From Tuskegee to Moscow: Black Southerners and Self-Determination for the Black Belt in the 1920s

Excerpted from *Defying Dixie: The Radical Roots of Civil Rights, 1919-1950*

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The following paper is from my just-released book, which focuses on challenges to white supremacy in the three decades before what we traditionally think of as the civil rights movement. In my research in the Moscow archives (RGASPI), I became fascinated by the attention that the Executive Committee of the Comintern paid to rural black southerners. The policy of self-determination for the Black Belt, which grew out of that concern, has been treated by historians as an aberration, a false step that the Communists in far-away Moscow took because they were blinded by ideology and knew little about the South. In reality, southerners, white and black, advised on the policy and the RGASPI fonds are crammed with agricultural data on the South. I argue that the Comintern thought that southern black farmers would be the most revolutionary group in the United States and therefore the one that they should organize first to prevent them from becoming a reserve proletariat for the industries that were rapidly moving South. Moreover, the great migration of black southern farmers to the North threatened the Communists’ ability to organize in industry there. Since how and whether to organize peasants is an important debate in Marxism, the challenge that poor southern black farmers presented to the Comintern and U.S. Communists provides a fascinating view on how ideology, organizing, and leadership worked among Communists before Stalin tightened his grip on debate.

If Lovett Fort-Whiteman had let himself think too hard about it, the trek from Tuskegee to Moscow might have seemed insurmountable. At the beginning, when he took pleasure in going barefoot, red dust sifted up between his toes. At the end, the icy cold from frozen cobblestones penetrated his soles, arching up through his legs despite his knee-high felt boots. Back at Tuskegee Normal and Industrial Institute in 1906, he sometimes had gone for days without seeing a white person, but at the University of the Toilers of the East, he rarely spotted a black person.¹ In Alabama, when he traveled forty miles to bustling Montgomery, Fort-Whiteman stepped aside carefully for white women and children, knowing that trouble might follow if he caught a white person’s eye. But as he walked through the streets of Moscow in 1924, curious Russian eyes searched his face,
and friendly women and children reached out to touch him. He shed the narrow neckties and white shirts of Tuskegee for a *robochka*, a long shirt sashed with a fancy belt. Now he tucked his trousers into his high boots and adopted a fur hat that sat like a ‘possum on his freshly shaved head.

His greatest adjustment came from escaping to a place where racism, or “social poison,” as the Russians called it, was illegal. The Russian Revolution shortened the distance between the South and the Soviets and built a bridge that beckoned those who deplored Jim Crow. The receding southern shore legislated racial discrimination. The looming Soviet horizon legislated the social equality of the races. In the 1920s and early 1930s, the Communists encouraged friendship, love, and marriage between blacks and whites. The thoroughgoing ideal of racial and ethnic equality that existed in the USSR sprang both from an ideological impetus to cast off Czarist prejudices and from a practical desire to unite people as Communists, not as Jewish or Uzbek. Many black Southerners imagined the USSR as the one place in the world free of racial prejudice.

To Communists in the 1920s, race trouble, such as that in the United States, simply camouflaged class disparity: racism was a byproduct of economic competition between groups. The international Soviet governing body, the Comintern, welcomed the “rising tide of color” that they could turn against imperialist nations. Those whom the eugenicists feared, the Soviets welcomed as comrades. To the Soviets, racism wafted off the capitalist enterprise like noxious smoke, an indication of something rotten and smoldering at the core. Where there was smoke, the Comintern thought, fire would soon follow, a revolution kindled by class solidarity that would incinerate discrimination.
worldwide.⁷

Southern-born people, those who spoke “Russian with a Mississippi accent,” helped to make the South and African Americans central to Soviet policy.⁸ In speaking for the southern masses, African American Communists had an influence on domestic and international Communist policy disproportionate to their meager numbers.⁹ As delegates to the International Congresses, as students in Moscow, and as radical editors, the fifty or so Communist African Americans and their occasional white southern ally found highly placed Communists in New York and Moscow eager to listen to their advice. After 1928, well-positioned African Americans in the Negro Commission of the Comintern’s Executive Committee (ECCI) helped set policy for Communist organizing around the world.

Lovett Fort-Whiteman, a black man from Dallas, Texas, became the first American-born black Communist. Earning the title the “reddest of the blacks,” Fort-Whiteman came to Communism through socialism, radical labor activism, and race consciousness.¹⁰ As a man, Fort-Whiteman embodied the excesses of radicalism; white Southerners would have called him one of the crazy ones. Born in December 1889 in Dallas, Texas, Lovett Fort-Whiteman grew up in a “radical family.” He graduated from Tuskegee, became an anarcho-syndicalist in Mexico, dodged the draft in WWI, joined the Communist Party in 1919, and was arrested at J. Edgar Hoover’s behest. He spent part of the early 1920s in jail and emerged as a representative of the Workers Party (the Communist Party) in 1924.
Race as Class in the USSR

In mid-June, 1924, Fort-Whiteman traveled from Chicago to Moscow as one of roughly five hundred delegates to the Fifth World Congress of the Third International. In Red Square, the delegates viewed Lenin’s body. Down the hill from the Kremlin, men rowed small skiffs up and down the river, and people on the streets had a more prosperous air about them than anytime since the Revolution. Some conceded that “events have not developed with quite the speed we expected.”¹ The session at which Fort-Whiteman spoke was devoted to “discussion on national and colonial question[s].” Since colonies had not yet industrialized, Fifth Congress delegates debated under what conditions Communists should organize rural peasants like those in Vietnam, Africa, or the American South. Simultaneously, they thrashed out an anti-imperial policy.¹²

On July 1, a long, warm summer day, Fort-Whiteman rose to educate listeners, including Joseph Stalin and Ho Chi Minh, on the Negro question. He outlined the Great Migration of black Southerners to the North and pointed out that these new black industrial workers were difficult to organize. He advised the Party to move into the South and “exploit” rising dissatisfaction among sharecroppers, a strategy that would pay off, since the “negroes are destined to be the most revolutionary class in America.” Yet, he tried to explain that “even the wealthy bourgeoisie among the negroes suffer from persecution;” thus, African Americans “are not discriminated against as a class, but as a race.” This was not exactly the right thing to say to a Marxist gathering. Such talk made some warn Fort-Whiteman that he must be careful not to emphasize race over class. Class came first; indeed, it created race.¹³ For now, Fort-Whiteman began his education by
listening to Fifth Congress delegates call “national and race prejudices . . . [the] product of slavery.” The Fifth Congress institutionalized a permanent Negro Commission in the Comintern, chaired by an American Communist.14

Fort-Whiteman did not return immediately to the United States, but enrolled in the school for colonized peoples, the Kommunisticheskii Universitet Trudyashchisya Vostoka, the Communist University of Toilers of the East, known by the acronym KUTV.15 He focused on the treatment of minorities within the USSR, which he found extraordinarily encouraging. For example, he marveled that until the Bolshevik Revolution, “the Jew was the Negro of Russia subjected to periodic wholesale lynchings, termed in Russia ‘pogroms.’” Now the Jew, Fort-Whiteman concluded, “has become a complete integer of national life. . . . [H]e lives where he chooses.” He overlooked the fact that the Bolsheviks suppressed Jewish religious practice.16

Fort-Whiteman admired the separate administrative homelands in the USSR where a particular ethnic group was in the majority and where, theoretically, the group could retain and develop its cultures. He saw the homelands as necessary breathing spaces. With territorial “realignment,” he reported, Soviets had created “republics in which each of these races may enjoy group autonomy . . . [thus] every trace of racial friction is obliterated.” Previously, it had been “Tatar [sic] against Turk; . . . Georgian against Armenian,” with “strict segregation.” In Tashkent, for example, wooden partitions had “separated natives from Europeans” on streetcars. Fort-Whiteman argued that the Soviets had “approached these racial problems with a directness and a scientific understanding” unsurpassed in the world. The Muslem gained access to schools in
Turkestan, and the Uzbeks, crushed under the Czar, were, according to Fort-Whiteman, “quite free and independent and a politically important people.” This ethnic freedom did not include retaining religious customs; for example, Fort-Whiteman supported the campaign to convince Uzbek women to lift their veils.¹⁷

Naturally, he filtered his perceptions of racism in the USSR through his memories of racism in the United States. In the Soviet Union, he saw nothing of lynching, Jim Crow accommodations, racial slurs in public spaces, or ethnic disfranchisement. The openness of the Soviet people astonished him. In the Ukraine, the Third Cossack Division made him an honorary member. In Turkestan, residents of Kaufmansky voted to rename their city Whitemansky in his honor. Audiences everywhere listened raptly as Fort-Whiteman told them of the racial hierarchy in the U.S. South; audiences everywhere disavowed racism in the new Soviet society. Fort-Whiteman became convinced that the USSR had become the “first state in the history of the world which ha[d] actually solved the problem of racial discrimination.”¹⁸ Under his Party name, James Jackson, he wrote to W.E.B. Du Bois “from a village deep in the heart of Russia.” He marveled that in the Soviet Union women and men from all over the world “live as one large family, look upon one another simply as human beings.” “Here life is poetry itself!” Fort-Whiteman exclaimed.¹⁹

His studies at KUTV and experience on the ground slowly convinced Fort-Whiteman that he had been wrong when he said that African Americans were discriminated against as a race, not as a class. It helped to realize that racism was a man-made, rather than a natural, phenomenon. Racial oppression sprang from slavery and
shored up the post-bellum southern economic structure. Freedpeople provided a vital cheap labor force, and whites honed new measures to keep them there. “Race prejudice is not an inherent thing in the mental makeup of the individual,” Fort-Whiteman discovered; it was not “transmitted thru the blood.” Instead, “race prejudice . . . springs from the capitalist order of the society,” he declared. White capitalists knew all too well how to “divide and rule” poor whites and blacks. Moreover, a few black people were successful capitalists themselves. It was the “Negro proletariat,” rather than the black middle class, that held “the key of salvation of the race.”

A senior official in the Comintern provided the intellectual compass for journeys such as Fort-Whiteman’s. Sen Katayama, whom Fort-Whiteman had met in New York, was a Japanese revolutionary, an honorary Southerner, and an honorary African American. As a young man in the early 1890s, Katayama had attended Presbyterian Maryville College in Maryville, Tennessee. Set atop a mountain near Knoxville, Maryville was one of the very few predominately white southern schools that admitted African American students. Some held it up as a success story, but Katayama found the racial situation in Maryville abysmal. While Japanese students found acceptance on campus—a fellow countryman captained the football team—only a few African Americans attended the school. Katayama thought that the administration treated those black students as tokens. Himself a “small, dark-brown” man, Katayama was appalled at southern white supremacy when he ventured into town. Katayama did not specifically record what the white men sitting by the cracker barrel said to the “small, dark-brown man” when he went into the store. Did they call him “boy?” Once outside, did they
demand that he step off the sidewalk when a white woman passed? Whatever they did, Katayama’s hated them for a lifetime. After three semesters at Maryville, he could stand it no more and transferred to Grinnell College in Iowa.\textsuperscript{23} Converted to social gospel activism at Grinnell, Katayama then graduated from Yale Divinity School in 1895 and returned to Japan, where he became a labor activist and eventually a Socialist.\textsuperscript{24}

Katayama moved to New York in 1914 and put himself in the heart of radical politics. He encountered Fort-Whiteman and Otto Huiswoud at New York’s Rand School during World War I and met with Nikolai Bukharin and Leon Trotsky in Brooklyn. Closely watched by Military Intelligence during World War I, Katayama leapt the Socialist Party fissures, joined the Communist Party of America, and ran a popcorn stand on Coney Island.\textsuperscript{25} The Bolsheviks called him to Moscow in 1920, where they revered him as a father of Communism and ensconced him in the halls of power.\textsuperscript{26} Throughout this dazzling life, Katayama never forgot his bitter experience at Maryville. As one African American Communist recalled, “‘Old Man’ Katayama knew all about white folks.”\textsuperscript{27}

In 1921, Katayama had “placed the American Negro problem first upon his full agenda.” He spoke in a “squeaky grandmotherly voice about Negro problems and kept the African American cause before the Soviet councils.”\textsuperscript{28} He held three positions that helped him promote that cause. He was chief of the “American Bureau” of the Comintern, a member of its powerful Executive Committee (ECCI), and served alongside Ho Chi Minh on the executive committee of the Krestintern, the commission that dealt with rural and peasant issues. The latter position lent him a bully pulpit to point out the
potential for revolution among black sharecroppers and tenant farmers.29

The Krestintern hoped to link southern black farmers’ struggles with international agrarian travails. Katayama sponsored a successful “Resolution on the Negro Question” and won approval for a World Negro Congress from the Fourth Congress in 1922. The Comintern’s focus on African Americans complemented their “turn to the East,” which argued for liberating the oppressed colonial subjects of European imperialism, rather than focusing exclusively on European proletarians.30 The turn to the East meant that Communists believed that farmers around the world were potential revolutionaries.

While Katayama was committed to organizing agrarians, he realized that black southern farmers were rapidly becoming a cheap urban wage labor force. He believed that urban, ethnic white Communists gravely failed their party and obstructed revolution when they “neglect[ed]” and postpone[d] “Negro problems again and again.” They had not protested the “wholesale massacre of the Negro population of the city of Tulsus [Tulsa], Oklahoma by the armed whites of that city” in 1921. Nor had they lobbied for an anti-lynching bill before the U.S. Congress.31 “The American Negroes are proletarian,” Katayama pointed out, “and they are engaged in heavy works like dockers, railway porters and now many Negroes are in factories of the North.” The Comintern could no longer give in to the “petty objections put up by the American Comrades who are too sensitive and irritable about the prejudice of the Southern people and . . . Communists who are yet unable to get rid of racial antagonism.” The Party would be doomed in the United States, Katayama warned, unless it solved its own “Negro problem.”32
Learning to be Black Bolsheviks

One spring day in 1925, Oliver Golden, of Yazoo City, Mississippi, Tuskegee, Alabama, and, most recently, Chicago, Illinois, spotted his old friend Fort-Whiteman walking down the street. Golden could not believe his eyes. Fort-Whiteman’s shaved head reflected the cold spring sun. He sported a robokha, knee-high felt boots, and a small moustache. Golden laughed, “What the hell are you wearing? Have you just come off the stage?” Fort-Whiteman chortled that he had just returned from the USSR. Golden shared the news that he had just married and was working as a chef on the railroad. But, he complained, the railway companies demanded long routes of black workers, withheld amenities, and failed to pay them for all of the hours they worked. Fort-Whiteman shot back: Then why don’t you go to school in Moscow next year? Golden reported, “At first I thought he was kidding, man, but I would have done anything to get off those dining cars.” When Fort-Whiteman said that Golden’s wife, Bessie, could go too, the deal was sealed for join eight other new black recruits to KUTV. After eight months in the Soviet Union, Fort-Whiteman had returned to the United States to recruit other African Americans—some already Communists, others like Golden, merely aggrioved—to study and work in Moscow. Members of the Comintern believed that this core of black students would return to the United States to recruit new black Communists.

In reality, Golden was more traveled and more political than his account of the meeting suggests. Two years older than Fort-Whiteman, Golden had served in France during World War I with the 92nd Division of African American soldiers. His best friend had been signal corpsman James Ford, born in 1893 in Pratt City, Alabama. After the war,
Ford had joined Golden in Chicago, worked in the post office, and tried to organize through the Chicago Federation of Labor for black postal workers’ rights.34

Both the Golden and the Ford families had been driven from the South. Oliver Golden’s grandfather owned a large farm in the Delta, but whites twice burned down his house, once in the 1890s and again in 1909. The last fire proved a blow from which the family never recovered. James Ford had an even more tragic family story: a white mob in Georgia had lynched his grandfather. Golden graduated from Tuskegee and Ford from Fisk, where his running skills on the football field earned him the nickname “Rabbit.” Both men had followed the Great Migration stream to Chicago, where they joined the army during World War I. In France, Ford and Golden had protested against discrimination. After they mustered out, they arrived back home just in time to witness the 1919 Chicago race riot. Finding themselves shut out of the jobs for which the army had trained them, the two ex-soldiers worked on the rails and in the post office, where they came into contact with other educated black workers in jobs incommensurate with their educations.35 Fort-Whiteman’s experience in the USSR provided a bridge for Golden to cross in 1925; subsequently, Ford would follow.

Fort-Whiteman succeeded in recruiting three black women and seven black men to KUTV, including the Goldens and Otto Hall, whose younger brother, Haywood, would join him in a few months and change his name to Harry Haywood. Soon Oliver Golden was learning Russian, and Bessie took the new name “Jane.”36 Black Americans joined white Americans who traveled to Moscow after World War I to escape from the labor, racial, and class repression of the Red Scare. U.S. citizens poured into the USSR in the
late 1920s and 1930s at a rate of 5,000 each year. Many were simply tourists. Others were
dissidents who sought a place where labor had dignity, where the people ruled over the
bosses, where races coexisted peacefully, and where fulfilling basic human needs took
precedence over capitalist accumulation. They thought they might find such a place in the
USSR.37

African Americans, especially, wanted to see the Soviet experiment in racial
equality. NAACP founder W. E. B. Du Bois wrote from Moscow in the summer of 1926,
“I stand in astonishment and wonder at the revelation of Russia that has come to me.”
After “less than two months . . . and two thousand miles” in the country, he allowed that
he might “be partially deceived and half-informed. . . . But if what I have seen with my
eyes and heard with my ears in Russia is Bolshevism, I am a Bolshevik.”38 George Tynes
came from Roanoke, Virginia, by way of Wilberforce University, with an agricultural
degree. He stayed the rest of his life and became the Soviet authority on the breeding of
Peking ducks.39

At the University of Toilers of the East (KUTV), African Americans joined
Indians, Indonesians, Koreans, Filipinos, Persians, Egyptians, Middle Easterners,
Africans, Chinese, and Japanese in Marxist theory classes taught in English, French, and
Chinese.40 KUTV actually functioned as a segregated university for “colonized” peoples,
usually of color; white Americans attended other schools, such as the Lenin School.41 In
fourteen months, African Americans could become “theoretically trained workers,” who
might be “summon[ed] to Moscow for a prolonged period” to influence Soviet policy on
oppressed peoples, but most of their time would be spent organizing in their home
countries. Conditions at KUTV shocked African American students. They reported that the dorms were freezing and declared the “sanitary conditions” . . . “INTOLERABLE.” They lacked lighting to study and, despite the fact that they slept on boards, they suffered from bedbugs. They finally asked the Comintern for “separate rooms in the dormitory, the habits and conditions of living of the Eastern students being totally different from what the Americans are accustomed to.” In other words, they asked for segregation within the segregated university. William Patterson, a black lawyer from California by way of Harlem, argued that white—not black—U. S. Communists should study at KUTV so that they could learn about people of color and imperialism.

As he led his new recruits into KUTV, Fort-Whiteman told the press that he had been recruiting African Americans for three years’ training for the Russian “diplomatic service.” From Moscow, the international Herald Tribune reported: “Soviet Trains Negroes Here for Uprising.” The story quoted Fort-Whiteman as he assured recruits that he would provide them forged passports and announced his plans to open a KUTV branch in Harlem. The idea was “fantastic,” “grotesque,” and designed to teach African Americans to “do some real upheaving when they come home.” A liberal magazine for white Americans, The Independent, concluded that the point of such an education must be to “spread Communism among the colored people of the entire world.” The editor of The Independent reflexively held up the image of Tuskegee as a totem to ward off such radical Negroes. After all, it was at Tuskegee that African Americans took their first slice of the great capitalist pie. With African American capital in the United States now amounting to over two billion dollars, “It would be hard for a Communistic agitator to
fool” such sober, not to mention wealthy, Negroes, *The Independent* scoffed. The editor imagined the KUTV recruiters as “white, . . . [and] mysterious,” with purses full of Moscow gold. The truth—that by now Tuskegee itself had produced several of those *black* and “mysterious” Communist agitators—would have made Booker T. Washington spin in his grave. 47 If Jim Crow produced black Bolsheviks, then southern white supremacy threatened the entire nation.

**Building a Black Communist Base**

When he returned to Chicago to recruit KUTV students, Fort-Whiteman also founded the American Negro Labor Congress (ANLC). 48 He announced that the ANLC would fight lynching, discrimination in housing and employment, and end disfranchisement and sharecropping, which he described as a “peonage system.” He would force the American Federation of Labor to “abolish the colour line,” he would organize black and white farm workers together and “institute a vigorous campaign” to defeat the Ku Klux Klan, which Fort-Whiteman described as an “American fascist organization.” 49 In the early spring of 1925, Fort-Whiteman launched a tour to promote the American Negro Labor Congress in the Northeast and the South, seeking to organize “Negro LABOR connections.”50 Fort-Whiteman stayed so far underground on the southern leg of his tour that it is unclear whether he went at all. Many of the ANLC’s planning committee members were southern-born, but only two of the seventeen still lived in the South: a longshoreman from New Orleans and the head of the “Neighborhood Protective Association, Toomsuba, Mississippi.”51
Fort-Whiteman might have taken the conference’s opening night in late October, 1925, as a hint of even more trouble to come. His love for Moscow and his flair for the dramatic prompted him to plan an opening night extravaganza of Russian ballet and theatre. Five hundred African Americans packed a hall on the South Side of Chicago, and as expectant hush fell on the crowd, an all white female ballet troupe entered. Shocked to see a mostly black audience, one of the ballerinas exclaimed in a loud southern accent, “Ah’m not goin’ ta dance for these niggahs!” To which someone in the audience shouted, “Throw the cracker bitches out,” and the “Russian” ballet corps scooted out of the hall. Then came the piece de resistance, a Pushkin play, performed by real Russian actors. Pushkin, who was part African, was revered as Russia’s greatest poet. To Fort-Whiteman’s dismay, disaster struck again when the actors began to speak—in Russian.52

When Fort-Whiteman finally rose to welcome the delegates, standing under a banner that read “Organization is the First Step to Freedom,” he faced a confused and agitated audience. But he saved the night with a fiery speech, telling them, “The aim of the American Negro Labor Congress is to gather, to mobilize, and to co-ordinate into a fighting machine the most enlightened and militant and class conscious workers of the race.”53 Ten white men lurking on the fringes of the hall, “Mr. Coolidge’s federal dicks,” took down his every word.54

The opening night crowd of five hundred vanished the next morning, turning out to have been mostly local people seeking entertainment. When the credentials committee met, they seated about “forty Black and white delegates, mainly Communists and close sympathizers,” most of them from Chicago.55 The absence of black southern farmers and
sharecroppers left an embarrassing void at the conference, since the Comintern had ordered the conference to report on southern farmers for Sen Katayama’s peasant committee, the Krestintern. In fact, no “Negro peasants” showed up in Chicago. Only three black Southerners attended at all: a dockworker from Galveston, Texas, a freight handler from Lake Charles, Louisiana, and a woman who led the 250-member chapter of the African Blood Brotherhood in Montgomery, Alabama. White Southerner Robert Minor tried to put the best face on things by arguing that repression had depressed attendance, but he had to admit a “very serious weakness lay in the complete absence of representation of Negro farmers.”

Although Fort-Whiteman told the Comintern that the conference signaled the start of “real revolutionary work among Negroes,” it actually exposed the Communists’ weaknesses. Geographically limited to a few large northern cities, small in numbers, unaffiliated with the masses of black workers, and unable to penetrate the South, the ANLC faced insurmountable obstacles. As of January, 1926, only one branch existed, in Chicago, with a membership of fifty. One recruiting success stood out: James Ford, future CPUSA vice-presidential candidate, began his long Communist career at the conference. Fort-Whiteman headed out to recruit comrades to join him. After Fort-Whiteman spoke in Baltimore, the Afro-American concluded, “If this is red propaganda, then for God’s sake let all our leaders supply themselves with a pot and brush and give 12,000,000 colored people in this country a generous coating.” Other African Americans who heard Fort-Whiteman on tour disagreed. According to one, he suffered from an “astral enthusiasm” that would “die aborning.”
The white press reacted as if Lovett Fort-Whiteman was Nat Turner and Vladimir Lenin rolled into one. “The Reddest of the Blacks,” Time magazine called him. Communists were “Bolshevizing the American Negro” and “Boring into Negro Labor.” The boring “appears to be directed by the Communist Internationale in Moscow as part of its world-wide propaganda among backward and ‘oppressed’ colored races.” Lovett Fort-Whiteman’s own motivation, education, and ideology counted for nothing in the white press, where he appeared as a member of a “backward and ‘oppressed’ colored race,” a dog who barked when he heard his Comintern master’s voice. The Literary Digest could not resist laughing at black workers even as they shuddered to think they might turn Communist. A cartoon in the Digest’s pages showed a white man offering a spic-and-span Sambo figure “Bolshevik Pills” and a bucket of red paint. The Sambo-esque workman rejected the offer saying, “Excuse me, Mister Bolshiviki, but ah reckon ah’s goin’ to keep the color the good Lord give me.” For his part, Fort-Whiteman complained that not a single black journal had supported the Congress, but he exaggerated. In Crisis, Du Bois upheld the “right . . . to investigate and sympathize with any industrial reform, whether it springs from Russia, China or the South Seas.”

The ANLC launched The Negro Champion, which took as its motto, “The New Negro Acknowledges No ‘Superior’ Race.” Editor Cyril Briggs and contributing editor Lovett Fort-Whiteman reported on the black side of labor stories, for example, the key role that black workers played in the mostly white textile strike in Passaic, New Jersey in 1926. The Negro Champion’s news seemed to jump off the page; it excited, it exhorted, it encouraged. No wonder “one of the younger fellows on the farm” wrote from Alabama,
“I understand that all of the city young people are in unions and are getting higher wages and are perfectly satisfied with life . . . . how should we go about organizing?”

Ironically, if “one of the younger fellows on the farm” got a glimpse of the world through the Negro Champion, Katayama and the other peasant council Krestintern members decried the fact that they couldn’t get glimpse of the younger fellows on the farm in its pages. Even Fort-Whiteman saw the rural South only in his memories. His lectures remained limited to a few border states, even though he was aware of Katayama’s and the Krestintern’s displeasure with his failure to bring in black southern farmers.

The Conundrum of Race, Class, and Nation

Three ideological issues divided Communists when they thought about organizing African Americans: the direction of the economy, whether black peasants or proletarians should be organized first, and how much black Southerners’ condition resembled that of minorities in the Soviet republics. If one believed that U.S. capitalism was flourishing and the revolution remained far off in the future, it might be prudent to wait for the Great Migration to bring African Americans to the North and organize them there as proletarians. Indeed, they already made up twenty percent of the nation’s industrial workforce. But the economy was collapsing, it made more sense to go at once to the South and organize black sharecroppers even though that would be the tougher task in the short run. The third question involved an analogy to the Soviet Union: did southern black people represent an oppressed group similar to the USSR’s ethnic minorities? If one
believed that African Americans constituted a nation within a nation, then the question became how to give them a democratic voice and cultural autonomy. It might be necessary to plot a second southern secession. Fort-Whiteman’s difficulties at the grassroots reflected and fueled a debate in the halls of the Kremlin.\(^\text{72}\)

In 1927, the Executive Committee of the Comintern (ECCI) expressed its displeasure that Fort-Whiteman “sadly neglected” work among southern farmers. That year, he claimed forty-five ANLC chapters, but none in the South. The two strongest were in Chicago and Harlem, where the ANLC had recently recruited a law student named Malcolm Meredith Nurse. Under the name George Padmore, Nurse would become a famous Communist and then a famous ex-Communist.\(^\text{73}\) But such victories were small. Critics said that the ANLC was not a “real fighting organization,” it was “merely a propaganda club.” There was no “practical plan of building up local councils in the South,” either for “unorganized Negro workers in the new southern industries” or for the “Negro tenant and ‘share’ farmer.”\(^\text{74}\) It might seem that a black man from Dallas, especially a Tuskegee graduate, would have excelled at southern organizing. Perhaps he failed precisely because he \textit{was} a black Communist from Dallas by way of Tuskegee, a man who knew the limits of the possible in his homeland and found them intolerable. Perhaps he saw too clearly the danger of moving in and out of sharecroppers’ shacks, running from a lynch mob, languishing in jail, or, more likely, dying there. The ECCI relieved Fort-Whiteman of his duties in the ANLC.\(^\text{75}\)

Suddenly emancipated from Party work and confused about his failures, Fort-Whiteman sought solace in the summer of 1927 by enrolling in Robert Harry Lowie’s
anthropology class at Columbia University. Lowie, a former student of acclaimed sociologist Franz Boas, taught that race was a variable, unstable concept that obscured individual characteristics rather than illuminated them. Moreover, cultural diffusion—the spread of ideas and practices from one group to another—meant that minority groups did not have distinct, fixed cultures, an argument that countered the Soviet idea of ethnic nationhood. As Boas put it, “a close connection between race and personality has never been established.” As a marker of a distinct people, race simply did not exist.

Fort-Whiteman now reversed his thinking on the best way to produce black Communists. From now on, Communists should not establish separate organizations such as the ANLC, nor should they try to organize southern rural African Americans. Action should proceed on class lines, not racial lines. But as usual, he went overboard. The “Negro,” Fort-Whiteman argued, “has no peculiar role to play as a race in the American proletarian revolution. He holds no strategic place in our industrial system, nor will he attain to such a position on the eve of the revolution.” That did not mean that black people should not be organized, but only alongside white people, according to their class interests. It did mean that Soviets should temper their expectations of southern African American farmers as a revolutionary group-in-waiting.

As he prepared for the upcoming Sixth Congress in Moscow in the early summer of 1928, Fort-Whiteman co-authored a paper entitled “Thesis for a New Negro Policy.” Taking on Sen Katayama, the Krestintern, and most of the Comintern, he argued that it was counterrevolutionary to organize black southern farmers, since white southern farmers would never join them and, therefore, class solidarity among poor rural
Southerners was impossible. Fort-Whiteman’s “Thesis” also bore the signature of Jay Lovestone, the white General Secretary of the Workers Party.\textsuperscript{78}

The preceding year, Lovestone had written a controversial article on the “Great Negro Migration” in which he argued that only continued black migration to the North would bring African Americans into the Communist Party because only then would they share the class perspective of white workers. Then, as the standard of living for African Americans improved in the North, lynchings would decrease, and the South, facing an agricultural labor shortage, would industrialize. Those African Americans who remained in the South would grow more militant since their labor would be in shorter supply, and they would become proletarians in the new factories. It would, therefore, be premature to enter the South now. Soon, as blacks filled northern factories, and later, when they filled southern ones, white workers everywhere would jettison racial prejudice and recognize their shared class interests with African Americans.\textsuperscript{79}

For the time being, Communists did not need to go to the South, since the South, or at least its African Americans, would come to them. The South did not stand as a powder keg awaiting a Red match; rather, the southern problem would wither away.\textsuperscript{80} The explanation comforted Fort-Whiteman. He had wasted his time organizing black workers separately; he should have been organizing black and white workers together.

The Lovestone-Fort-Whiteman position antagonized three powerful ideological groups at home and abroad. First, there were those who supported Lovestone’s competitor and rising party star William Z. Foster. Then there were black Communists who had come into the party through the African Blood Brotherhood. That group, which
embraced a form of black nationalism that the Party tolerated in the 1920s, also believed in the immediacy of the revolution, making them allies of Foster. Third, the Lovestone-Foster breach in the U.S. party mirrored a breach among the Soviets that was partly personal, partly ideological. Having just dispatched Leon Trotsky to internal exile, Joseph Stalin now turned to eliminating Nikolai Bukharin from the chairmanship of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. Bukharin argued that capitalism had gained—not lost—ground in the United States, and Lovestone agreed with him. But in the spring of 1928, Stalin disputed them and decided that the revolution was at hand. Foster supported Stalin.

All of this esoteric thinking carried heavy practical implications. If the revolution remained, say, a decade away, it made sense for Communists to join non-Communist organizations and unions, and gradually to try to persuade other people to join the Party by boring from within. On the other hand, if the economy was going to collapse forthwith, now was the time to establish separate Communist unions and organizations so that revolutionary cadres that would be ready and willing to step in when the time came. Fort-Whiteman knew Bukharin well and, as a Lovestone supporter, settled in his deferred revolution camp at the Sixth Congress in the summer of 1928. The meeting marked “the culmination of the struggle for power and policy which had racked the Soviet Party since Lenin’s death.”

The intricate relationships among those who would organize African Americans alongside whites or in a separate group, who would stay in the urban North or venture into the rural South, who believed in the health of capitalism or its sickness, who
followed Lovestone or Foster, who bet on the Bukharin’s strategies or Stalin’s ruthlessness, all nestled within one another like Russian matrioshka dolls. Fort-Whiteman’s future lay hidden in the innermost void. His position on a seemingly small issue of grassroots politics—the way the Party should go about organizing southern black farmers—thus had resounding implications for individuals, U.S. party factions, and even Soviet history. At the same time, Stalin’s attempt to undercut Bukharin, Foster’s attempt to oust Lovestone, and Moore’s replacement of Fort-Whiteman had resounding implications for the South.\(^{86}\)

**Self-Determination for the Black Belt**

With characteristic valor and habitual indiscretion, Fort-Whiteman walked straight into the tempest of the Sixth Congress with his “Thesis for a New Negro Policy” in hand. He attacked William Z. Foster unfairly for maintaining the old Socialist party prejudice against recruiting African Americans, and blamed him for “the Party’s half-hearted work among Negroes.”\(^{87}\) Black American Harry Haywood wrote a diverging thesis that supported William Z. Foster, one that Stalin would be much more likely to support. He argued that the revolution was imminent and that a swath of black majority areas of the South—the Black Belt—constituted a nation unto itself.\(^{88}\)

Haywood, the son of slaves from Kentucky and Tennessee, had grown up just about as far away as could get from the Black Belt in Omaha and Minneapolis. But he had raised hell through Dixie while traveling with his regiment during World War I, as the black soldiers looted segregated restaurants and punished white insults. If a white
Southerner drawled, “Where you boys going?” the soldiers answered, “Goin’ to see your momma, you cracker-son-of-a-bitch.” Coming from Nebraska, Haywood passed through Dixie as if it was another country. He got away with a lot because he kept moving, but he learned little about southern reality on his way.

Sen Katayama had long supported the idea of African Americans as a separate nation, which meant that they should have geographical, cultural, and some political integrity, but Haywood resisted the theory when he had been a KUTV student. Stalin himself had tried to convince Haywood’s brother, Otto Hall, of the same thing. After graduating from KUTV, Haywood had advanced to the Lenin School, where his Marxist theory teacher was Nikolai “Charlie” Nasanov. Just back from two years in the United States, Nasanov argued that black Southerners were an oppressed nation, Haywood began to listen to him. According to Nasanov, the North had won the Civil War, but the South had won the peace, short-circuited Reconstruction, and incorporated the freed slaves as a separate entity that functioned as a captive source of cheap agricultural labor. Southern African Americans constituted a nation within the United States; as such, they had “the right of self-determination even to separation.”

Nasanov followed Lenin, who had written of “the right of nations to self-determination,” and included black Southerners as “an oppressed nation . . . (e.g., in Ireland, among the American Negroes etc.).” Joseph Stalin had written on the national problem within the USSR, defining a nation as “an historically evolved stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture.” Across the United States, African Americans should have
political rights, but since they met Stalin’s definition of a nation in the Black Belt, they could secede from the United States if it did not accord them their rights.  


Into this Marxist discussion, Haywood blended strains of American composition. He recognized that the idea of self-determination resonated with Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points and that African Americans had deplored Wilson’s failure to apply his international philosophy to his native region, the South. Moreover, he knew of the long history of southern black nationalism that grew from slave cultivation of the land, black Southerners’ disappointment at Reconstruction’s failure to redistribute it, and Pan-African longings. There were newer riffs to play as well. The separatist teachings of Marcus Garvey had attracted many black Americans, to the dismay of the Communists. The idea of black folk culture as a separate genius of the African American people appealed to the white Southerners who misappropriated it and inspired many African Americans in the Harlem Renaissance.  

If Fort-Whiteman’s new thesis wrote off the South, Haywood’s theory of black nationhood made the region a cornerstone of American Communist policy. It would be “the beginning of systematic work in the South.”  

The slogan “self-determination” would encourage black Southerners to confiscate white planters’ land and institute “democratic land redivision.” The argument over race and nation divided brothers Otto Hall and Harry Haywood. Hall called his brother Haywood’s thesis “criminally stupid,” and argued that it “would only serve to drive the Negro masses away.”  

African
Americans, he warned, would see it as self-imposed segregation, sort of “revolutionary Jim Crowism,” or, as one historian later put it, “a red-winged Jim Crow.”

Fort-Whiteman’s and Hall’s theses went to the new thirty-two member Negro Commission, chaired by Stalin faithful Otto Kuusinen. The debate lasted for three days in early August 1928. Haywood and his brother Otto Hall joined James Ford, Sen Katayama, Jay Lovestone, and William Foster. Fort-Whiteman appeared before the general session, but his voice is conspicuously absent from the minutes of the self-determination debate, perhaps demonstrating Foster’s power to exclude him. Haywood argued that rural black Southerners were “the natural allies of the revolutionary proletariat,” and going South constituted “one of . . . [the Comintern’s] principal tasks.” The first thing to do would be to “establish a new district in Birmingham, Alabama . . . and gradually . . . spread to the rural districts.”

The Negro Committee quickly rejected Fort-Whiteman’s argument to wait out the Great Migration, but some were shocked at Haywood’s thesis as well. As they parsed Haywood’s phrase “oppressed nation,” everyone acknowledged the oppression; it was the nation part that confounded them. Otto Hall was far from alone when he argued, “The Negroes in America are not a national minority; our slogan should be full social and political equality.” Many believed, “the whole theoretical basis of the thesis wrong.”

James Ford, from Pratt City, Alabama, wondered out loud if the South could be penetrated. “We have practically no Negro party members,” Ford said, mentioning some fifty black Communists out of 12 million African Americans. Someone else pointed out “the Party has no organizer in the South.”
The policy ultimately incorporated four imperatives. First, the Party would emphasize “Negro work.” Second, this work would have to be done in the South, since most of the black population remained there and industry was moving there. Third, the problem of the black southern population was part of a “general international Negro problem.” Fourth, the delegates approved wording that argued that black Southerners “may” seek self-determination, a controversial idea that some argued would fail to win black Southerners while antagonizing poor white Southerners who might have become Party members.\(^{107}\)

Much drafting and redrafting would follow, but it was at this moment that the Communist line of self-determination for African Americans in the South emerged. Self-determination did not mandate secession; rather, it argued that the black majority in the Black Belt could determine for themselves their political future. The Negro Commission seized the moment to adopt the same theoretical imperative for “an independent native South African republic.” A white South African who sat on the Negro Commission warned that white South African trade unionists would “howl them down” and “bricks would fly” when they advocated such a slogan.\(^{108}\)

A few days later, Otto Hall delivered his own dissenting opinion before the Sixth Congress. “If we consider the American Negro a national minority . . . we should advocate immediately for an independent Negro republic in the United States,” Hall acknowledged, but that would be the wrong move for a number of reasons. First, Hall argued that African Americans were not a nation culturally, and he portrayed the current celebration of folk songs, traditions of slavery, literature, and “so forth, an idealization of
all things black” as “the fabrication of Negro history.” Second, the Negro “does not want separate autonomy,” Hall argued; rather, “He wants social and political equality and this is what we have to fight for.” Third, the self-determination idea would backfire. It wasn’t the black sharecropper but the “southern white worker . . . [who] would welcome this slogan,” the idea of “which he would interpret as a means of segregation.”109 One might dream of a “Negro Soviet Republic,” but now the Negro question was “not what will be done with them after the revolution,” but what it will take to make them revolt in the first place. Social equality, not self-determination, should be the “central slogan around which we can rally the Negro masses.”110

But it was too late to abandon self-determination. Hall’s demurral resulted in an amendment that “‘social equality’ remain the central slogan of our party for work among the masses,” but a countermotion proposed that “to the point of separation and organization of a separate state” be added to the Haywood self-determination policy.111 What the committee had avoided when drafting the line—the possibility that black self-determination might mean secession from the South—now put teeth in their resolution. Both amending motions passed by one vote each, whereupon “Old Man” Katayama closed the proceedings by warning dissidents such as Hall, “it is your duty to carry out the instructions of the Comintern.”112

Despite, or perhaps because of, his forthright opposition to self-determination, African American Otto Hall became one of the Communist shock troops in a Southern invasion.113 The Communists’ first chance to implement the new Negro policy came a few months later, in Gastonia, North Carolina, when Communist-organized textile workers—
ninety-five per cent of them white—struck. In Gastonia, the Communists would touch a southern powder keg with a Red match

For eighteen months after the Gastonia strike, southern organizers let the self-determination line languish. As a black party leader in New York paused in 1931 to evaluate southern work, he could not figure out how southern African Americans would be brought into the Communist Party by organizing white mill workers. What had happened to the policy of self-determination?¹¹⁴

What indeed? For two years following the Sixth World Congress, the effort to explain self-determination took many twists and turns. The idea of a minority as a nation became entwined internationally with anti-colonialist efforts and complicated by an argument against black “nationalism” of the Garvey variety.¹¹⁵ Although the line was not working out in the South, it was the argument over self-determination at the Sixth World Congress that had first made the “Negro Question” important to the CPUSA. It had brought them into the South standing firm on racial equality and propelled African Americans to national and international party offices. For example, the Red International of Labor Unions World Conference in the summer of 1930 required that one-third of the American delegates be “black proletarians.”¹¹⁶

In August 1930, the Comintern’s Negro Commission reaffirmed self-determination of the Black Belt, including the right to secede, as the line to be used in the U. S. South.¹¹⁷ Harry Haywood criticized those southern organizers who neglected the line and accused them of a “deep lack of faith in the Negro masses.”¹¹⁸ In February, 1931, the Comintern ordered all U.S. Communists to get behind the idea, whether they liked it
or not. To Comintern leaders, the “struggle for the right of self-determination” was now an article of faith. They believed that a zeal for self-determination must be inherent in southern Negro toilers. Self-determination was a bonfire that the masses had built, and it simply awaited an organizer’s match. If it wasn’t catching fire, it was because the organizers had failed to strike that match. Self-determination went from being an idea, to being a line, to being an immutable truth ignored at one’s peril.

For the most part, those trying to organize grass roots party members didn’t like the self-determination line. It was ambiguous at best and segregationist at worst. Field organizers explained self-determination most easily as majority rule, which it was in part, and they rarely ventured into long discussions upholding the right of secession. That was grist for the mills of their enemies, who probably brought up self-determination more often then did the southern Communist organizers. One prominent white Southerner who had read up on the issue thought self-determination proved that the Communists could not be serious about organizing poor whites at all; they simply wanted to organize “the negroes [sic] under European direction.” An African American organizer in District 16 warned, “if we raise the slogan of self-determination we will be driven under ground.” Otto Hall put it more gently, “we have neglected to put this slogan forward and really clarify this slogan.” Although he had opposed it in Moscow, after Gastonia he argued, as he had to, that it would be a good tool to “utilize this national spirit that exists among Negro peasantry.”

The Comintern ignored the facts of southern landownership after adopting self-determination. They imagined Dixie as a land in which white large landowners...
held African Americans as serfs, even though they collected troves of census and economic data about the South. The messy reality of southern farming negated their fantasy. Among the rural poor, many white farmers rented some of their land to black and/or white tenant farmers or had black and/or white sharecroppers on the place who owned no land; some blacks owned some land, but it might not be enough to support their families, so they were tenants on a little more; some poor white farmers owned no land and sharecropped or rented land themselves; some poor white farmers tended their land without any help from black sharecroppers or tenants. Although he professed to support the line, Birmingham organizer Tom Johnson urged the Politburo, “we have to decide whose land is to be confiscated, and to whom does it go. . . . if you come in [here] . . . with a demand for confiscation of land, these fellows who are starving on their 40 acres, and renting the other half to their brother, will lynch you.” He tactfully suggested sparing these southern Kulaks and asked the Politburo to “frame our demand as the confiscation of the land of the big landowners.” Southern small farming, tenancy, and sharecropping proved too complicated for self-determination, and many organizers ignored it, even as they stood up against racism and for social equality.123

If Lovett Fort-Whiteman had been proven right by the failure of the self-determination line, he didn’t much care anymore. After 1928, he had stayed in Moscow.124 Turning the title of Claude McKay’s *Home to Harlem* upside down, Fort-Whiteman grew fond of saying that he went “home to Moscow.”125 He felt free there, whole there. As he had so often in the past, again he judged the risky path safe enough.
In 1939, Fort-Whiteman died in the Gulag.
Note to Agrarian Studies: I’m afraid that you will have to consult the bibliography of *Defying Dixie* for abbreviations of collections, publications, and full titles of secondary literature. That bibliography is too long to include here. Citations that look like this: 495/261/1746, RGASPI, refer to the location of material in the Anglo-American Secretariat of the Communist International, Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, Moscow. MRSK is the Mark Solomon and Robert Kaufman Research Files on African Americans and Communism in the Tamiment Library at NYU. I’ll bring the bibliography to our meeting so that you can track down any citation that eludes you in this shortened form.

1 Best overviews of black Communists include Solomon, Cry Was Unity; Naison, Communists in Harlem; E. Hutchinson, Blacks and Reds; Record, Negro and the Communist Party; H. Williams, Black Response; Kelley, “‘Afric’s Sons’”; James, Holding Aloft. On Fort-Whiteman at the KUTV, see “Central Executive Committee,” Oct. 13, 1928, LFWD, 495/261/1476, RGASPI; “Lovett Fort Whiteman,” 22. On Tuskegee, see B. T. Washington, ed., Tuskegee; Norrell, Reaping the Whirlwind, 1-30.

2 Claude McKay, “Soviet Russia,” [January], 114, found Russians “curious with me . . . in a friendly refreshing manner.” On black Muscovites, see Haywood, Black Bolshevik, 167-9; Du Bois, “Russia, 1926,” 8; Blakely, Russia and the Negro, esp. 81-104.


4 R. Robinson, Black on Red, 68; Haywood, Black Bolshevik, 170-71; Glazer, Social Basis, 171.

5 Brandenberger, National Bolshevism.

6 Naison, Communists in Harlem, 18-19; “Russia in 1924”; C. J. Robinson, Black Marxism.
7 “Draft Manifesto,” 495/155/4, RGASPI; Solomon, Cry Was Unity, 40-41; Maxwell, New Negro, 90.

8 Haywood, Black Bolshevik, 186; Khanga, Soul to Soul.

9 For pawns of Moscow, see Record, Negro and the Communist Party, 105-6; Glazer, Social Basis, 173-4; Klehr, Communist Cadre, 54; Sworakowski, Communist International, 8.


12 Executive Secretary, June 2, 1924, 38, LFWP; Degras, ed., Communist International, 1:117; Fifth Congress, 196, 198, 200-201.

13 Fifth Congress, 200-201; Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, 329-30; Solomon, Cry Was Unity, 46-8; Berland, “Emergence of the Communist Perspective, Part One,” 427-8.


15 To the Central Executive Committee, Oct. 13, 1928, and July 2, 1924, delegate list, LFWP; Foner and Allen, American Communism and Black Americans, 41; Degras, Communist International, 2:94. After Fort-Whiteman attended, it was renamed Stalin Communist University of Toilers of the East, Universitet Trudyashchysya Vostoka Imeni Stalin.

16 Fort-Whiteman, “Racial Question,” 495/155/18, 95-7, RGASPI; Pipes, Russia, 362-7.

17 Fort-Whiteman, “Racial Question,” 495/155/18, 95-7, RGASPI; Hughes, I Wonder, 172; Khanga, Soul to Soul, 81, and photographs following p. 128.


20 Fort-Whiteman, “Negro and American Race Prejudice,” DW, Feb. 9, 1924, quoted in Foner and Allen, American Communists and Black Americans, 42.


23 Claude McKay’s description of Katayama, Long Way from Home, 164. See also photographs in Cehatopob, Sen Katayama, and Sen Katayama, photographs #162, #198, #199, r7, RPS/YU.


25 Kublin, Asian Revolutionary, 240, 243, 248; Solomon, Cry Was Unity, 11; [Hermie Huiswoud], “Re: Otto Eduard Huiswoud,” b20, Office M.I.B., to Director, MID, Nov. 20, 1918, “Bolshevik Activities,” Nov. 19, 1918, Harvey W. Miller to The Director, MID, Mar. 23, 1921, all in f Communist Party-Gestation, b1, MSRK.

26 Katayama, International Press Correspondence, Aug. 13, 1928, in Foner and Allen, American Communism and Black Americans.

27 Haywood, Black Bolshevik, 656 n. 5.

28 McKay, “Soviet Russia,” 64; McKay, Long Way from Home, 165.


31 White Tulsans accused the ABB of starting the rioting, something that Briggs and the Commander of the Tulsa ABB vehemently denied. “Tulsa Riot,” 1173; “Denies Negroes Started Tulsa Riot,” NYT, June 5, 1921, 21. A white New Yorker was arrested a few days later with printed appeals for victims of “The Tulsa Massacre,” signed by the CP, “Communists Champion
Negro,” 1212.

32 Sen Katayama, “Action for the Negro Movement,” May 22, 1923, and “Negro Race as a Factor,” July 14, 1923, both in 495/155/17, RGASPI.

33 Notes on Interview with W. A. Domingo, f3, b21, TDRF; Haywood, Black Bolshevik, 166; Khanga, Soul to Soul, 50; Garb, They Came to Stay, 36-40; Solomon, Cry Was Unity, 51.

34 E. Hutchinson, Blacks and Reds, 21-2; Khanga, Soul to Soul, 47.

35 Khanga, Soul to Soul, 41, 46-51; “International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers,” in Foner and Allen, American Communism and Black Americanism, 151; Berry, introduction, 13.

36 Khanga, Soul to Soul, 47-9; “Communists Boring,” NYT, Jan. 17, 1926, E1; “Black and Red,” Time 6 (Nov. 9, 1925): 8; Haywood, Black Bolshevik, 160-68.


39 H. Smith, Black Man in Red Russia, 64; Khanga, Soul to Soul, 71-80.


41 List and explanation are from Haywood, noting that Japan was not a colonial country. Haywood, Black Bolshevik, 155-7, 164; Berland, “Emergence of the Communist Perspective, Part Two,” 197.


Negro Section,” January 8, 1930, 495/155/83, all in RGASPI.

44 “Meeting of the Negro Section,” January 8, 1930, 495/155/83, RGASPI; W. L. Patterson, Man Who Cried Genocide, 102-6; Solomon, Cry Was Unity, 89-91; “International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers,” July 3, 1936, 495/14/36, 19-27, and “International Trade Union Negro Committee,” Aug. 19, 1935, 495/14/60, both in RGASPI. George Padmore also signed, Hooker, Black Revolutionary, 4-6, 14-15.


50 Agenda for Fort-Whiteman, [Feb. 1925], f Negro 1924-5, b12, RM; James Jackson [LFW] to John Pepper, n.d. [spring 1924], 495/155/102, RGASPI. John Pepper was Joseph Pogany, a Hungarian Communist. Whitney, Reds in America, following p. 44.

51 Letterhead, Jackson [LFW] to John Pepper, n.d. [spring 1924], 495/155/102, RGASPI. Otto Hall is listed on the “Provisional” committee letterhead, but he left for KUTV and Harry Haywood served with organizers Howell V. Phillips, Edward L. Doty, and Otto Huiswoud. Haywood, Black Bolshevik, 143.

52 Quot. in Haywood, Black Bolshevik, 144-5, description 142-7; Poster, Metropolitan Community Center, 3118 Giles Ave,
with a dance at Vincennes Hall, 36th and Vincennes Ave.; “Grand Opening,” f Negro 1924-5, b12, RM; “‘Reds’ in Chicago,” AA, Oct. 31, 1925, 1; Record, Race and Radicalism, 33-4; Solomon, Cry Was Unity, 67; E. Hutchinson, Blacks and Reds, 29-42; J. W. Ford, Negro and the Democratic Front, 81-3; Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, 331-2.


56 “Extract from Decision of the Organizational Bureau of the ECCI on September 14, 1925 on the A.N.L.C.,” 495/155/87, RGASPI.

57 “Committees,” List of delegates, 495/155/33, RGASPI; ANLC press release, Oct. 1925, f ANLC, b3, MSRK.


59 Fort-Whiteman, “Statement,” 495/155/34, RGASPI.

60 Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, 331-2.


62 “Fort-Whiteman” and “Fort-Whiteman Is He a ‘Red?’ ” both in AA, Mar. 13, 1926, 13.


65 “Plot to Make Our Blacks Red.”

Communism and Black Americans, 113.


70 Perhaps “Dolson,” Alabama, was Dothan, and perhaps Thomas Lane was a figment of Fort-Whiteman’s imagination.

Thomas Lane to the editor, NC, June 1926, 3.

71 Fort-Whiteman to Robert Minor, Aug. 6, 1925, 495/155/27, RGASPI.


73 Entz, “American Negro Labor Conference,” 55. Hutchinson quotes these figures, substantiated only by Fort-Whiteman’s claims. E. Hutchinson, Blacks and Reds, 35; Solomon, Cry Was Unity, 56-7.

74 “Directions for the Party Fraction,” 495/155/39, RGASPI.


76 “Robert Harry Lowie,” www.anthrobase.com; “Robert Harry Lowie,” www.mnsu.edu/museum/information/biography, accessed on May 31, 2004; Murphy, Lowie, 5, 11-14; Lowie, Are We Civilized? chap. 4; Fort-Whiteman to Franz Boas, Nov. 7, 1927, and Boas to Fort-Whiteman, Nov. 9. 1927, both in ser. 1, box Fischer E. to Frachtenberg, L., FB.


78 “Thesis for a New Negro Policy,” May 28, 1928, 495/155/64, 2, RGASPI; Solomon, Cry Was Unity, 64, 331 n. 36. Black
Communist Howell Phillips also signed, but Patterson later disavowed this position.

79 Lovestone, “Great Negro Migration,” 182-4; Berland, “Emergence of the Communist Perspective, Part One,” 427-8; R. J. Alexander, Right Opposition, esp. intro. and chap. 1; Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, 248-314; Cannon, First Ten Years, 138-89, 201-4.

80 Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, 341.

81 Barrett, Foster, 155-6; Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, 268-99; R. J. Alexander, Right Opposition, 15-27; Harrison George, “Basis of the Right Danger,” 534/7/489, 46-9, RGASPI.

82 T. Morgan, Covert Life, 69-74.

83 Solomon, Cry Was Unity, 63-7; Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, 267, 300-14; Jay Lovestone, “Party’s Shortcomings,” DW, Sept. 22, 1927, 4; R. J. Alexander, Right Opposition, 13-28; Commission of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. (B.), History of the Communist Party, 293-5.

84 H. Smith, Black Man in Red Russia, 81; Gitlow, Whole of Their Lives, 154-7.

85 Berland, “Emergence of the Communist Perspective, Part Two,” 196. American Party Representative to the E.C.C.I., June 18, 1928, and American Party Representative to the Militia, Nov. 22, 1928, 29, 37, LFWP.

86 Naison, Communists in Harlem, 30 n. 69; Record, Negro and the Communist Party, 54-69.

87 Foster, Great Steel Strike, 205; Berland, “Emergence of the Communist Perspective, Part One,” 429. Undated, unsigned note in Lovett Fort-Whiteman’s (beautiful) handwriting, 495/155/43, RGASPI. On Foster, see Barrett, Foster.


89 Haywood, Black Bolshevik, 45-53.

90 Haywood recounts that Katayama introduced the black KUTV students to Lenin’s writings on the South; Black Bolshevik, 218, 656 n. 5. Quotation from verbatim account of the debate, “Minutes of the Negro Commission,” Aug. 2, 1928, 495/155/56, RGASPI; Katayama, International Press Correspondence, Oct. 30, 1928, 1392-3, quoted in Foner and Allen, American Communism and Black Americans, 188; Solomon, Cry Was Unity, 40; Agrarian program, reprinted in Whitney, Reds in
91 Stalin, Marxism and the National Question, 182-92; Stalin, quoted in Foster, Negro People, 464; Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, 334; Haywood, Black Bolshevik, 134-5; Klehr and Tompson, “Self-Determination,” 358.

92 Nasanov was the YCI representative to the U.S. from 1924 to 1926, Joseph Z. Kornfeder to Theodore Draper, Apr. 18, 1958, and Sam Darcy to Mark Solomon, June 27, 1974, both in f Communist Party-Gestation, b1, MSRK. Haywood, Black Bolshevik, 218-27; Berland, “Nasanov”; Solomon, Cry Was Unity, 70-71, 332 n. 3; J. M. Turner, Caribbean Crusaders, 156.

93 “Minutes of the Negro Commission,” n.d., 495/155/30, RGASPI.


95 Stalin, quoted in Foster, Negro People, 463-4; Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, 321, 349; Stalin, Marxism and the National Question,” 182-92; Agarwal, Soviet Nationalities Policy; Roucek, “Soviet Treatment of Minorities”; Conner, National Question; H. B. Davis, Toward a Marxist Theory.


97 The transcript proves more black involvement than indicated by Klehr and Tompson, “Self-Determination,” 354-66, or Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, 344. See also Theodore Draper to Dear Jim, Feb. 21, 1958, f2, b21, TDRF. Berland notes the influence of the Far East policy at KUTV, Berland, “Emergence of the Communist Perspective, Part One,” and refutes Draper in “Part Two,” 212-3. Solomon notes that Draper argued that Stalin had imposed self-determination, but proved “the opposite,” Solomon, Cry Was Unity, 335 n. 48. J. M. Turner, Caribbean Crusaders, 157-61.

98 Haywood, Black Bolshevik, 218; quot. from “Minutes of the Negro Commission,” Aug. 2, 1928, 495/155/56, RGASPI;
Solomon, Cry Was Unity, 68-91.

99 “Report to the Polcom,” Feb. 4, 1930, f515, r41, d2024, 3, CPUSA.

B1/CJ, “Comrade Jones report,” “Is there a Basis for a Nationalist or Separatist Movement in the United States?” June 14, 1928 (routed to Nasanov), 495/155/56, 8, RGASPI. Darcy opposed it as well, Sam Darcy to Mark Solomon, June 2, 1974, f
Correspondence, b1, MSRK. Record, Race and Radicalism, 57; Berland, “Emergence of the Communist Perspective, Part Two,” 197-8.


102 The following people (in addition to those in the text) attended at least one of three sessions: Roy Mahoney and Howell V. Phillips, both African Americans; white Americans included Sam Darcy, Bertram D. Wolfe [Manuel Gomez], J. Louis Engdahl, ILD leader, William Dunne, labor organizer, Alexander Bittleman, William F. Kruse and Clarence Hathaway, Lenin School students, Herbert Zam, YWL, James Cannon, Jay Lovestone, Carl Reeves; also attending were “Petrovsky” [Dr. Max Goldfarb], “who had lived in the U.S.” and was vice-chairman and secretary of the Anglo-American Secretariat, John Pepper, a Hungarian-born self-styled “expert” on the “Negro problem” who lived in the U.S., Harry M. Wicks, who had worked in Australia, “Charlie” Nasanov, and “Zack and Skripnik,” whom I cannot identify. All identifications using Solomon, Cry Was Unity, Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, and RGASPI documents.

103 Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, 347-53; Lovett Fort-Whiteman, International Press Correspondence, July 25, 1928, 708; Ford, International Press Correspondence, Oct. 25, 1928, 1345-7. Solomon writes that Fort-Whiteman was
“present but did not participate in the discussion of the national question,” but I did not find evidence of his attendance, Cry
Was Unity, 69. RTxKhIDNI is now RGASPI.

104 “Tasks of the American Communist Party,” Aug. 2, 1928, 495/155/56, RGASPI.

105 “Minutes of the Negro Commission,” Aug. 2, 1928, and “John Pepper,” both in 495/155/56, RGASPI.


107 Best summary is Berland, “Emergence of the Communist Perspective, Part Two,” 214 n. 16.

108 Johns, Raising the Red Flag, 219-29, quot. 224, 222; “Minutes of the Negro Commission,” Aug. 4, 1928, 495/155/43, RGASPI; “Communists Are for a Black Republic!” DW, Nov. 12, 1928, 6; Haywood, Black Bolshevik, 235-40;


110 Debate of Aug. 18, 1928, Jones, International Press Correspondence, Oct. 30, 1928, 1392-3; Solomon, Cry Was Unity, 80.

111 “Minutes of the Negro Commission,” Aug. 11, 1928, 495/155/43, RGASPI. On amendments and drafts, see Solomon, Cry Was Unity, 77-81; “Communist International Resolution on the Negro Question in the U.S.,” in Foner and Allen, American Communism and Black Americans, 189-98.


113 “Workers Party Will Invade the South,” AA, Nov. 10, 1928, 11.

114 “Negro Department Meeting,” Sept. 10, 1929, f515, r130, d1685, 36, and “National Negro Department,” Nov. 22, 1929, f515, r130, d1685, 42, both in CPUSA.


116 Beal, Proletarian Journey, 247; Solomon, Cry Was Unity, 85-9.

117 Solomon, Cry Was Unity, 84.


120 W. W. Ball to W. J. Thackston, Oct. 15, 1929, b19, WWB.

121 Sol Harper to Dear Comrades, 1929, f515, r155, d2024, 16, CPUSA.

122 “Communist Party Organization Conference,” Mar. 31-Apr. 4, 1930, 7, f19, b6, TDRF.


125 Maxwell, New Negro, Old Left, uses the term “Home to Moscow,” 63-93. Solomon, Cry Was Unity, 96; H. Smith, Black Man in Red Russia, 77; American Party Representative to the ECCI, Oct. 4, 1928, and American Party Representative to the ECCI, Oct. 14, 1928, 35, 36, both in LFWP.