They also made her sensitive to the crisis brought by

the Depression. As early as 1935 she saw the threat of fascist Germany to global order and called for preparations to resist.⁸¹ Keun's 1937, *A Foreigner Looks at the TVA*, outlined methods for resistance. She saw development as not just one element of liberal society but a means to directly grapple with liberalism's totalitarian challengers. She articulated the belief that the TVA and the larger style of development it epitomized could be more than a means to restore the global legitimacy of liberalism, it could contain the appeal of totalitarian ideologies. Specifically, what the TVA promised was "a model" of "a middle-road technique, applicable throughout the land...it may destroy those evils and infamies of exploitation...which render capitalism unendurable."⁸² (emphasis original) Accordingly it was the best example to summarize how modernity could be achieved by liberal means on a global scale. Keun felt:

The immortal contribution of the TVA to Liberalism, not only in America, but all over the world, is the blueprint it has drawn, and that it is now transforming into a living reality, of the road which Liberals believe is the only road mankind should travel.⁸³

The experiment in the valley did more than inspire discussion it brought action. Various groups, particularly NGOs already invested in developmental missions, gravitated to the TVA concept. It came to be seen as the exemplar of the same basic ideas they had been evolving. The program already had the attention of the Rockefeller Foundation. For the foundation's personnel, the TVA appeared as a tailor-made example of the sort of multipurpose development based on applied social science and technology they had come to advocate in the early 1930s. Efforts in the South, like those the foundation had embarked upon overseas, sought to reach down into the social life of the region and bring social changes the social changes necessary for modern, progressive outlooks to take root.⁸⁴ Lilienthal's grass roots philosophy provided a convincing argument that broadly conceived programs could easily be tailored to fit variety of people's needs and were therefore transferable to regions very different from the Tennessee Valley. By the later 1930s, many adherents

were campaigning for the creation of other TVA-styles authorities across the United States.⁸⁵

Partisans at the Rockefeller Foundation took that faith a step further, seeing it as a template for economic and social development they could actively export across the globe.

In China the TVA became an example of how liberal development could be extended. Keyed up officers with the Rockefeller Foundation compared their own China program with the ongoing New Deal project. Differences between programs in these two parts of the world were believed to be of “degree and not kind” and a distinct similarity was seen in “principles, objectives, and obstacles.” Rockefeller staff served as brokers, passing along information from by the TVA to Chinese officials working on rural development.⁸⁶ Attention has been given to the TVA’s role during the Cold War as a major developmental tourist destination. However, this trend began in the 1930s as part of the larger shift in development thinking. It was not only the likes of Huxley and Keun but also a selection of officials, thinkers, and technicians from around the world—including China and India—who visited. Rockefeller eagerly participated, sponsoring trips to Knoxville by numerous foreign visitors. Many Chinese had firsthand views of the New Deal program paid for by American sponsors. By serving as a travel bureau, Rockefeller was part of a growing trend. In 1937 alone the TVA claimed to have entertained more than 600 foreign visitors on top of over 110,000 American tourists. For those Chinese who saw the region, the TVA became one of the best examples of what development planning could achieve in their country.⁸⁷

This was not intended to be a purely one-way exchange of ideas. High-level officials at the foundation thought China provided “the social sciences with something which has heretofore been lacking, namely, a ‘laboratory’ where experiments can be carried on under controlled conditions.” Rockefeller staff hoped that ongoing “experiments” within the Depression-wracked United States could provide materials to be tested in their Asian lab and, at the same time, experience gained modernizing China could be fed back into reform in the United States. They believed the social

science community would be inspired by the foundation's Asian program. Eventually strategies would be picked up by American institutions to solve problems in the South and elsewhere.⁸⁸

With development finding a strategic rationale the U.S. government began to actively implement programs internationally. During the critical years from 1937 to 1940 Americans, with Franklin Roosevelt in the van, revised their vision of the international order and the role of the United States within it. Increasingly, the United States turned to cultural and economic diplomacy as a way to contain the influence of fascism, particularly German influence in Latin America. The clear outlines of how development should operate as part of an ideological confrontation were already being drawn. Americans rapidly came to the conclusion they had to actively guide economic development to assure stability in the region. As early as 1938, a range of official State Department cultural and economic programs, built on the experiences of various American non-governmental groups, appeared for this purpose. These would eventually include the flamboyant Nelson Rockefeller, well aware of the experiments of the foundation sharing his name and was influenced by Beardsley Ruml's personal faith in the social sciences to solve social problems. At the request of Roosevelt they drafted an influential 1938 report that made technical assistance an important part of U.S. economic intervention in the region. An outgrowth of Rockefeller's activism was the Institute of Inter-American Affairs, and its range of technical assistance, agricultural, and cultural programs that are rightly seen as forebears to Cold War government aid programs.⁸⁹

The start of European war in 1939 appeared to some internationalists as an opportunity to imagine a world reshaped on liberal terms. However, these dreams had to contend with the reality of those ideologies already inscribing their own "new orders" on the globe. In this continued debate over the shape of the world TVA enhanced its reputation as proven means to effect liberalism's promise. Huxley took a whirlwind tour of the U.S. during the fall and winter of 1939-40 to gauge American attitudes toward a postwar settlement. The TVA was on numerous tongues in

conversations about creating a world based on rising prosperity to justify Allied war aims and liberal aspirations generally.⁹⁰ Among the groups considering the world to come was the influential World Peace Foundation, which gathered prominent academics and activists in early 1940. They saw development of “backward” areas as one of the “economic essentials of durable peace.” South America, Africa, and Asia were all marked for large-scale development on the TVA model. China, for one, was to receive a “T.V.A. for the Yangtze Valley.” All would secure a revitalized liberal order postwar.⁹¹

Hopes for an early peace were soon dashed but thinking about global development ground on. As was often the case, Staley systematically explored what others only sketched. If the peoples of the globe were to achieve the “freedom from want” promised by Roosevelt’s “Four Freedoms” much more was required. Staley knew the issue of postwar stability and prosperity went beyond repair of war damage. The establishment of an integrated global economy based on liberal principles was a necessity. “Mixed” economies where cooperative planning principles blended with capitalist markets served as the means to greater global productivity. Accordingly, the imperative of reconstruction brought opportunity. The need to deal with underdevelopment remained a staple of discussion on the economic basis of peace. Staley, who joined the wartime United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), asserted recovery would easily segue into larger effort to develop the world economy in a refashioned liberal international order.⁹²

Capital investment and informal exchange were not enough to stimulate this conversion. As Staley outlined before the war, comprehensive technical assistance was foundational to an effective global process. Wealthy nations had to serve as catalysts by providing the necessary development aid but there was also need for devoted international institutions such as a “United Nations Development Authority.” He pointed to Sun Yat-Sen’s 1922, *The International Development of China* as a template. Indeed, the postwar development of what he hoped would be non-communist

China remained one of Staley's leading examples of how and why a continued commitment to international development was necessary. Fears in the West that emerging nations would eventually become technologically adept competitors were misplaced. A rising economic tide brought by development would lift all boats and his evidence was drawn from recent domestic experience. Quoting FDR, Staley recounted the logic that New Deal aid to the American South had not brought a competitor to the industrialized North but a set of fresh markets. Staley posited that with a positive program of development, the same would occur worldwide.⁹³

By 1944 Staley used the term development in the expansive manner that would come to be accepted during the Cold War and beyond:

What is economic development? It is a combination of methods by which the capacity of a people to produce (and hence to consume) may be increased. It means introduction of better techniques; installing more and better capital equipment; raising the general level of education and the particular skill of labour and management; and expanding internal and external commerce in a manner to take better opportunities for specialization. Economic development is a broader term than 'industrialization' ...⁹⁴

Importantly, Staley and others began to use the term "modernisation" as synonymous with this process. The term was not new in and of itself but applying it to these activities helped distinguish them from the older and ever more ambiguous rubric of "reconstruction." During the war the commonly used "reconstruction" had become increasingly confused with "recovery"—the reclamation of previously existing capacity. The new label of "modernisation" was a unified banner for maturing development approaches with a predilection for large-scale development programs and tempered planning. Along with other liberal advocates of development, Staley embraced the TVA as proof this liberal transformation was possible.⁹⁵

These hopes departed from earlier official U.S. approaches to development. It was not the informal, nongovernmental, and bilateral attempts to spread "civilization" that had reigned in the years after World War I. Rather, the new vision of liberal development Staley and others articulated,

made a prominent place for planning. It assumed the U.S. government would permanently be insinuated into the process. Even with this increased state role, non-governmental and international bodies were to have instrumental roles in what was seen as a global mission. Again, Staley acknowledged that modernization was a political and social process as much as economic and technological. He subscribed to existing assumptions that it would necessarily rearrange social and cultural relationships in the societies on the receiving end. More to the point, the liberal “modernisation” Staley had identified was perpetual and universal. In the framework he helped craft could be found the basic structure organizing U.S. development policies during the Cold War.

Lurking behind the imperative to modernize were the fears etched into the liberal mind by the tumult of the 1930s. Failure to embrace an international modernization mission would have profound consequences. Staley’s worldview assumed all societies were on the path to modernity but had varying ways to complete the journey. Without aid and guidance, developing nations would make their own choices about how they would modernize. Before the war ended Staley worried they might succumb to persistent temptations of “exclusive nationalism.” Most vexing was this path remained marked by the Soviet Union, a demonstration that national development could be achieved divorced from the wider international economy. Added to this, aggressive demagogues might once again marshal disaffection brought by recurring economic misery and social dislocation. The “ultimate totalitarian dictatorship” and war would result. Modernization based on “voluntary, democratic co-operation” offered an escape from repetition of the recent past.⁹⁶

Staley’s wartime assertions were core beliefs he would carry into a long academic and policy career. They were not singular. Numerous others came to see development as a spine to support liberalism’s legitimacy. Liberal internationalists, however, were starkly aware that their ideological competitors had their own appealing modernization programs. As they looked for the means to implement their vision, eyes fell upon evolving methods and institutions emerging from

contemporary cycles of reform. From these the TVA emerged as a liberal champion. In a period where modernization models were always part of an international dialogue, the TVA could distinguish itself from other development approaches with a claim its large-scale, socially transformative, planning-based development was securely encased in liberal politics. The ease with which these ideas flowed through global war into Cold War strategies was a reflection of the fact modernization was already a weapon to combat ideological threats to liberalism.

¹ Odette Keun, *A Foreigner Looks at TVA* (New York: Longmans, 1937), 5.

² Keun, *Foreigner*, 5.

³ George F. Kennan, "Memorandum for the Minister," Aug. 19, 1932, reprinted in the *New York Review of Books*, April 26, 2001.

⁴ On this scholarly consensus see, John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War : A New History* (New York: Penguin Press, 2005); Melvyn P. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind : The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War*, 1st ed. (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007); Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War : Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). See also David Engerman, "The Romance of Economic Development and New Histories of the Cold War" *Diplomatic History* 28 (Jan. 2004): 23-54.

⁵ Quoted in Reynolds, *Roosevelt*, 30-31.

⁶ Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent : Europe's Twentieth Century*, 1st American ed. (New York: A.A. Knopf : Distributed by Random House, 1999), , 3-17. Reinhold Niebuhr, *Reflections on the End of an Era* (New York, London.: C. Scribner's Sons, 1934), , 23. Harold Joseph Laski, *Democracy in Crisis* (Chapel Hill.: The University of North Carolina Press, 1933), , 16-19, 237. See also Akira Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).

⁷ Raymond Blaine Fosdick and League of Nations Association (U.S.), *Companions in Depression : The International Implications of the Business Slump* ([New York, N.Y.?]: Published by the Margaret C. Peabody Fund for the League of Nations Association, Inc., 1930).

⁸ James Thomson Shotwell and Raymond Blaine Fosdick, *The Conditions of Enduring Prosperity, International Conciliation, No. 267* (Worcester, Mass., New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Intercourse and Education, 1931).

⁹ Richard Pells, *Radical Visions and American Dreams: Culture and Social Thought in the Depression Years* (New York: Harper and Row, 1973).

¹⁰ Mazower, *Dark Continent*, 104-115. See also Wolfgang Schivelbusch, *Three New Deals : Reflections on Roosevelt's America, Mussolini's Italy, and Hitler's Germany, 1933-1939*, 1st ed. (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006).

¹¹ Robert O. Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism*, 1st ed. (New York: Knopf, 2004), , 32-42. R. J. Overy, *The Dictators : Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia*, 1st American ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2004).

¹² Sinclair Lewis, *It Can't Happen Here* (1935, New York: Signet edition, 2005), 30.

¹³ *Official Guide Book of the Fair* (Chicago: A Century of Progress, 1933), 11; J. M. Winter, *Dreams of Peace and Freedom : Utopian Moments in the Twentieth Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006). Lewis Mumford, *Technics and Civilization* (New York.: Harcourt Brace & World, 1963), , 3, 6.

¹⁴ John P. Diggins, *Mussolini and Fascism; the View from America* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972).

¹⁵ *Official Guide*, 93.

¹⁶ R. J. B. Bosworth, *Mussolini's Italy : Life under the Dictatorship* (London: Allen Lane, 2005), , 436-40. Frank M. Snowden, *The Conquest of Malaria : Italy, 1900-1962* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), , 142-80.

¹⁷ Richard J. Evans, *The Third Reich in Power, 1933-1939* (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), , 322-28, 45-50, 707-09. Mazower, *Dark Continent*, 133-137; Dan P. Silverman, *Hitler's Economy: Nazi Work Creation Programs, 1933-1936* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 244-246; Schivelbusch, *Three New Deals*, 173-183; Jeffrey A. Frieden, *Global Capitalism : Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century*, 1st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006), , 214-15.

¹⁸ David Engerman, *Modernization from the Other Shore: American Intellectuals and the Romance of Russian Development* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 153-193.

¹⁹ Stephen Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain : Stalinism as a Civilization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).

²⁰ Kotkin, *Magnetic*, 363; *Soviet Union*, "Ussr in Construction," (*Moscow: State Art Publishing House [etc.]*, 1930).; William Henry Chamberlin, *The Soviet Planned Economic Order* (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1931); See also Paul R. Josephson, *Industrialized Nature: Industrialized Nature Brute Force Technology and the Transformation of the Natural World* (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2002).

²¹ Martin Malia, *Russia Under Western Eyes: From the Bronze Horseman to the Lenin Mausoleum* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1999), 314-356. See also Peter G. Filene, *Americans and the Soviet Experiment, 1917-1933* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967).

²² Stuart Chase, *A New Deal* (New York: Macmillan, 1932), 235-241, 252.

²³ Stuart Chase, "TVA: The New Deal's Best Asset, The Great Transition," *The Nation*, June 24, 1936, 804-805; Stuart Chase, "TVA: The New Deal's Best Asset, Broadening the Exchange Base," *The Nation*, June 10, 1936, 738-741; Stuart Chase, "TVA: The New Deal's Best Asset, Planning by Consent," *The Nation*, June 17, 1936, 775-777; Stuart Chase, "TVA: The New Deal's Best Asset, Landscape and Background" *The Nation*, June 3, 1936, 702-705.

²⁴ Julian Huxley, *Africa View* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1931). Julian Huxley, *A Scientist Among the Soviets* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1932), 60-61; On the international intellectual economy feeding the New Deal see Daniel T. Rogers, *Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1998), 409-484.

²⁵ Huxley, *Dictator*, 99-100.

²⁶ Julian Huxley, "Plans for Tomorrow: The Tennessee Valley Authority," *The Listener*, Nov. 20, 1935, 897-900.

²⁷ Julian Huxley, "The TVA: A Great American Experiment," *The Times*, May 21, 1935; and Julian Huxley, "The TVA-A Town in the Making," *The Times*, May 22, 1935.

²⁸ James Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven, 1998), 6; David Nye, *Electrifying America: Social Meanings of a New Technology, 1880-1940* (Cambridge, 1990), 298; David Kennedy, *Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945* (New York, 1999), 147-149; Erwin C. Hargrove and Paul K. Conkin, eds., *TVA: Fifty Years of Grass-Roots Bureaucracy* (Chicago, 1983), 3-34.

²⁹ Jordan A. Schwarz, *The New Dealers: Power Politics in the Age of Roosevelt* (New York: Vintage, 1993), xi-xii; Anthony J. Badger, *The New Deal: The Depression Years, 1933-1940* (New York: Basic books, reprint, Chicago: Ivan Dee, 2002), 169, 175-177; and "Tennessee Valley Authority Act," May 18, 1933, *New Deal Network*, Dec. 12, 2001 <http://newdeal.feri.org/html>>; "Problem No. 1," *Time*, July 18, 1938; National Emergency Council, *Report on Economic Conditions of the South* (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1938).

³⁰ Donald Worster, *Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth of the American West* (New York: Oxford, 1985), 5-15; World Commission on Dams, *Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decisionmaking* (Sterling: 2000), xxix; Richard White, *The Organic Machine: The Remaking of the Columbia River* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995), 55-58; J. R. McNeill, *Something New Under the Sun: An Environmental History of the Twentieth Century World* (New York: Norton, 2000), 149-191; Earle S. Draper, "Regional Planning and the Tennessee Valley Authority," Jan. 14, 1935, box 242, RG 142 Records of the Tennessee Valley Authority, National Archives Southeast Region, Atlanta, Georgia (hereafter NAGA).

³¹ David Blackbourn, *The Conquest of Nature : Water, Landscape, and the Making of Modern Germany*, 1st American ed. (New York: Norton, 2006).

³² Milton to Arnett, May 22, 1933, box 159, RG 1, General Education Board, Series 1, RAC; Paul Hutchinson, "Revolution by Electricity," *Scribner's Magazine*, Oct. 1934, 194; Comments of A.S. Jandrey, Feb. 20, 1943, box 79, RG 142 Records of the Tennessee Valley Authority, NAGA; "Roosevelt's Development Plan Seen as

Boon to South” *Greensboro Daily News*, April 3, 1933; Dewey W. Grantham, “TVA and the Ambiguity of American Reform” in Hargrove and Conkin, eds., *TVA*, 325.

³³ Richard A. Colignon, *Power Plays : Critical Events in the Institutionalization of the Tennessee Valley Authority*, *Suny Series in the Sociology of Work* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997); Thomas K. McCraw, *Tva and the Power Fight, 1933-1939, Critical Periods of History* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1971).

³⁴ Ronald C. Tobey, *Technology as Freedom: The New Deal and Electrical Modernization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 48, 50-51.

³⁵ TVA Agricultural Engineering Department, “Community Refrigerators,” Jan. 1941, box 160, Clapp to Mann, Dec. 18, 1941, box 159, RG 1, General Education Board, Series 1.1, Rockefeller Archive Center, North Tarrytown, New York (hereafter RAC).

³⁶ Tennessee Valley Authority, *Communities for Living* (Tennessee Valley Authority, 1941); Talbert, *FDR’s Utopian*, 116-122; Rodgers, *Crossings*, 462-468.

³⁷ Advisory Committee on Education, “Regional and National Problems and Education’s Contribution to their Solution,” Sept. 21, 1937, box 13, President’s Advisory Committee on Education, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York (hereafter FDRL), 22.

³⁸ Tennessee Valley Authority Training Program, “A Tentative and Unofficial Statement of Work, Aims, and Objectives,” March 21, 1935, box 160, RG 1, General Education Board, Series 1, RAC.

³⁹ Advisory Committee on Education, “Educational Activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority,” Aug. 27, 1937, box 13, President’s Advisory Committee on Education, FDRL, 7-11; Talbert, *FDR’s Utopian*, 118.

⁴⁰ Nancy L. Grant, *TVA and Black Americans: Planning for the Status Quo* (Philadelphia, 1990), 134. On racial exclusion and New Deal, see Ira Katznelson, *When Affirmative Action Was White : An Untold History of Racial Inequality in Twentieth-Century America*, 1st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005).

⁴¹ Charles H. Houston and John P. Davis, “TVA: Lily-White,” *Crisis* (October 1934): 290–91, 311; and Cranston Clayton, “The TVA and the Race Problem,” *Opportunity* (April 1934), *New Deal Network*, <http://newdeal.feri.org/texts/121.htm> (last accessed Feb. 19 2002).

⁴² Grant, *TVA and Black Americans*, 113.

⁴³ Daniel Klingensmith, *“One Valley and a Thousand” : Dams, Nationalism, and Development* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007).

⁴⁴ Patrick D. Reagan, *Designing a New America: The Origins of New Deal Planning, 1890-1943* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1999), 5-7.

⁴⁵ T. Levron Howard, “The Social Scientist in the Tennessee Valley Authority Program,” *Social Forces* 15 (Oct., 1936): 29-34; E.S. Wengert, “TVA Enlists Local Cooperation,” *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 1 (April 1937): 97-101; “Work Memorandum on the Plan of the Tennessee Valley Study,” May 20, 1933; Odum to Walker, June 17, 1933, Thompson to Crane June 20, 1933, box 407, RG 1.1 Projects, Series 200 Social Science Research Council--Tennessee Valley Authority Administrative Development, 1935-1937, RAC.

⁴⁶ E.L. Bishop, Director of Health, TVA, “The Health Program as a Contribution to the Population Engaged in the Economies of the Tennessee Valley,” Feb. 1, 1937, box 132, RG 2, RAC.

⁴⁷ Reagan, *Designing*, 224-225.

⁴⁸ Walter Lippmann, *An Inquiry into the Principles of the Good Society* (Boston,: Little, Brown and Company, 1937), , 3-4.

⁴⁹ James Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution: What Is Happening in the World* (New York,: The John Day company, 1941). Karl Mannheim and Edward Shils, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction; Studies in Modern Social Structure* (New York,: Harcourt, 1940), , 6. Tony Judt, *Postwar : A History of Europe since 1945* (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), , 68-70.

⁵⁰ On the place of planning see Guy Alchon, *The Invisible Hand of Planning : Capitalism, Social Science, and the State in the 1920s* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985).; John M. Jordan, *Machine-Age Ideology : Social Engineering and American Liberalism, 1911-1939* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994). McCraw, *Tva and the Power Fight, 1933-1939.*; Edwin Vennard, “The Case Against TVA,” 1943; Edwin Vennard, “Supplement to The Case Against TVA,” 1944; Edwin Vennard, “Dangers of the TVA Method of River Control,” 1945; box 1, Office of the Chairman and the Board of Directors, Records of David E. Lilienthal, RG 142, NAGA; David Nye, *Electrifying America*, 308–309; Donald Davidson, *The Tennessee*, vol. II, *The New River: Civil War to TVA* (reprint, Nashville, 1992); Most Agrarians, were optimistic about the effects the TVA. See Edward Shapiro, “The Southern Agrarians and the Tennessee Valley Authority” *American Quarterly* 22 (Winter

1970): 791–806; See also Otis L. Graham, *Toward a Planned Society : From Roosevelt to Nixon* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976).

⁵¹ Rogers, *Crossings*, 452–461; Anthony Badger, *New Deal: The Depression Years* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2002), 176.

⁵² Neuse, *David E. Lilienthal*, 131, chs. 3–4.

⁵³ “Digest of TVA,” September–October 1933, box 407, RG 1.1 Projects, Series 200, RAC; Jordan, *Machine-Age Ideology*, 243–245; Talbert, *FDR’s Utopian*, 169–194; Neuse, *David E. Lilienthal*, 93–108; Badger, *New Deal*, 175.

⁵⁴ Remarks of Lilienthal, “For This We Fight: Public Works in Postwar America,” Oct. 30, 1943, Audio Recording, RWA 8617B3–4, NBC Collection, Motion Picture, Broadcasting and Recorded Sound Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC; Quoted in John Gunther, *Inside U.S.A.* (New York, 1947), 748; David E. Lilienthal, “The TVA: An Experiment in the ‘Grass Roots’ Administration of Federal Functions,” Nov. 10, 1939, box 20, David E. Lilienthal Papers, Mudd Library, Princeton University (hereafter MLP). For a later and broader discussion of this concept see David E. Lilienthal, “The TVA and Decentralization,” *Survey Graphic*, June, 1 1940, *New Deal Network*, <http://newdeal.feri.org/texts/262.htm> (last accessed Feb. 19 2002).

⁵⁵ Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 151; Daniel Bell, *The Winding Passage: Sociological Essays and Journeys* (New Brunswick, 1991), 69–70.

⁵⁶ Alan Brinkley, *The End of Reform : New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War*, 1st Vintage Books ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1996), , 3–14. See also Thomas Bender, *A Nation among Nations : America's Place in World History*, 1st ed. (New York: Hill and Wang, 2006); Alan Brinkley, *Voices of Protest : Huey Long, Father Coughlin, and the Great Depression*, 1st Vintage Books ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1983); Nancy Cohen, *The Reconstruction of American Liberalism, 1865-1914* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002).

⁵⁷ Benjamin Alpers, *Dictators, Democracy, and American Public Culture: Envisioning the Totalitarian Enemy, 1920s-1950s* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 2–4; Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order*.

⁵⁸ Mallory to Stolper, Dec. 15, 1936; “Rise of Dictator States in Europe, First Meeting,” Jan. 6, 1937, box 39, Study Groups, Council on Foreign Relations Archives, MLP. On the Council see Robert D. Schulzinger, *The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs: The History of the Council on Foreign Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).

⁵⁹ Thomas R. Maddux, “Red Fascism and Brown Bolshevism: The American Image of Totalitarianism in the 1930s” *The Historian* 40 (Nov. 1977): 85–103; Les K. Adler and Thomas G. Paterson, “Red Fascism: The Merger of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in the American Image of Totalitarianism, 1930’s-1950’s” *American Historical Review* 75 (April 1970): 1046–1064.

⁶⁰ Inderjeet Parmar, “‘To Relate Knowledge to Action’” The Impact of the Rockefeller Foundation on Foreign Policy Thinking During America’s Rise to Globalism, 1939–1945” *Minerva* 40 (2002): 235–263; Inderjeet Parmar, “The Carnegie Corporation and the Mobilization of Opinion in the United States’ Rise to Globalism, 1939–1945” *Minerva* 37 (1999): 355–378.

⁶¹ Memo from Willits, Sept. 16, 1940, box 11, Rockefeller Foundation, RG 3, Series 910, RAC.

⁶² For Cold War views of totalitarianism see, Carl J. Friedrich, Michael Curtis, and Benjamin R. Barber, *Totalitarianism in Perspective: Three Views* (New York: Praeger, 1969) and Carl J. Friedrich, ed., *Totalitarianism: Proceedings of a Conference Held at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954).

⁶³ “Studies of the Nature of Totalitarian Societies,” Oct. 3, 1940; Memo from Willits, Aug. 19, 1940, box 11, Rockefeller Foundation, RG 3, Series 910, RAC.

⁶⁴ Lasswell’s analysis was inspired by the 1937 Sino-Japanese War and the role of Japanese military elites in its origins. Harold Dwight Lasswell and Jay Stanley, *Essays on the Garrison State* (New Brunswick, NJ ; London: Transaction Publishers, 1997). Reynolds, *Roosevelt*, 180.

⁶⁵ Ross A. Kennedy, “Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and an American Conception of National Security” *Diplomatic History* 25 (Winter 2001): 1–31.

⁶⁶ On the idea’s importance in the Cold War see Aaron L. Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State : America's Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000). Melvyn Leffler, *The Specter of Communism: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War* (New York: Hill and Wang 1994).

⁶⁷ Akira Iriye, *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations* vol. III *The Globalizing of America, 1913-1945* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); 164-169; and David Reynolds, *From Munich to Pearl Harbor: Roosevelt's America and the Origins of the Second World War* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2001), 69-101, 102-132; Barbara Rearden Farnham, *Franklin Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis: A Study in Political Decision Making* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton, 1997); Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order*. Frank Ninkovich, *Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

⁶⁸ Frank A. Ninkovich, *The Wilsonian Century : U.S. Foreign Policy since 1900* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), , 124-25. J. B. Condliff, *War and Depression* (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1935); Henry A. Wallace, *America Must Choose* (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1934). On the impact of nationalism and planning internationally see Walter Lippmann, "Self-Sufficiency: Some Random Reflections," *Foreign Affairs* 12 (January 1934); G.D.H. Cole, "Planning and International Trade," *Foreign Affairs* 12 (January 1934); Franklin Roosevelt, "Address at Chautauqua, New York" Aug. 14, 1936, American Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=15097&st=Chautauqua&st1=>, accessed June 8, 2007.

⁶⁹ Eugene Staley, "Cancellation of Allied War Debts," 1923; Eugene Staley, "Social and Economic Theories of Beatrice and Sidney Webb," 1926; Eugene Staley, "A Scheme for Reforming Economics and for Making it a Hypothetical Science" n.d., box 1; Eugene Staley Papers, HIA.

⁷⁰ Simeon Strunsky, "Machines: The Threat Appraised" *New York Times*, Jan. 29, 1933; Raymond Blaine Fosdick, *The Old Savage in the New Civilization* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Doran & company inc., 1928).

⁷¹ Eugene Staley, "What Price Self Sufficiency?" *Christian Science Monitor*, Sept. 22, 1937; Eugene Staley, *World Economy in Transition* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1939), 206-222; Eugene Staley, *Raw Materials in Peace and War* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1937).

⁷² Eugene Staley, "Power Economy versus Welfare Economy," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 198 (July 1938): 9-14; Staley, *World Economy*, 327-330.

⁷³ Eugene Staley, "Economic Foundations of a Just and Enduring Peace," May 30, 1941, box 3, Staley Papers, HIA; Staley, *Raw*, 55-69.

⁷⁴ Eugene Staley, "What Types of Economic Planning are Compatible with Free Institutions?" *Plan Age*, Feb. 1940, 33-50.

⁷⁵ Staley, *World Economy*, 279-281.

⁷⁶ Staley, *World Economy*, 68, 269-286, 333.

⁷⁷ "Speech to Massachusetts League of Women Voters," Jan. 23, 1940, box 3, Transcripts of Radio Broadcasts, "University of Chicago Round Table," NBC Radio Network, various dates between 1938-1941. box 4; Eugene Staley, "Answer to Lindbergh," July 2, 1941, box 3, Staley Papers, HIA.

⁷⁸ Charles Beard, *A Foreign Policy for the United States* (New York: Knopf, 1940); Jerome Frank, *Save America First* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1938). See also Ronald Radosh and ebrary Inc., *Prophets on the Right*

Profiles of Conservative Critics of American Globalism (Cybereditions, 2001); available from <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/yale/Doc?id=10041217> Online book

⁷⁹ Eugene Staley, "The Myths of Continents" in Hamilton Fish Armstrong ed. *The Foreign Affairs Reader* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), 318-333. Armstrong helped Staley refine his argument and the article was initially published in April 1941; Armstrong to Staley, March 29, 1941, box 3, Eugene Staley, "Can Capitalism Survive the War?" June 25, 1941, box 3, Eugene Staley, "The World is Round," Oct. 23, 1942, box 3; Staley Papers, HIA; Henry Luce, "The American Century," [1941] reprinted in *Diplomatic History*, Spring 1999, 159-171.

⁸⁰ H.W. Arndt, "Development Economics Before 1945," in Jagdish Bhagwati and Richard Eckaus, eds., *Development and Planning: Essays in Honor of Paul Rosenstein Rodan* (London, Allan and Unwin, 1972), 26; H. W. Arndt, "Economic Development: A Semantic History," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 29 (April, 1981): 465.

⁸¹ Odette Keun, *My Adventures in Bolshevik Russia* (New York.: Dodd, Mead and company, 1923). Julian Huxley, *Memories* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970), 166; Odette Keun, *Darkness from the North* (London, Brinton, 1935).

⁸² Keun, *Foreigner*, 4-5.

⁸³ Keun, *Foreigner*, 89.

⁸⁴ “Notes on a Luncheon Meeting between Arthur E. Morgan, Lewis Meriam, and Charles Ascher,” Feb. 5, 1936, box 407, RG 1.1, Series 200, RAC; Frank Ninkovich, “The Rockefeller Foundation, China, and Cultural Change” *The Journal of American History* 70 (March 1984): 799-820.

⁸⁵ “Report on Administrative Organization of the Tennessee Valley Authority and Future Regional Authorities,” May 14, 1937, box 166, President’s Secretary’s File, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library; William E. Leuchtenburg, “Roosevelt, Norris and the ‘Seven Little TVAs’” *Journal of Politics* 14 (Aug., 1952): 418-441.

⁸⁶ J. B. Grant, “Tennessee Valley Authority,” Dec. 19, 1934, box 407, RG 1.1, Series 200, RAC; May to Gough, June 9, 1937, box 147, RG 2, Series, 248, RAC.

⁸⁷ Robert Rook, “Race, Water, and Foreign Policy: The Tennessee Valley Authority’s Global Agenda Meets ‘Jim Crow,’” *Diplomatic History* 28 (Jan. 2004): 55-81; Visitors six months of 1937, Nov. 30, 1937, box 620, RG 142, National Archives, NAGA; Leonard S. Hsu, “A Sociological View on Rural Reconstruction,” *China Critic*, Dec. 26, 1935; Hayford, *To the People*, 177. See also Leonard S. Hsu, “Rural Reconstruction in China,” *Pacific Affairs* 10 (Sept. 1937): 249-265.

⁸⁸ “China Program Progress Report,” April 15, 1936, box 12, Series 601 China, RG 1.1; Gunn to Fosdick, Dec. 9, 1936; Gunn to Sawyer, Oct. 19, 1937, box 13, Series 601 China, RG 1.2; Favrot to Gunn, March 31, 1937, box 1, Series 601 China, RG 1.2, RAC.

⁸⁹ Claude C. Erb, “Prelude to Point Four: The Institute of Inter-American Affairs,” *Diplomatic History* 9 (Fall 1985): 249-269; Darlene Rivas, *Missionary Capitalist: Nelson Rockefeller in Venezuela* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002) 39-41; Cary Reich, *The Life of Nelson Rockefeller: Worlds to Conquer, 1908-1958* (New York: Doubleday, 1996).

⁹⁰ Memorandum, Dec. 9, 1939; “Final Report on Visit to USA,” Dec. 1939-Feb. 1940; “Interim Report on Visit to USA,” Nov. 28-Dec. 1939, box 14.4, Isaiah Bowman Papers, Special Collections, Milton S. Eisenhower Library, Johns Hopkins University; R.L. Duffus, “Blueprint for a Post-War World,” *New York Times*, Jan. 28, 1940.

⁹¹ Conference Proceedings, “The Economic and Political Bases of Durable Peace” April 1940, box 12, World Peace Foundation Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection.

⁹² Eugene Staley, “Toward a Durable Peace,” *Common Sense Magazine*, April 2, 1942; Eugene Staley, “Economic Aspects of Relief and Rehabilitation,” Aug. 26, 1943, Eugene Staley, “Foreign Investment as an Economic Investment,” Jan. 5, 1944, box 3, Staley Papers, HIA; Percy Ellwood Corbett, *Post-War Worlds* (New York, London,: Farrar and Rinehart, 1942); E. F. M. Durbin, *The Economic Basis of Peace; [Addresses* (London,: National Peace Council, 1942); Henry P. Jordan and American Council on Public Affairs., *Problems of Post-War Reconstruction* (Washington, D.C.: American council on public affairs, 1942). On the emphasis on prosperity in the postwar settlement see Elizabeth Borgwardt, *A New Deal for the World : America's Vision for Human Rights* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005).

⁹³ Eugene Staley, International labor office Geneva., and Robert W. Tufts, *World Economic Development; Effects on Advanced Industrial Countries* (Montreal: [International Labour Office], 1944), , 15-20. Staley would put some of his conclusions about technical assistance into action while part of an UNRRA mission to China in 1944. See Eugene Staley, *Far Eastern Survey*, 13 (Oct. 1944), 183-185.

⁹⁴ Staley, *Economic Development*, 5.

⁹⁵ Staley to Rogers, Aug. 16, 1944, box 1, Staley Papers, HIA; Staley, *Economic Development*, 8, 190. Interestingly, a study instrumental to Staley’s understanding of the significance of the TVA was by Herman Finer, a professor at the London School of Economics, whose research on the authority was funded by the Rockefeller Foundation.

⁹⁶ Staley, *Economic Development*, 31-32.